UIdaho Law

Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Not Reported

Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs

4-7-2018

State v. Salinas Clerk's Record v. 1 Dckt. 46183

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported

Recommended Citation
"State v. Salinas Clerk's Record v. 1 Dckt. 46183" (2018). Not Reported. 5586.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported/5586

This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by the Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs at
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Not Reported by an authorized administrator
of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please contact annablaine@uidaho.edu.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Victor Rodger Bliss
vs.
Minidoka Irrigation District

Supreme Court Case No. 46183-2018

CLERK’S RECORD ON APPEAL

Appeal from the District Court of the Fifth Judicial District,
in and for the County of Minidoka

HONORABLE JOHN K. BUTLER

Jonathan Grover

Sam L Angell

Attorney of Record

Attorney of Record

Attorney for Appellant

Attorney for Respondent

jgrover@egb-law.com

sla@hasattorneys.com

Page 1

MINIDOKA COUNTY DISTRICT COURT

CASE SUMMARY
CASE NO. CV-2017-334
§
§
§
§
§

Victor Rodger Bliss

vs.
Minidoka Irrigation District

Location: Minidoka County District
Court
Judicial Officer: Butler, John K.
Filed on: 04/17/2017
Case Number History:
Appellate Case Number: 46183-2018

CASE INFORMATION

Bonds
CasbBond
9/17/2018
Counts: 1

AA- All Initial District Court
Case Type: Filings (Not E, F, and HI)

$71.00
Posted

Case 09/14/2018 Appealed Case Status: Supreme Court Appeal

D..\TE

CASE ASSIGNMENT

Current Case Assignment
Case Number
Court
Date Assigned
Judicial Officer

CV-2017-334
Minidoka County District Court
06/27/2018
Butler, John K.

PART\' INFORMATION

Lead Attorneys
Grover, Jonathan R.

Bliss, Victor Rodger

Plaintiff

Retained
435-740-SS0O(W)

Angell, Sam L
Retained
208-522-3003(W)

Minidoka Irrigation District

Defendant

EVENTS

DATE

L~DEX

& ORDERS OF THE Conn

04/17/2017

New Case Filed Other Claims
New Case Filed - Other Claims

04/17/2017

Appearance through Attorney
Plaintiff: Bliss, Victor Rodger Appearance Through Attorney JonaJhan R Grover

04/17/2017

Miscellaneous
Filing: AA- All initial civil case filings in District Court ofarry type not listed in categories E,
F and H(I) Paid by: Evans, Grover & Heins, P.C. Receipt number: 0002010 Dated: 41/7/2017
Amount: $221.00 (Check) For: Bliss, Victor Rodger (plaintiff)

04/17/2017

04/17/2017

•

Complaint Filed
Complaint

Summons Issued
Summons: Summons Issued on 4117/2017 to Minidoka l"igation District; Assigned to. Service
Fee o/$0.00. issued to plaintiffs counsel for Service

04/17/2017

Summons
Party: Defendant Minidoka Irrigation District
issued to plaintiff's counsel for Service-served 5-3-2017@3:06 P.M

04/17/2017

Summons
Minidoka Irrigation District
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MINIDOKA COUNTY DISTRICT COURT

CASE SUMMARY
CASE No. CV-2017-334
Served: 05/04/2017
issued to plaintiffs counsel for Service-served 5-3-2017@3:06 P.M.
04/26/2017

'II Disqualification of Judge - Self
Order to Disqualify

04/26/2017

'110rder
Order ofAssignment by Administrative District Judge

05/04/2017

'Ill Summons Returned
Summons: Summons Returned-Persona/ Return ofService-served 5-3-2017@3:06 pm by G.
Severe

05/22/2017

Miscellaneous
Filing: II - Initial Appearance by persons other than the plaintiff or petitioner Paid by: Hall
Angell & Associates Receipt number: 0002760 Dated: 5/2212017 Amount: $136. 00 (Check)
For: Minidoka I"igation District (defendant)

05/22/2017

IJIAnswer
Answer to Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial and Counterclaim

05/22/2017

Hearing Scheduled
Hearing Scheduled (Status 07124/20/ 7 01 :30 PM) telephonic status-plaintiffs counsel to
initiate

05/22/2017

Appearance through Attorney
Defendant: Minidoka Irrigation District Appearance Through Attorney Blake G. Hall

05/22/2017

II Notice of Hearing

05/25/2017

'l!Answer
Amended

05/31/2017

'IIAnswer
to Counterclaim

07/24/2017

Hearing Scheduled
Hearing Scheduled (Pretrial Conference 05/14/20/8 01:30 PM) tee-initiated by Mr. Allen's
office

07/24/2017

Hearing Scheduled
Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 06106/2018 09:00 AM) 3 day jury trial

07/24/2017

'l!Order
Scheduling Order, Notice of Trial Setting and Initial Pretrial Order

07/24/2017

07/24/2017
07/24/2017

Status Conference (1:30 PM) (Judicial Officer: Butler, John K.)
telephonic status--plaintiff's cour,se/ to initiate Hearing result for Status scheduled on
07/24120/7 01:30 PM: District Court Hearing held
Court Reporter: Denise Scholder
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing estimated: less than 100 pages telephonic statusplaintiff's counsel to initiate

'II Court Minutes
DC Hearing Held: Court Reporter: # of Pages:
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MINIDOKA COUNTY DISTRICT COURT

CASE SUMMARY
CASE No. CV-2017-334
Denise &hloder
less than 100 pages

07/24/2017

'II Notice of Hearing
Notice Of Hearing -pretrial and jury trial

08/14/2017

II Order of Assignment - Administrative
(signed by R Bevan)

08/14/2017

Change Assigned Judge

08/14/2017

Notice
ofService

09/21/2017

Certificate of Mailing
Certificate OfService of Plaintiff's Response to Defendant's First Set oflnte"ogatories and
Requests for Production of Documents

10/16/2017

10/19/2017

11Notice
of Deposition Duces Tecum of Victor Rodger BJ-iss

'II Notice of Hearing
amended

10/27/2017

'II Notice of Hearing
second amended

02/07/2018

II Notice of Service of Discovery Requests

02/15/2018

'II Notice of Taking Deposition
of Dan Davidson

02/15/2018

'II Notice of Talcing Deposition
ofRuth Bailes

02/15/2018

•

Notice of Taking Deposition
of Frank Hunt

02/15/2018

'II Notice of Taking Deposition
of David Warr

02/15/2018

'II Notice of Taking Deposition
of Dan Davidson

03/06/2018

11 Affidavit
of Blake Hall

03/06/2018

II Affidavit
ofRuth Bailes

03/06/2018

'II Affidavit
ofDan Davidson

PAGE3 OF 8
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MINmoKA COUNTY DISTRICT COURT

CASE SUMMARY
CASE No. CV-2017-334
03/06/2018

.Affidavit
ofFrank Hunt

03/06/2018

'II Motion for Summary Judgment

03/06/2018

'Iii Affidavit
Affidavit of Vance Johnson

03/06/2018

II Notice of Hearing
Notice of Hearing

03/06/2018

II Memorandum In Support of Motion
Memorandum in Support ofMotion for Summary Judgment

03/14/2018

II Notice of Service

04/05/2018

II Witness Disclosure
Defendant's Witness Disclosure

04/06/2018

'II Witness Disclosure
Plaintiff's Witness Disclosure

04/07/2018

II Memorandum
Memorandum In Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment

04/07/2018

'II Exhibit
Exhibits 1 to 4 to Memorandum in Opposition to Summary Judgment

04/07/2018

II Exhibit
Exhibits 5 to 20 for Memorandum Opp Summary Judgment

04/09/2018

Iii Exhibit
Exhibit 15 to Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment

04/11/2018

'II Motion
Motion to Modify Scheduling Order, to Continue Trial Date and Extend Expert Disclosure and
All Other Timelines (Oral Argument Requested)

04/11/2018

I

'II Memorandum In Support of Motion
Plaintiff's Memorandum in Support of Motion to Modify Scheduling Order, to Continue Trial
Date and Extend &pert Disclosure and All Other Time/ines

04/11/2018

II Affidavit

Affidavit ofJonathan R. Grover in Support of Motion to Modify Scheduling Order, to Continue
Trial Date and Extend Expert Disclosure and All Other Timelines

04/11/2018

•

04/16/2018

'fl Opposition to

Notice of Hearing
Revised Notice ofHearing on Motion to Modify Scheduling Order, to Continue Trial Date and
Extend Expert Disclosure and All Other Time/ines

Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion to Modify Scheduling Order
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MINIDOKA COUNTY DISTRICT COURT

CASE SUMMARY
CASE No. CV-2017-334
04/16/2018

. . Memorandum In Support of Motion
Reply

04/16/2018

'II Notice of Hearing

04/16/2018

'II Motion
in Limine

04/16/2018

'II Memorandum In Support of Motion
Memorandum in Support ofMotion in Limine

04/23/2018

04/23/2018

. . Motion for Summary Judgment (9: 10 AM) (Judicial Officer: Tribe, Michael
P ;Locatioo: District Courtroom I)

II Court Minutes
Court Reporter: Patty Hubbell

04/27/2018

1111 Memorandum
Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion in Limine to Exclude Expert and
Lay Witnesses

05/02/2018

•

Memorandum
Plaintiffs Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion to Modify Scheduling Order, to Continue
Trial Date and Extend Expert Disclosure and All Other Time/ines

05/03/2018

'II Memorandum In Support of Motion
Defendant's Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion in Limine

05/07/2018

'II

Motion to Modify (9:00 AM) (Judicial Officer: Tribe, Michael
P ;Location: District Courtroom I)
Plaintiff Victor Bliss Motion to Modify Scheduling Order and Continue Trial date and extend
expert disclosure and all other timelines. (Oral Argument Requested)
Will also Hear Defendant Motion to Exclude Expert and lay Witnesses

05/07/2018
05/07/2018

DC Hearing Held: Court Reporter:# of Pages:

'II Court Minutes
court reporter: Patty Hubbell

05/07/2018

WNotice of Hearing

05/10/2018

'II Lener
from M&M Court Reporting Service. Transcripts of Ruth E. Stansbury Bailes, Frank Nelson
Hunt, David Warr.

05/10/2018

'II Letter
from M&M Court Reporting Service. Transcript ofDanny John Davidson.

05/10/2018

II Letter
fromM&M Court Reporting Service.fro Wes Goff.

05/15/2018

PAGES OF 8

Page 6

Prmtedon 12/03/20/8 at 12:00PM

MINIDOKA COUNTY DISfRICT COURT

CASE SUMMARY
CASE No. CV-2017-334

II Letter
from Defendant's Council

05/15/2018

. . Memorandum
Plaintiffs Pretrial Memorandum

05/18/2018

.Order
Modifying Scheduling Order, to cntinue Trial date, and to extend &pert Disclosure and
Deadlines

05/21/2018

Q Scheduling Conference (9:00 AM) (Judicial Officer: Tribe, Michael P)
Hearing will l,e telephonic. Plaintiff's council will initate call to Defendant's council then call
court.

05/21/2018

DC Hearing Held: Court Reporter:# of Pages:

05/21/2018

11 Court Minutes

05/22/2018

. . Notice of Hearing

06/06/2018

CANCELED Jury Trial (9:00 AM) (Judicial Officer: Butler, John K.)
Vacated
3 day jury trial

06/07/2018

CANCELED Jury Trial (9:00 AM) (Judicial Officer: Tribe, Michael
P ;Location: District Courtroom 1)
Vacated

06/12/2018

. . Notice of Hearing

06/18/2018

Q Status Conference (9:45 AM) (Judicial Officer: Tribe, Michael
P ;Location: District Courtroom 1)

06/18/2018

DC Hearing Held: Court Reporter: # of Pages:
Court Reporter:Patty Hubbell

06/18/2018

II Court Minutes

06/25/2018

'II Request
for Reassignment ofCase

06/27/2018

'IIOrder
to Disqualify

06/27/2018

'ti order
by Assignment by Administrative Judge Signed by Erick Wildman

07/09/2018

'l!lorder
Re: Motion for Summary Judgment Under Advisement. Signed by new Judge John K Bult/er

07/12/2018
08/06/2018

Case Taken Under Advisement

111 Memorandum
PAGE 60F 8
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MINIDOKA COUNTY DISTRICT COURT

CASE SUMMARY
CASE No. CV-2017-334
decision re: motion for summary judgment
08/06/2018

'II Judgment

08/06/2018

Final Judgment (Judicial Officer: Butler, John K.)
CommentO
Party (Minidoka Irrigation District; Bliss, Victor Rodger)
Monetary/Property Award
lo Favor Of: Minidoka Irrigation District; Bliss, Victor Rodger
Against: Minidoka Irrigation District; Bliss, Victor Rodger
Entered Date: 08/0612018
Current Judgment Status:
Status: Active
Status Date: 08/07/2018
Comment: I) Judgment on Plaintiffs complaint in favor ofDefendan~
MID and against Plaintiff Victor Bliss and Plaintiffs complaint is hereby
dismissed. 2) On the Defendant's counterclaim in favor of the counterdefendant Victor Bliss and against counterclaiman~ MID as to Count I and
the counterclaim is dismissed as to Count I. 3) as to Count II of the
Defendant's counterclaim for Declaratory relief, the counterclaim is
dismissed and the issue of the removal of the encroachment is remanded to
MID for further proceedings in accordance with J.C. 42-1209.

08/0712018

Civil Disposition Entered

08/14/2018

S Memorandum of Costs & Attorney Fees
Memorandum ofCosts and Attorney Fees

08/1412018

.Affidavit
Affidavit of Costs and Fees

08/28/2018

•

Opposition to
Plaintiff's Objection to Defendant's Memorandum ofCosts and Attorney Fees and Motion to
Disallow Part or All ofthe Costs and Attorney Fees (Oral Argument Requested)

08/2812018

S Memorandum lo Support of Motion
Plaintiffs Memorandum in Support of Objection to Defendant's Memorandum ofCosts and
Attorney Fees and Motion to Disallow Part or All ofthe Costs and Attorney Fees (Oral
Argument Requested)

08/28/2018

II Affidavit
Affidavit ofJonathan R Grover in Support of Motion to Disalluw Part or All ofthe Costs and
Attorney Fees

08/28/2018

'II Notice of Hearing
Notice ofHearing on Motion to Disallow Part or All ofthe Costs and Attorney Fees

09/1412018

'l!I Notice of Appeal

10/0112018

9

Memorandum

Memorandum in Opposition

10/04/2018

'II Reporter's Notice ofTranscript(s) Lodged

10/04/2018

'II Transcript Lodged
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MINIDOKA COUNTY DISTRICT COURT

CASE SUMMARY
CASE No. CV-2017-334
10/09/2018

II Memorandum
Plaintiff's Reply Memorandum in Support of Objection to Defendant's Memorandum of Costs
and Attorney Fees and Motion to Disallow Port or All ofthe Costs and Attorney Fees (Oral
Argument Requested)

10/12/2018
10/15/2018

Case Summary

'II Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs (I :30 PM) (Judicial Officer: Butler, John K.)
and Objection to attorney fees and costs
(to be heard in Jerome Caunty by TCC)

10/15/2018

'II Court Minutes

10/17/2018

II Decision or Opinion
and order re: attorney fees and costs

10/17/2018
01/07/2019

02/05/2019

'II Amended Judgment
CANCELED Pre Trial (9:00 AM) (Judicial Officer: Tribe, Michael P)
Vacated
Plaintiff may contact Defendam's council and initiate call then call court.
. . CANCELED Jury Trial (9:00 AM) (Judicial Officer: Tribe, Michael P)
Vacated
FI~ANCIAL INFORMATION

Defendant Minidoka Irrigation District
Total Charges
Total Payments and Credits
Balance Due as of 12/3/2018

136.00
136.00

Plaintiff Bliss, Victor Rodger
Total Charges
Total Payments and Credits
Balance Due as of 12/3/2018

350.00
350.00

0.00

0.00

Plaintiff Bliss, Victor Rodger
Civil Cash Bond Accouot Type Balance as of 12/3/2018

PAGE 80F 8
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FILED-DISTRICT COURT •
: CASE#_ _ _ _ _ _
• TIME
/'D '.otl4-q
·,

Jonathan R. Grover (#7318)
EVANS, GROVER & BEINS, P.C.
52 West Main Street
P.O. Box 160
Tremonton, Utah 84337
Tel: (435) 257-6590
Fax: (435) 257-6592
Email: jgrover@egb-law.com

·1

·. - '..

ArR 1 7 2017

1t;, PATTY TEMPLE, CLERK j'-ti
ff:c_'---~'-----'' DEPUTY .,
.

Attorney for Plaintiff Victor Rodger Bliss

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF MINIDOKA
Case No.:

VICTOR RODGER BLISS,

(!,,V 2ot1- 33'{

Plaintiff,
vs.

COMPLAINT

MINIDOKA IRRIGATION DISTRICT,

Fee: $221.00

Defendant.

COMES NOW, the Plaintiff and respectfully submits this Complaint and states and alleges
as follows:
1.

Plaintiff Victor Roger Bliss (hereafter "Bliss" or "Plaintiff") resides in the County of
Minidoka, State ofldaho and owns real property located in the County of Minidoka, State
ofldaho.

2.

Minidoka Irrigation District (hereafter "MID") is an Irrigation District duly organized and
operating under the laws of the State of Idaho, with its principle place of business in the
County of Minidoka, State of Idaho.

Page 1 of7
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•f

3.

MID is a quasi public corporation, but no stock assessments are made since no stock is
issued.

4.

This Court has both subject matter in this case and personal jurisdiction over the parties.

5.

This Court is the proper venue for this action.

6.

Bliss possesses all the qualifications required of electors of MID under the general laws of
the State ofldaho.

7.

MID leases, uses or has rights to access and utilize certain rights of way, canals, and other
easements owned by the United States Government and managed by the Bureau of
Reclamation, Bureau of Land Management, and/or Department of the Interior.

8.

MID is regarded as a unit and legal entity holding title to its property and water rights in
trust for the uses and purposes set forth in law for the benefit of Bliss and other landowners.

9.

Bliss has paid all required, due and payable, assessments and fees to MID, both past and
current.

10.

Through his ownership of certain rights, Bliss is entitled to use irrigation water delivered
through the canal and ditch appurtenances operated by MID.

11.

Bliss is the owner of certain water rights entitling him to receive various amounts of water
each year from MID who holds such rights in trust for Bliss.

12.

Sometime in the recent past, MID relocated one of its canals servicing Bliss's property
which caused the water level to drop at Bliss' headgate.

13.

MID operates an undercurrent check device on the canal near Bliss' headgate, which check
device has been locked to prevent Bliss from backing up sufficient water to which he is
otherwise entitled to receive.

Page 2 of7
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14.

MID has failed to establish equitable by-laws, rules and regulations as are necessary and
just to secure the just and proper distribution and use of water to Plaintiff.

15.

MID has sufficient supply of water in its canals for the delivery of water to Bliss for his
land, but MID simply refuses to provide adequate devices, and clean and maintain canal
and appurtenances to adequately, timely and properly deliver the water to Bliss.
COUNT I - BREACH OF CONTRACT

I 6.

The Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference the allegations contained m
paragraphs 1 through 15 above as if fully set forth herein.

17.

Defendant entered into a contract with Plaintiff for the delivery of water to Bliss' farm
property.

18.

Defendant breached the terms of the contract when they failed to deliver adequate water in
a reasonably fashion whereby Bliss could receive delivery of the water on his farm
property.

19.

Defendant breached the terms of the contract when they failed to maintain and repair the
canals, ditches, and other water appurtenances for the delivery of water to Bliss.

20.

Bliss fully performed all his obligations under the contract.

21.

Defendant's breach directly and proximately caused damages to Bliss.

22.

Bliss has been damaged in an amount to be proven at trial.
COUNT II

23.

BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY

The Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference the allegations contained m
paragraphs 1 through 22 above as if fully set forth herein.

24.

Defendant owes a fiduciary duty to Bliss to maintain and keep in repair its ditches, canals

Page 3 of7
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and laterals.
25.

Defendant owes a fiduciary duty to Bliss to deliver water to him.

26.

Defendant owes a fiduciary duty to Bliss to construct and maintain its drain works, ditches,
canals and laterals in a manner that reasonably avoids flooding of Bliss' farm property.

27.

Defendant breached the fiduciary duty by failing to deliver adequate water to Bliss.

28.

Defendant breached the fiduciary duty by failing to maintain and repair its ditches, canals
and laterals that were used to deliver water to Bliss.

29.

Defendant breached the fiduciary duty by constructing earthen dams, plugs or other devices
to prevent the natural or reasonable drainage flow of water from Bliss' farm property.

30.

Defendant's breach of these fiduciary duties is a direct and proximate cause of damages to
Bliss.

31.

Bliss has been damaged in an amount to be proven at trial.
COUNT ill-TRESPASS

32.

The Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference the allegations contained rn
paragraphs 1 through 31 above as if fully set forth herein.

33.

Plaintiff has intentionally and with volition placed dirt, soil, and other items from its canal
on top of Bliss' property without legal right or authority.

34.

Plaintiff has intentionally and with volition placed dirt, soil and other items from its canal
on top of a fence owned by Bliss, damaging the fence and personal property near the fence.

35.

Plaintiff has no right or justification for its actions.
COUNT IV - DECLARATORY RELIEF

36.

The Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference the allegations contained m
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paragraphs 1 through 35 above as if fully set forth herein.
37.

Bliss has the right to receive enough water delivered to him from MID to sufficiently water
his crops.

38.

This water is deliverable pursuant to the times and schedules set forth by MID each water
season, similar to other similarly situated water users in MID.

39.

MID is required by law to control the noxious weeds upon and within its canals, ditches,
and surrounding banks where it utilizes its easement.

40.

MID is required to have all director meetings open to the public at large, including Bliss.
COUNT V - WRONGFUL PROSECUTION/
INFLICTION OF EXTREME EMOTIONAL DISTRESS

41.

The Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference the allegations contained m
paragraphs 1 through 40 above as if fully set forth herein.

42.

In or about 2016, MID made a report of false facts to the Minidoka Sheriffs Office for the
purpose of seeking to have Bliss prosecuted criminally.

43.

The reports stated that Bliss did not have authority to obtain sufficient water by closing a
water check in the canal.

44.

Bliss had in fact obtained authority from MID through Frank Hunt.

45.

MID knew that Bliss had authority and still make false statements of fact to induce the
Minidoka County Attorney to file charges against Bliss.

46.

Criminal Charges where in fact filed against Bliss by the Minidoka County Attorney's
Office.

47.

At a large expense of time, emotional distress, and cost, Bliss was able to secure a dismissal
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of all criminal charges.
48.

The Defendant's conduct and misrepresentations were intentional or reckless.

49.

The Defendant's conduct and misrepresentations is extreme and outrageous and goes to
the very essence of an owner's interest in watering his real property.

50.

There is a causal connection between the Defendant's wrongful conduct and the Bliss'
emotional distress, resulting legal expenses and fees.

51.

The damage suffered by Bliss is severe.

WHEREFORE, the Plaintiff prays for the following relief:
1.

For the Court to enter judgment in favor of Plaintiff and against Defendant on Count
1 in an amount to be proven at trial;

2.

For the Court to enter judgment in favor of Plaintiff and against Defendant on Count
2 in an amount to be proven at trial;

3.

For the Court to enter judgment in favor of Plaintiff and against Defendant on Count
3 in an amount to be proven at trial;

4.

For the Court to enter and declare the rights of Bliss as to Count 4;

5.

For the Court to enter judgment in favor of Plaintiff and against Defendant on Count
5 in an amount to be proven at trial.

6.

For attorney's fees and costs; and

7.

For such other and further relief as the Court deems just, equitable and proper.
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DATED this 5th day of April, 2017.
EVANS, GROVER& BEINS, P.C.

J~naih i-R:ifrover
Attorney for Victor Rodger Bliss
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PATTY TEMPLE, CLERK :;
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-

____£._, OEPUT'i ;

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF MINIDOKA
)

Victor Rodger Bliss,

Plaintiff,

Vs.

Minidoka Irrigation District
Defendant.

)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV 2017-334

)
)
)
)

ORDER TO DISQUALIFY

)
)

COMES NOW, Jonathan P. Brody, District Judge in the above-entitled court and does hereby
disqualify himself from the above-entitled cause and petitions and requests the Administrative
Judge to appoint another District Judge to hear the abo-1e-ent..tfod case
DATED this)' f"' day of April, 2017

JON-~ctJ~
I

ORDER OF DJSQUALIPICATION

Page 17

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

r9{1l. day of April, 2017, she

The undersigned hereby certifies that on the

caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER TO DISQUALIFY to be served

upon the following persons in the following manner;
Judge Bevan

(x) Email

Jonathan Grover
PO Box 160
Tremonton, UT 8433 7

Mail

Dated this

li"'-

.;,lo

day April, 2017

Patty Temple, Clerk of the Court

Certificate of service

1
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JU[!ICIAL DISTRICT OF •
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF MINIDOKA
Victor Rodger Bliss,

)
)
)

Plaintiff,

Case No. CV-2017--334

)
)

vs.

Order of Assignment by
Administmtive District Judge

)
)

Minidoka lrrigatior. District,

____________
Defendant.

)
)

)
),

The above-entitled case is assigned to the Honorable John K. Butler, District Judge,

for all further proceedings.
Dated: April 26, 2017

. RICHARD BEVAN
Administrative District Judge
Fifth Judicial District

C:

ORDER OF REASSIGNMENT

1
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•

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The widersigned hereby certifies that on the _ _ day of April, 2017, she

caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER to be served upon the following
persons in the following manner;

(x) Email

Judge Butler
Jonathan Grover
PO Box 160
Tremonton, UT 84337

Mail

Dated this _ _ _day April, 2017

Patty Temple, Clerk of the Court

Laurie McCall, Deputy Clerk

Certificate of service

1
I
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1:·•FILED-DISTRICT COURT ~ ·
CASE #--,-;;,;:rn-:-- .
~,. TIME
!Illa,,- ~

JI

BLAKE G. HALL, ESQ.
SAM L. ANGELL, ESQ.
HALL ANGELL & ASSOCIATES, LLP
107S S Utah Avenue, Suite ISO
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83402
Telephone (208) S22-3003
Fax (208) 621-3008
ISB Nos. 2434 and 7012
bgb@baSAf:tomeys.com
sla@basattomeys.com

11r ·
/;It'~.,_

I

/0

. -~

PATTY T E ~~LES<

"1

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OP THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF MINIDOKA
VICTOR RODGER BLISS,
Case No. CV-2017-334
Plaintiff,
ANSWER TO COMPLAINT AND
DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL AND
COUNTERCLAIM
.

MINIDOKA IRRIGATION DISTRICT,
Defendant
By and tlirough counsel of record, Defendant submits the following as an Answer to

Plaintiff's Complaint (hereinafter "Complaint'').
In answering this Complaint, Defendant expressly reserves, in addition to the defenses set

forth below, all other de:fonses provided by law. Moreover, Defendant states that the investigation
of this matter is continuing and as such, certain avennents, statements and defenses may change

in the future in light of additional or newly discovered infomiation.
GENERAL DENIAL

Defendant denies any and all allegations in Plaintiff's Complaint not expressly admitted
herein.
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MAY 2 2 Ziil/

Attorneys for Defendant

v.

l

1.

With regard to Paragraph 1, Defendant is without information sufficient to either

admit or deny, and therefore, denies the· same.
2.

With regard to Paragraph 2, Defendant admits the same.

3.

With regard to Paragraph 3, Defendant admits the same.

4.

With regard to Paragraph 4, Defendant is without information sufficient to either

admit or deny, ruid therefore, denies the same.

5.

With regard to Paragr?Ph 5, Defendant is without information sufficient to either

admit or deny, and lberefore, denies the same.

6.

With regard to Paragraph 6, Defendant is without information sufficient to either
'

admit or deny, and therefore, denies the same.

7.

With regard to Paragraph 7, Defendant denies the same.

8.

Witl1 !f>g,Jrd to Paragraph 8, Defendant denies the same.

9.

Witb regard to Paragraph 9, Defendant denies the same.

10.

With regard to Paragraph 10, Defendant denies the same.

11.

Witb regard to P?.ragraph 11, Defendant denies the same.

12.

Witli regard to Paragraph 12, Defendant denies the same.

13.

With reg!.ITd to Paragraph 13, Defendant denies the same.

14.

VTrth regard to Paragraph 14, Defendant denies the same.

15.

VI.Tith regard to Paragraph 15, Defendant denies the same.

COUNTJ-BREACHOFCONTRACT
-16.

Wit!! rep.aid to Paragraph 16, this paragraph contains no allegations of met, and

therefore, Defimdaf't denies the same.

17.

With regard to Paragraph 17, Defendant denies the same.
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18.

With regard to Paragraph 18, Defendant denies the same.

19.

With regard to Paragraph 19, Defendant denies the same.

20.

With regam to Paragraph 20, Defendant denies the same.

21.

With regard to Paragraph 21, Defendant denies the same.

22.

With regard to Paragraph 22, Defendant denies the same.
COUNT ll - BREACH OF FIDUCT.~RY DUTY

23.

Wit~ regard t.o Paragraph 23, this paragraph contains no allegations of fact, and

thtaefo1e, Defend.nit denies t.he same.
24.

Witl1 regard to Paragraph 24, Def.endant denies the same.

25.

Witl: regard to Paragraph 25, Defendant denies the same.

26.

With rerard to ParP.graim 26, Ddi:w.lant dllnies the same.

27.

Vlith regard to Paragraph 27, Defendant denies tlie same.

28.

With regan! to Paragraph 28, Defendant denies the same.

29.

Witl: regard to Peragraph 29, Defendant denies the same.

30.

Wilf1 regard to Paragraph 30, Defendant denies the same.

31.

"Witl1 ref.7l!Td t.o Paragranh 31, Defendant dl',nies the same.
COUNT ill-TRESPASS

32.

Wit!: regard to Pm.graph 32, this paragraph contains no allegations of fact, and

therefore, Defendant denies thr, same.
33.

VTrtl: regard t.o Paragraph 33, Defendant denies the same.

34.

VTttJ, regllid to Pt!ragraph 34, Dl'iendant denies the same.

35.

With regard to Paragn>{'h 35, Defend1!1lt dellillfl the same.
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COUNT IV -DECLA RATORY RELmF

36.

With regard to Paragraph 36, this paragraph contains no allegations of fact, and

thei:ef01e, Defendant denies the same.
37.

Willi regard to Paragraph 37, Defendant denies the same.

38.

With regard to Paragraph 38, Defendant denies the same.

39.

With regard to Pa.-agra!)h 39,, Defendant denies the same.

40.

With. regard t.o Pm:agraph 40, Defendant denies the same.
COUNTY - WRONGFUL PROSECUTION/
lN!l'J.JCTION OF EXTREME EMOTIONAL DISTRESS

41.

With regard to Paragraph 41, this. par..giaph roiitains no allegations of fact, and

therefore, Defendant deni.e~ the rca,'!le.

42.

Wifi1 ~rvird t.o P~b. 4-2, Defendant denie..q the same.

43.

With regatd to Paragraph 43, Defimd:3111 drnies the Slime.

44.

Wirt. rn~,:d to PJrag,:aJ~h 44, Defendant clenie"S the same.

.4S.

V/iffr rP.gard to Paragraph 4-5, Defendant denies tlie same.

46.

Wilh ~ to Puagraph 46, Defendant denies tj).e same.

47.

Wi.fh re.gard to Peragrar.h 47, Defendant denies the same.

48.

·With.regard. to P,~h 4-8, Defen.dmrt demes the same.

49.

W"Itl~ ~ oo P:,ra~h 49, Defendant der.ir..'! the same.

SO.

Wit/1 regRrd to Paragraph 50, Defendant dr.nie.q the same.

S1.

With rep,ard to Paragraph 51, Defendant denies the same.
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AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES:
I.

Plaintiff's Complaint, and each and every allegation contained therein, fails to
!!ate .e c!<>itn "-Z"l""! Defendm!t upon which relief can be granted.

2.

Plaintiff has failed to comply with requirements of the Idaho Tort Claims Act.

3.

Defendant is entitled to immunity under the Idaho Tort Claims Act

4.

Plaintiff has failed to r-Ylur:irt rdirhirntr fe re:i1frlies with regard to some or all

of tr.r. r:laims asserted fur which exbaumor.. fa requiiT,d uuder applicable law.
S.

Pfaint\fts ,;farnev,es, if !my•.mi solely attrihut<!i,k to the conduct of Plaintiff
and/or were pro:ximate.ly caused in whole or in part by unforeseeable,
ind~e:ident, intervening, and/or supersedin~; events end by the unforeseeable,
act!- sn::Jor otll!ll!!ions 'Jf Pft'SO!IS or entities ot1::er than Defendant.

6.

Plalntii'f:ltr.b s!mding to p1JI'Sl,.>e ('Jaims ir. thfa D".atler and/or Plaintiff's claims are

7.

P!aintl.ff's cll!ims :i.re pt~luded by the doctrillt'S of Waiver, Estnppel and/or

8.

P!l!ir.f.fi':"s clr.ur.s !tl:'6 precluded by the applicable Statutes of Limitation,
spe-?i:fii;alJy L C. !i 5-219.

·r

9•

......,,_, tc r.->1·ti·gate damages, 1 8DY,
• 'ft-''-•
1>1
.. m,S .n,.u,,
....8JJ1f.j

IO.

Th~ R~.:i or omissimis cf Plaintiff and/or otht'l:'S constitute oompmative negligence
whkh. J)UISllant to Idaho Code § 6-801 et ,req, or other applicable laws, bars or

redm:r.s Plaintiff's recovery, if any, agaio..c:t DF.fendant.
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11.

The actions of Defendant were at all limes carried out in good filith. Defendant

had objectively reasonable belief that all conduct was lawful at all times stated in
Plaintiff's Complaint.
12.

Equitable remedies are not appropriate.

13.

Plaintiff's damages, if any, were caused by the actions of Plaintiff and/or other

individuals or er.:f.ities o>.ber then Defendant.
14.

The foregoing defenses are applicable, whP,Te appropriate, to any and all of
Plaintiff's cfoims for relic£ In asserting these defenses, Defendant does not admit
that it !ms tlie b•;rden of proving the allegations or denials contained in the
dtifemm, but, to !he oontrary, 11sserts d!at by reasons of the denials and/or by

re11mn ◊f. relevant stanrtory and judicial authority, the burden ofproving the facts
relr.v!II'.t to m1ny of the defen~~ and/or !he 1.--:irnen ofproving the inverse to the
nller,~lfoDs ro!lt.~inffl in many of the defenses is upon the Plaintiffs. Defendant

doP.s '!•)t admit, h IISYming !!!!Y deferue, any responsiht1ity or liability, but, to the

ct-ntr.r.y, specifically denies any and a11 alleg,,t!ons of respons11>ility and liability
• DJ : .,..., , ,.. ~-

Iamt.
•

111 .•. lhl!us:S ,,O.·,P

15.

Dflf'enifant ha~ r.onsidert'Ji and believes that it ma.y haVll additional defenses to

Pla!ntii"'":' Complr.int, but cannot !I! this f.ime, ronsistent with Rule 11 of the Idaho
Rules of Ci.vii ~ . state with specificity th<lse defunses. Accordingly,
Detimc'.•nt rese:i•r.s the r_;_ght to supplement its .Answer and add additioilal

defo,1fer. :tj disOO''!'i"Y in this case progresses.

ANSWER.AND DEAfp.}';;J, il'-OR.R'.i:!( 'i'filAL A1'<"1> COON'l'ER:.CL.UM'. -6
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REQUEST FOR ATTORNEY FEES
Defendant has been required to retain counsel to defend this action, and is entitled to
recover reasonable. allomey f~ •nd costs inrorroo in the defunse ofthls action from Plaintif4
pUISUant to Idaho Code § 6-91 S(A) and all

other applicable laws allowing for the recovery of

costs or attorney fees in this acHon. Defendant denies that Plaintiff is entitled to any award of
attorney fees.
WHEREFORE. Defilntfa~f prays for judgment as folfows:

· ..,,., s .._;ty.'Pp
"
1mot
. · be diS?nl!:?ef
. I WJ•11.u pre~-cc-.lJCC,
. ,,., Vtl.r;.:
...,_ Plaintiff" taking nowwg
.,_,_
J:' f-.iiiLtu
1. Th m:· ~1
I

thereunder;
2. Def~mfam be ~:we.rdt.d co;;tn a.'l<l attorney fllell nr.ressarily incurred in defending this
action;
3. For s•ic'· srl:her relkf ?:l tl:?- Court may deem j11il imd proper.

f..'9J!fil!J;~CJ,:,AfM,
COMES NOW Counterciaimant/Defendant, MlNIDOKA IRRIGATION DISTRICT

(MID), by and tb.rou[l"h counsel nf:ret"!Jrd, HAT.I. ANGEII. & ASSOCJATES, LLP, and as a

Counterclaim against Counterdllfend!!!1t/Plaintif4 VICTOR RODGER BLISS, plesds and alleges
as follows:
1.

MID i~ ,m irrigation din.kt or,prni?Jld and r.~.at.ing pursuant to the laws oftbe

State ofldaho.
2.

Blfas ;-, a resident of anti 1rwns real propflrty in Minidoka Oomrty, Idaho.

3.

The Cou.tt ha., juri.sdfotfon over the parties and the snbje.x matter of this action.

4.

Venue is proper.
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5.

MID operates and maintains the MID water delivery system pursuant to contract

with the United States, Department of Interior, Bureau of Reclamation (BOR).
6.

B!iss C':'".'!JS re:i! property lccated in Township 9 South, Range 23 East, Boise

Meridian, Minidoka C01mty, Idaho, Section 9, East half Southwest Quarter (Bliss property),
which is located within the boundary of MID.
7.

Ne.11.n.l fl.ow and stol:1'..~ water riglrts held i.n the name of MID and BOR for the

benefit of real property located within MID are appw.ten.'il!t to the Bliss property.
8.

Part of tm:r 171 '.!, 11 w:iter delivety and cc~.Ve<f.mce dih::h operated and

maiotaiDM by MID, is .located on the Bliss property.
COUl\'T I-TRESPASS

alleges Jll!nl:~8,'lb,, 1-8 of the C'.ounterffa.im as tb.oogh fully set furth.

9.

JI,@

10.

In ?.011, 'Bliss ad,rised rep.resentatives ofMID tr.at Bliss desired to install a

crossing into ar:d -:ver li1tml l 712, ill the SE¼SW% ser.tloo of the Illiss property {new

crossing).

11.

At the time ofthereq-JI'#, Bliss had a C!'OS.'l.i.'IS located in and over Lateral 1712,

located in the sv11,sr<ri1 section ofttt,, Bl.iss propertyth2.t 1~vided access across Lateral 1712

to and from the Blhs tm,perty.
12.

Blirs ,_,_..,s advisee. by Il':lW-'",entativr.s ofJ,..f/D :r.at the :~Jes an.d regulations of

BOR require Bliss t.o enter into s. cro.<!Sing agreement with BOR befure the crossing could be
installed.

13.

Bliss ,ns advi~ by r!'Jl.)ffllffltatives ofMJD that MID policy requites Bliss to

enter into a cross~g !ll_lreffl\ent with MID before the crossing could be installed.

ANSWER. AND DF.MA.a":.O FOR .iURY 'fRJAL AND COu"Nl'Erc.CLAIM • 8
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14.

Idaho fo.w requires that Bliss obtain written permission before installing a crossing

in Lateral 1712.
15.

B!i!!! w~s pro•.iii:l~ a =ssmg agreement by MID and Bliss requested changes to

the agreement Some of the requested changes were made and a new crossing agreement was
mailed to Bliss.

16.

Blfas cid not si,?ll a crossing agreement with BOR or MID.

17.

Contr;;zy to law, Bliss installed the new crossing without the written permission of

-MID or BOR. TI,e 11c,1v cros~,1 i:nm1!e<! by Bliss comrtih1t1;,s trespar,r.
18.

M~ 5.? c:rr,'.itled to e1:1 ~w,ml of its a~m,,y's &.,:is incnr.l'f'.tl in the pro~tion of

this Counterclaim pursuant to the provisions ofldabo Code §6-918 and 12-117.
COTJNT Il -- DECLABATOF.Y "l<"fi'LIEF
19.

MID P.ruleg-es 9aca,~hs 1-18 oftbe Counteislaim as though fully set forth.

20.

J\oflD owns II sl".P.t!Jtnr:11ight-of-way along ~rh side of Lateral 1712, including an

easement, as is rm;;ol'labJe a'Y.i n.~es:11rry to operate antl mnintain Lateral 1712 and the MID
system, pursuant ~cs lf!aho C.i.-k §42-1107- Further, Idaho Code §42•!209 proht'bits

encroachments of lilly t;ipe witlto-:lt w1itte11. permission of tl;_e "•-'nel' of the.right-of-way.
21.

Blfo;:, wit11011t am;' •,rritt1m consent or authority md 81?,llinst. the will of MID,

entered onto MID's rifht-of-wr.y 11ml-~•!a.ced and/or erer.ted v!l!i01JS m.croacbments witllin said
right-ott-way. B!.isr- '=!.:-ir.:i~ anlllr:r ei:ectoo mmb encr-oacl:,J!!:;.t..~ on the 11furm1entioned right-of,.
way.
22.

Bli~' r.onduci' h~~ ~wed irreparable d'¼mP.~ to MID, prohtoiting it :6:om

complying with it~ ,fur ia of clewring; maintaining, am! repming Lat.et.tll 1712 bordering Bliss'
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property. Said encroacbments further require that MID exit the right-of-way and enter onto Bliss'
property and/or oilier _property in ordar to continue to clean, maintain, and repair Lateral 1712. 23.

BE~s ;,ea ,:ompi,_,,;ie,_l ,1,:; =al OCC!!Sions l!b<:>u1 the rnaintenance of Lateral 1712

and the operation of Lateral 17 l 2.
24.

In pari lo address Bliss' concerns, and to other.vise properly main1ain and operate

Lateral 1712 and t!Je iVHD syst:r..:, lv.'ll11!01ified Bliss thr:t it was ne~sary to constru<;t a road
along Lateral In:!.

25.

E::::;:, .},i.-ctcl ~., fi.e w,is1mction of 11 mad. :,1f/D and F.li~ attempted to negotiate

i:esohmon of the is,:1: fr> n1> av;il
26.

MID:~ r.11tif.l~1! tn ,:cno;lJ:uct a road gforg r.~w::,11712 t., is reasonable and

necessary to opemt" i:a•d :mainm;_n lit,,ral l 7i'Z and the watf"1" de-livery cystem. operated and
maintained by MID.

27.

D:.,, !,, ;;,_. nc!u:,\, -i,:dr1ing :md m~.,:rial c:('nh·c "~:sy lJ"tween MID and Bliss, MID

is entitled to an orr.l~ cf tlifa ~"1;rt settling the controversies in MID's favor in accordance with

the Idaho Declrratory R~ljef A-"1, !tl!\ho Code Sectin.n 10-1.'{01
28.

~ sec;.

.9"l'll'l! ,;·,1 infurrn~_•:ic,n. J<::d. belief, :MID itlleg~ trmtUlllesg resfnlined by this oourt,

Bliss will continue to trespass on MID's right-of-way. Such trespassory conduct by Bliss will
result in im:parlbfo !i.i~!n to MtD, in !hat MID will he predwJe1:l. fro~ fully and properly

cleaning, maintaini11r;, ~:lllf. re:imrring tb, lat.era.\ 1712 at ism-ie, furthenequiring that MID emer
Bliss' property in ::;cl•,;,' t.o r.omfl'Y with i~ statutory c.1.>Jigatio-,,s cf clmming, maintaining. and
repairing the Later~ l 1·1) 2 at !.,!".,~ T.lm 1'.denthl d=a,g.?S that -:ould. ))!07.imately result from

Bliss' continued ~w.ss wonk! be extremely difficult, if not !lD_POSSible, to assess accurately and
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MID has no other remedy at law to restrain Bliss from attempting to control and/or use the rightof-way.
29.

MID i~ entitled to an injunction or an order of ejection ordering Bliss to

immediately remove all encroachments from the right-of-way and ordering Bliss to refrain from
preventing access to and/or constructing or installing encroachments in the right-of-way without
written permission.

30.

MID is entitled to an award of its attorney's fees incurred in prosecuting this

Counterclaim pmaliant to tl-e provisk-~, of!d!!.ho Code ·112.- i 17 and 12-121. MID alleges that an
attorney's fees xrnu-d nfTwD Thonr.ar.d Five Hundn:d Doll;;rs ($2.5.'JO.OO) is reasonableifthe
defirult of Bliss is <lilt,~.ed.

WHERF.!FORE, C'.ount,;rc!aim~.nt/Defendailt, MINIDOKA IRRJC,ATION DISTRICT,
prays for judgmerr. a; follows:

I.

Th!!t Cout>t:roefu~da.'1! Bfas r::move all 1:11c.ruchments placed end/or ~cted

within the right-of-•ny ai its own w.~lll1re;
2.

Fr.r rlf;~'!ges for trespa.~s;

3.

Titr11 Cvtml.eroefo/.ldimt Bli3.1 be enjoiM.i fi..Jc, t,oong uiy action to prevent MID

from acx-.essing, d1:1tdlig,. minfllininr~ ml/or repairing Lateral l 712 and area within the right-of.
way.
4.

For a rkr.!nraton· .iud~t that Counterclaimlm.t/Defendant MID holds a right-of-

way and the scope tl:w.rof.
5.

T11r.· C')1mterclai1?)tnt!Dmdant MID b:i e.,,•a-:dr.d its rosts and attorney files

uecessanly illCl11'T~-:1 fri :lefimdi!'-ll this aclico;

ANSWEII.AND DE1'1.u'l!.) FOR JM:'i( l'if.'i,;..i, il..Nl> CO\JNNRCt..-ill\R -11
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6.

For such other relief as the Court may deem just and proper.

Dated this If_ dayofMay, 2017.

~ tUkf___
~G.HALL

DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL
Defendants Iet!Uest a trial of the issues of fact herein by a jury.
Dated this /f dayofMay,2017.
,
~G.HALL

·

CERTIFICATE OF SER.VICE
this

I hereby certiff that I served a true copy of the fo,.;g,.'1,,g document upon the :lbilowing
day of May, 2017, by the method indicated below:

_,ff..

Jonathan R. Grover, E,.,,q.
EVANS GROVER BEINS
52 West Main S1ree':
PO Box 160

[ )(] Mailing
[ f ] Hand-Delivery
[ ] Facsimile
[);] Email

Tremonton, UT 84337

Fax: 435-257-6592
Email: jgrover@egb-iaw.com

ANSWERANDDF.!'!IM{DF0RJURYTRIALANDCOUNTERCL.4IM-11
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BLAKE G. HALL, ESQ.
SAM L. ANGELL, ESQ.
HALL ANGELL & ASSOCIATES, LLP
1075 S Utah Avenue, Suite 150
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83402
Telephone (208) 522-3003
Fax (208) 621-3008
ISB Nos. 2434 and 7012
bgh@hasattomeys.com
sla@hasattomeys.com
Attorneys for Defendant
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF MINIDOKA
VICTOR RODGER BLISS,
Case No. CV-2017-334
Plaintiff,

AMENDED ANSWER TO
COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR
JURY TRIAL AND COUNTERCLAIM

V.

MINIDOKA IRRIGATION DISTRICT,
Defendant.
By and through counsel of record, Defendant submits the following as an Answer to
Plaintiff's Complaint (hereinafter "Complaint").
In answering this Complaint, Defendant expressly reserves, in addition to the defenses set
forth below, all other defenses provided by law. Moreover, Defendant states that the investigation
of this matter is continuing and as such, certain averments, statements and defenses may change
in the future in light of additional or newly discovered information.

GENERAL DENIAL
Defendant denies any and all allegations in Plaintiff's Complaint not expressly admitted
herein.
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1.

With regard to Paragraph 1, Defendant is without information sufficient to either

admit or deny, and therefore, denies the same.
2.

With regard to Paragraph 2, Defendant admits the same.

3.

With regard to Paragraph 3, Defendant admits the same.

4.

With regard to Paragraph 4, Defendant is without information sufficient to either

admit or deny, and therefore, denies the same.
5.

With regard to Paragraph 5, Defendant is without information sufficient to either

admit or deny, and therefore, denies the same.
6.

With regard to Paragraph 6, Defendant is without information sufficient to either

admit or deny, and therefore, denies the same.
7.

With regard to Paragraph 7, Defendant denies the same.

8.

With regard to Paragraph 8, Defendant denies the same.

9.

With regard to Paragraph 9, Defendant denies the same.

10.

With regard to Paragraph 10, Defendant denies the same.

11.

With regard to Paragraph 11, Defendant denies the same.

12.

With regard to Paragraph 12, Defendant denies the same.

13.

With regard to Paragraph 13, Defendant denies the same.

14.

With regard to Paragraph 14, Defendant denies the same.

15.

With regard to Paragraph 15, Defendant denies the same.
COUNT I - BREACH OF CONTRACT

16.

With regard to Paragraph 16, this paragraph contains no allegations of fact, and

therefore, Defendant denies the same.
17.

With regard to Paragraph 17, Defendant denies the same.

ANSWER AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL AND COUNTERCLAIM - 2
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18.

With regard to Paragraph 18, Defendant denies the same.

19.

With regard to Paragraph 19, Defendant denies the same.

20.

With regard to Paragraph 20, Defendant denies the same.

21.

With regard to Paragraph 21, Defendant denies the same.

22.

With regard to Paragraph 22, Defendant denies the same.
COUNT II - BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY

23.

With regard to Paragraph 23, this paragraph contains no allegations of fact, and

therefore, Defendant denies the same.
24.

With regard to Paragraph 24, Defendant denies the same.

25.

With regard to Paragraph 25, Defendant denies the same.

26.

With regard to Paragraph 26, Defendant denies the same.

27.

With regard to Paragraph 27, Defendant denies the same.

28.

With regard to Paragraph 28, Defendant denies the same.

29.

With regard to Paragraph 29, Defendant denies the same.

30.

With regard to Paragraph 30, Defendant denies the same.

31.

With regard to Paragraph 31, Defendant denies the same.
COUNT III- TRESPASS

32.

With regard to Paragraph 32, this paragraph contains no allegations of fact, and

therefore, Defendant denies the same.
33.

With regard to Paragraph 33, Defendant denies the same.

34.

With regard to Paragraph 34, Defendant denies the same.

35.

With regard to Paragraph 35, Defendant denies the same.

ANSWER AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL AND COUNTERCLAIM - 3
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COUNT IV - DECLARATORY RELIEF

36.

With regard to Paragraph 36, this paragraph contains no allegations of fact, and

therefore, Defendant denies the same.
37.

With regard to Paragraph 37, Defendant denies the same.

38.

With regard to Paragraph 38, Defendant denies the same.

39.

With regard to Paragraph 39, Defendant denies the same.

40.

With regard to Paragraph 40, Defendant denies the same.
COUNT V - WRONGFUL PROSECUTION/
INFLICTION OF EXTREME EMOTIONAL DISTRESS

41.

With regard to Paragraph 41, this paragraph contains no allegations of fact, and

therefore, Defendant denies the same.
42.

With regard to Paragraph 42, Defendant denies the same.

43.

With regard to Paragraph 43, Defendant denies the same.

44.

With regard to Paragraph 44, Defendant denies the same.

45.

With regard to Paragraph 45, Defendant denies the same.

46.

With regard to Paragraph 46, Defendant denies the same.

47.

With regard to Paragraph 47, Defendant denies the same.

48.

With regard to Paragraph 48, Defendant denies the same.

49.

With regard to Paragraph 49, Defendant denies the same.

50.

With regard to Paragraph 50, Defendant denies the same.

51.

With regard to Paragraph 51, Defendant denies the same.
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AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES:
1.

Plaintiffs Complaint, and each and every allegation contained therein, fails to
state a claim against Defendant upon which relief can be granted.

2.

Plaintiff has failed to comply with requirements of the Idaho Tort Claims Act.

3.

Defendant is entitled to immunity under the Idaho Tort Claims Act.

4.

Plaintiff has failed to exhaust administrative remedies with regard to some or all
of the claims asserted for which exhaustion is required under applicable law.

5.

Plaintiff's damages, if any, are solely attributable to the conduct of Plaintiff
and/or were proximately caused in whole or in part by unforeseeable,
independent, intervening, and/or superseding events and by the unforeseeable,
acts and/or omissions of persons or entities other than Defendant.

6.

Plaintiff lacks standing to pursue claims in this matter and/or Plaintiff's claims are
moot and/or not yet ripe.

7.

Plaintiff's claims are precluded by the doctrines of Waiver, Estoppel and/or
Laches.

8.

Plaintiff's claims are precluded by the applicable Statutes of Limitation,
specifically I. C. § 5-219.

9.

Plaintiff has failed to mitigate damages, if any.

10.

The acts or omissions of Plaintiff and/or others constitute comparative negligence
which, pursuant to Idaho Code§ 6-801 et seq, or other applicable laws, bars or
reduces Plaintiff's recovery, if any, against Defendant.
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11.

The actions of Defendant were at all times carried out in good faith. Defendant
had objectively reasonable belief that all conduct was lawful at all times stated in
Plaintiffs Complaint.

12.

Equitable remedies are not appropriate.

13.

Plaintiffs damages, if any, were caused by the actions of Plaintiff and/or other
individuals or entities other than Defendant.

14.

The foregoing defenses are applicable, where appropriate, to any and all of
Plaintiffs claims for relief. In asserting these defenses, Defendant does not admit
that it has the burden of proving the allegations or denials contained in the
defenses, but, to the contrary, asserts that by reasons of the denials and/or by
reason of relevant statutory and judicial authority, the burden of proving the facts
relevant to many of the defenses and/or the burden of proving the inverse to the
allegations contained in many of the defenses is upon the Plaintiffs.

Defendant

does not admit, in asserting any defense, any responsibility or liability, but, to the
contrary, specifically denies any and all allegations of responsibility and liability
in Plaintiffs' Complaint.
15.

Defendant has considered and believes that it may have additional defenses to
Plaintiffs' Complaint, but cannot at this time, consistent with Rule 11 of the Idaho
Rules of Civil Procedure, state with specificity those defenses. Accordingly,
Defendant reserves the right to supplement its Answer and add additional
defenses as discovery in this case progresses.
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REQUEST FOR ATTORNEY FEES
Defendant has been required to retain counsel to defend this action, and is entitled to
recover reasonable attorney fees and costs incurred in the defense of this action from Plaintiff,
pursuant to Idaho Code § 6-91 S(A) and all other applicable laws allowing for the recovery of
costs or attorney fees in this action. Defendant denies that Plaintiff is entitled to any award of
attorney fees.
WHEREFORE, Defendant prays for judgment as follows:
1.

That Plaintiff's Complaint be dismissed with prejudice, with Plaintiff taking nothing

thereunder;
2.

Defendant be awarded costs and attorney fees necessarily incurred in defending this

3.

For such other relief as the Court may deem just and proper.

action;

COUNTERCLAIM
COMES NOW Counterclaimant/Defendant, MINIDOKA IRRIGATION DISTRICT
(MID), by and through counsel ofrecord, HALL ANGELL & ASSOCIATES, LLP, and as a
Counterclaim against Counterdefendant/Plaintiff, VICTOR RODGER BLISS, pleads and alleges
as follows:
1.

MID is an irrigation district organized and operating pursuant to the laws of the

State ofldaho.
2.

Bliss is a resident of and owns real property in Minidoka County, Idaho.

3.

The Court has jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter of this action.

4.

Venue is proper.
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5.

MID operates and maintains the MID water delivery system pursuant to contract

with the United States, Department of Interior, Bureau of Reclamation (BOR).
6.

Bliss owns real property located in Township 9 South, Range 23 East, Boise

Meridian, Minidoka County, Idaho, Section 9, East half Southwest Quarter (Bliss property),
which is located within the boundary of MID.
7.

Natural flow and storage water rights held in the name of MID and BOR for the

benefit of real property located within MID are appurtenant to the Bliss property.
8.

Part of Later 1712, a water delivery and conveyance ditch operated and

maintained by MID, is located on the Bliss property.
COUNT I -TRESPASS

9.

MID alleges paragraphs 1-8 of the Counterclaim as though fully set forth.

10.

In 2013, Bliss advised representatives of MID that Bliss desired to install a

crossing into and over Lateral 1712, located approximately 37.5 feet west of the eastern border
of the SE¼SW¼ section of the Bliss property (new crossing).
11.

At the time of the request, Bliss had a crossing located in and over Lateral 1712,

located approximately 57 feet east of the western border of the SE¼SW¼ section of the Bliss
property that provided access across Lateral 1712 to and from the Bliss property.
12.

Bliss was advised by representatives of MID that the rules and regulations of

BOR require Bliss to enter into a crossing agreement with BOR before the crossing could be
installed.
13.

Bliss was advised by representatives of MID that MID policy requires Bliss to

enter into a crossing agreement with MID before the crossing could be installed.
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14.

Idaho law requires that Bliss obtain written permission before installing a crossing

in Lateral 1712.
15.

Bliss was provided a crossing agreement by MID and Bliss requested changes to

the agreement. Some of the requested changes were made and a new crossing agreement was
mailed to Bliss.
16.

Bliss did not sign a crossing agreement with BOR or MID.

17.

Contrary to law, Bliss installed the new crossing without the written permission of

MID or BOR. The new crossing installed by Bliss constitutes trespass.
18.

MID is entitled to an award of its attorney's fees incurred in the prosecution of

this Counterclaim pursuant to the provisions of Idaho Code §6-918 and 12-117.
COUNT II- DECLARATORY RELIEF

19.

MID realleges paragraphs 1-18 of the Counterclaim as though fully set forth.

20.

MID owns a statutory right-of-way along each side of Lateral 1712, including an

easement, as is reasonable and necessary to operate and maintain Lateral 1712 and the MID
system, pursuant to Idaho Code §42-1102. Further, Idaho Code §42-1209 prohibits
encroachments of any type without written permission of the owner of the right-of-way.
21.

Bliss, without any written consent or authority and against the will of MID,

entered onto MID's right-of-way and placed and/or erected various encroachments within said
right-of-way. Bliss placed and/or erected such encroachments on the aforementioned right-ofway.
22.

Bliss' conduct has produced irreparable damages to MID, prohibiting it from

complying with its duties of cleaning, maintaining, and repairing Lateral 1712 bordering Bliss'
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property. Said encroachments further require that MID exit the right-of-way and enter onto Bliss'
property and/or other property in order to continue to clean, maintain, and repair Lateral 1712.
23.

Bliss has complained on several occasions about the maintenance of Lateral 1712

and the operation of Lateral 1712.
24.

In part to address Bliss' concerns, and to otherwise proper! y maintain and operate

Lateral 1712 and the MID system, MID notified Bliss that it was necessary to construct a road
along Lateral 1712.
25.

Bliss objected to the construction of a road. MID and Bliss attempted to negotiate

resolution of the issue to no avail.
26.

MID is entitled to construct a road along Lateral 1712 as is reasonable and

necessary to operate and maintain Lateral 1712 and the water delivery system operated and
maintained by MID.
27.

Due to the actual, existing and material controversy between MID and Bliss, MID

is entitled to an order of this Court settling the controversies in MID's favor in accordance with
the Idaho Declaratory Relief Act, Idaho Code Section 10-1201 et seq.
28.

Based on information and belief, MID alleges that unless restrained by this court,

Bliss will continue to trespass on MID's right-of-way. Such trespassory conduct by Bliss will
result in irreparable harm to MID, in that MID will be precluded from fully and properly
cleaning, maintaining, and repairing the Lateral 1712 at issue, further requiring that MID enter
Bliss' property in order to comply with its statutory obligations of cleaning, maintaining, and
repairing the Lateral 1712 at issue. The potential damages that could proximately result from
Bliss' continued trespass would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to assess accurately and
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MID has no other remedy at law to restrain Bliss from attempting to control and/or use the rightof-way.
29.

MID is entitled to an injunction or an order of ejection ordering Bliss to

immediately remove all encroachments from the right-of-way and ordering Bliss to refrain from
preventing access to and/or constructing or installing encroachments in the right-of-way without
written permission.
30.

MID is entitled to an award of its attorney's fees incurred in prosecuting this

Counterclaim pursuant to the provisions of Idaho Code §12-117 and 12-121. MID alleges that an
attorney's fees award of Two Thousand Five Hundred Dollars ($2,500.00) is reasonable if the
default of Bliss is entered.
WHEREFORE, Counterclaimant/Defendant, MINIDOKA IRRIGATION DISTRICT,
prays for judgment as follows:

I.

That Counterdefendant Bliss remove all encroachments placed and/or constructed

within the right-of-way at its own expense;
2.

For damages for trespass;

3.

That Counterdefendant Bliss be enjoined from taking any action to prevent MID

from accessing, cleaning, maintaining, and/or repairing Lateral 1712 and area within the right-ofway.
4.

For a declaratory judgment that Counterclaimant/Defendant MID holds a right-of-

way and the scope thereof;
5.

That Counterclaimant/Defendant MID be awarded its costs and attorney fees

necessarily incurred in defending this action;
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6.

For such other relief as the Court may deem just and proper.

Dated this

a6z day of May, 2017.

DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL
Defendants request a trial of the issues of fact herein by a jury.
Dated this ol.;lday ofMay, 2017.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I served a true copy of the foregoing document upon the following
this ;'.2.J-day of May, 2017, by the method indicated below:

[)(] Mailing
[
] Hand-Delivery
[
] Facsimile
[ Xl Email

Jonathan R. Grover, Esq.
EVANS GROVER BEINS
52 West Main Street
PO Box 160
Tremonton, UT 84337
Fax: 435-257-6592
Email: jgrover@egb-law.com
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FILED-DISTRICT COURT
CASE#
TIME --/.'_0_£_f_M_

Jonathan R. Grover (#7318)
EVANS, GROVER & BEINS, P.C.
52 West Main Street
P.O. Box 160
Tremonton, Utah 84337
Tel: (435) 257-6590
Fax: (435) 257-6592
Email: jgrover@egb-law.com

MAY 3 1 2017
PATTY TEMPLE, CLERK
_ _ _ _£_,DEPUTY

Attorney for Plaintiff Victor Rodger Bliss

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH roDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF MINIDOKA
VICTOR RODGER BLISS,

Case No.: CV-2017-334

Plaintiff,

ANSWER TO COUNTERCLAIM

vs.

MINIDOKA IRRIGATION DISTRICT,
Defendant.

COMES NOW, the Plaintiff and Counter Defendant Victor Rodger Bliss (hereafter
"Bliss"), by and through his attorney of record, Jonathan R. Grover of Evans, Grover and Beins,
P .C., and respectfully submits this Answer to Counterclaim as an answer to the counterclaim filed

by Defendant and Counterclaimant, Minidoka Irrigation District (hereafter sometimes "MID'}

Plaintiff reserves the right to add, subtract or otherwise amend this answer and defenses herein.
This case is in its early stages and investigation is still ongoing and certain provisions may change
as discovery is completed.
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ANSWER

FIRST DEFENSE
Counterclaimant fails to state a claim upon _which relief can be granted.

SECOND DEFENSE -ADMIT OR DENY
I.

As to paragraph 1, Bliss admits.

2.

As to paragraph 2, Bliss admits.

3.

As to paragraph, 3, Bliss admits.

4,

As to paragraph 4, Bliss admits.

5.

As to paragraph 5, Bliss admits that MID operates a water delivery system. Bliss is
without information sufficient to admit or deny the remaining allegations of paragraph 5

and therefore denies the same.
6.

As to paragraph 6, Bliss admits.

7.

As to paragraph 7, Bliss admits that MID holds water rights in its name for his benefit
Bliss is without information sufficient to admit or deny the remaining allegations of
paragraph 7 and therefore denies the same.

8,

As to paragraph 8, Bliss admits there is a ditch operated by MID on his property, Bliss
is without information sufficient to admit or deny the remaining allegations of paragraph

8 and therefore denies the same.
9.

As to paragraph 9, Bliss incorporates and restates his foregoing responses to paragraphs 1
through 8 above as if fully set forth herein.

10.

As to paragraph 10, Bliss admits that he notified MID ofa crossing. Bliss is without
infonnation sufficient to admit or deny the remaining allegations of paragraph 10 and
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therefore denies the same.
11.

As to paragraph 11, Bliss admits it had a crossing on MID's canal located on his
property, however, MID had irreparably damaged the crossing causing it to become
unusable. Bliss denies the remaining allegations of paragraph 11.

12.

As to paragraph 12, Bliss denies.

13.

As to paragraph 13, Bliss denies.

14.

As to paragraph 14, Bliss denies.

15.

As to paragraph 15, Bliss admits he.was provided a document purporting to be for a
crossing and that he requested changes. Bliss is without information sufficient to admit
or deny the remaining allegations of paragraph 15 and therefore denies the same.

16.

As to paragraph 16, Bliss denies.

17.

Asto paragraph 17, Bliss denies.

18.

As to paragraph 18, Bliss denies.

19. .

As to paragraph 19, Bliss incorporates and restates his foregoing responses to paragraphs
1 through 18 above as if fully set forth herein.

20.

As to paragraph 20, Bliss denies.

21.

As to paragraph 21, Bliss denies.

22.

As to paragraph 22, Bliss denies.

23.

As to paragraph 23, Bliss admits that he has complained to MID on several occasions

about the maintenance of the canal servicing his property. Bliss denies the remaining
allegations of paragraph 23,
24.

As to paragraph 24, Bliss denies.
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25.

As to paragraph 25, Bliss admits he objected to a road. Bliss denies the remaining
allegations of paragraph 25,

26.

As to paragraph 26, Bliss denies.

27.

As to paragraph 27, Bliss denies,

28.

As to paragraph 28, Bliss denies,

29.

As to paragraph 29, Bliss denies.

30.

As to paragraph 30, Bliss denies.

TlllRD DEFENSE
Defendant denies every allegation not expressly admitted herein.

FOURTH DEFENSE
MID's claims are baned by written, oral, express and/or implied permission, consent,

authority, and/or right.

FIFTH DEFENSE
MID's claims are baned by failure of consideration.

SIXTH DEFENSE
MID' s claims are barred by the doctrine oflatches.

SEVENTH DEFENSE

MID' s claims are barred in full or part by the statute of limitations.
EIGHTH DEFENSE
MID's claims are barred by if.<! failure to join indispensable parties.

NINTH DEFENSE
MID' s claims are barred by the doctrine of equitable estoppel.
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TENTH DEFENSE
MID' s claims are barred by the doctrine of reliance.

ELEVENTH DEFENSE
MID' s claims are barred by the statute of frauds.

TWELFTH DEFENSE

MID' s claims are ban:ed by the doctrine of waiver.
THIRTEENTH DEFENSE
MID's claims are barred by the doctrine of payment.

FOURTEENTH DEFENSE
MID' s claims are barred by the doctrine of unclean hands.

FIFTEENTH DEFENSE

MID's claims are barred by the doctrine of mootness or its claims are not yet tipe.
SIXTEENTH DEFENSE

MID's claims are barred by its failure to mitigate its damages.
SEVENTEENTH DEFENSE

MID' s claims are barred to extent the damages being claimed were caused by the actions
of Third Parties or other individuals or entities other than Bliss himself.

EIGHTEENTH DEFENSE
This answering party hereby asserts the right to amend its answer of new defenses which
are not yet know to Defendant, but which may become known through future discovery.

WHEREFORE, the Plaintiff prays for the following relief:
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1.

For the Court to dismiss all claims of MID with prejudice;

2.

For attorney's fees and costs; and

3.

For such other and further relief as the Court deems just, equitable and proper.

P 7

DATED this 30t!i of May, 2017.

i'onath~:ili-over
Attorney for Victor Rodger Bliss

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on May 30, 2017, I served a true and correct copy of the foregoing
ANSWER TO COUNTERCLAIM via, facsimile & U.S. Mail, first class, postage prepaid, to
the following:

Blake G. Hall
Sam L. Angell
HALL ANGELL & ASSOCIATES, LLP
1075 S Utah Avenue, Suite 150
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83402
Fax: (208) 621-3008
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FILED-DISTRICT COURT
CASE#----'---TIME._ ___,...._ __;_
COURT MINUTES

JUL 2 4 fuit

PATTY TEMPLE, CLERK
~(.DEPUTY

CV-2017-0000334
Victor Rodger Bliss vs. Minidoka Irrigation District
Hearing type: Status
Hearing date: 7/24/2017
Time: 1:32 pm
Judge: John K Buder
Courtroom: District Courtroom-1
Court reporter: Denise Schloder
Minutes Clerk: Laurie McCall
Tape Number: save to server
Party: Minidoka Irrigation District, Attorney: Blake Hall-Austin Allen
Party: Victor Bliss.Attorney: Jonathan Grover

I

Counsel present by telephone.
Court calls case: Re: scheduling conference.
1:32 p.m.-Counsel -would like Jury trial\
Mr. Grover-8 months to go through discoveryMr. Allen-agrees 8 months.
Court-trial date June of 2018-Suggests June 6, 2018-Will set for 3 day jury trial.,

"r.

Grover-agree\ible.} .

Mr. Allen-also works for them.

1:34 p.m -court pretrial conference-May 14th, 2018-set at 1:30 p.m.-by telephop.eCounselagrees.

!·

~~ -~¼~--~:~•'H.t::;.-'.~;~·
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1:35 pm. --Court asks Mr. Allen to initiate call.
Clerk will Issue pretrial scheduling order-Inquires
Nothting further.
Counsels-nothing further.
1:35 p.m. REcess

'

'
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FILED-DISTRICT COURT.
CASE'#
· ,.
TIME
:l '.ot, p,._.,
C

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTII JUDICIAL DISTiJcT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF

))

Victor Rodger Bliss,

Plaintiftls),
vs.

)
)
)

Minidoka Irrigation District,
Defendant(s).

)
)
)
)
)

L•

,K~i\ l. •P---

·

JUL 2 4 lJil

.. -+-----·

Case No. CV 201 ~33

SCHEDULING
NOTICE OF
AND INITIAL P
ORDER

TfING

TRIAL: This case is set for a JURY TRIAL to begin at 9:

a.~., on June 6,

2018, in the District Cowtroom, Sherman Bellwood Building, Minidoka Co

, iupert, Idaho.

A total of ..1... days have been reserved. On the fmrt day of trial. counsel hall report to the

Court's chambers at 8:30 a.m. for a brief Slatus conference. Unless otherwise qrdl:rcd, other than
the trial, proceedings will convene at 9:00 a.m. each morning, and adjourn at a

1dmatcly 5:00
i
1
p.m. each afternoon. Two twenty (20) minute recesses will be taken at ap1Pf(»ctnat♦ly 10:30 a.m.
and 12:30 p.m.
l.

ALTERNATE JUDGES: Notice is hereby given that the

idingjudge listed

below intends to utili:ze the provisions ofl.R.C.P. 40(d)(l)(G). Notice is also · en that if there
are multiple parties, any disqualification pursuant to I.R.C.P. 40(d)(l)(A) is

!ij,ct to a prior

determination under I.R.C.P. 40(d)( 1)(C). The panel of a1tcmate judges consi
judges who have otherwise not been disqualified in this action: Judges Bev
Copsey, Crabtree, Elgee, Higer, Schroeder, Sbindurling, St. Clair, Stoker, Wil

1

Tuesdays and Thursdays coun wm convene at 9:00 a.m. and acljown approximately 2:
afternoon.

SCHEDULING ORDER
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.,~•._·•.•· · PATTY TEMPLE, CLERK ·1.
:·
~ DEPUTY i

Pursuant to I.R.C.P. 16 and 40, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
1.

1

,and Wilper .

p.in. each

'

3.

PRETRIAL CONFERENCES: The pre-trial conference will be conducted

pursuant to I.R.C.P. 16 at 1:30 p.m., May 14'.. 2018. Mr. Allen to initiate eo•ference call at

2~9041. Counsel for each party and/or a self-1ep1esented party is to complete a "Pre-trial
Memorandum" pursuant to Rule 16(b) for the final pn:-trial conference. The Pre-Trial
Memorandum shall cover the subject matter as

set

forth in I.R.C.P. I 6(bXI). The memorandum

shall be filed with the Clerk no later than seven (7) days before the pre-trial conference. Any
failure to file a Pre-Trial Memorandum may subject such counsel and/or party to sanctions
pursuant to I.R.C.P. 16(i).
4.

PRE-TRIAL MOTIONS: All motions to join parties or amend the plead~;

motions pertaining to punitive damages under I.C. §6-1604; and motions for summary judgment
must be filed and heard so as not to require the continuance or vacation of the trial date. All such
motions must be filed and served at least 90 days before the trial date and shall be noticed by the
party ftling the motion to be

heard not later than 60 days prior to the trial date. All other non-

dispositive pre-trial motions (including, but not limited to motions in limine or motions which
seek to challenge the admissibility or foundation of expert testimony) must be filed so as to be
scheduled for hearing not less than thirty (30) days before trial. Exceptions will be granted
inftequently, and only when justice so requires.
5.

MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY

JUDGMENT:

All motions for summary

judgment must be accompanied by a mem<>11111dum which includes a concise statement of each
material fact upon which the moving party claims there is no genuine issue, and which shall
include a specific reference to that portion of the record at or by which such filct is proven or
established. Any party opposing a motion for summary judgment shall, not later than fourteen
(14) days prior to hearing, serve and file any affidavits and opposing brief{s). The opposing brief

shall identify the specific factual matters as to which the non-moving party contends there are
genuine issues requiring denial of the motion, including a specific reference to the portion of the
record which supports the claim that a genuine issue of fact exists. In ruling upon any summary
SCHEDULING ORDER
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judgment motion. the Court may assume that· the facts as claimed by the moving party are
conceded to exist without dispute except and to 1he extent the non-moving party shall have
controverted them. Any reply brief must be lodged at least seven (7) days prior to hearing.
Further, any objection to 1he admissibility of evidence must be in writing and shall be part of the
response to the motion for summary judgmeni or in reply to the response in opposition to
summary judgment. The failure to object in writing to 1he admissibility of evidence in support of
or in response to summary judgment shall constitute a waiver as to any objection to the
admissibility of evidence at the time of the hearing on summary judgment. Oral objections to the
admissibility of evidence at the time of hearing on summary judgment will not be considered by
the court.

6.

SCHEDULING AND HEARINGS. The Court bolds its regular civil law and

motion calendar each Monday at I :30 p.m. Absent an order shortening time, all motions must be
filed and served at least fourteen (14) days prior to hearing. A "judge's copy" of any memoranda
or affidavits should be provided for use by the court. All such documents shall be clearly marked
as "JUDGE'S COPY." As a matter of courtesy, counsel are expected to contact the Court's
Depmy Clert, Traci Brandebourg, (phone# 208-644-2601 ext. 2601) to schedule hearings, and to
confirm the availability of opposing counsel for proposed hearing dates. As an accommodation
to out-of-town counsel and parties, hearings on any pretrial motion (except motions for summary
judgment or hearings at which testimony is to be offered) may be conducted by telephone
conference call pursuant to LRC.P. 7(b)(4), in the discretion of the court. Counsel requesting a
hearing by conference call will be responsible for arranging for placement of the call, and the cost
thereof. Arrangements for telephone conference of any status conference must be pre-arranged

by the Wednesday preceding the date of the status conference.
7.

DISCOVERY AND DISCOVERY DISPUTES: The Court will not entertain

any discovery motion unless accompanied by a written certification signed by counsel, which

confirms that a reasonable effort has been made to voluntarily resolve the dispute with opposing
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counsel. A party's obligation to fully and timely respond to discovery requests is distinct from
any obligation imposed by this order, and no party may rely upon the Order or any deadline it
imposes as justification for failing to timely respond to discovery requests or to supplement prior
responses.
8.

DISCOVERY

CUT-OFFS:

Absent a stipulation to the contrary, all discovery

shall be propounded and served such that responses are due no later than thirty (30) days before
trial. Any supplemental responses a party is required to make pursuant to 1.R.C.P. 26(e) or the
terms of an earlier discovery request shall also be served at least thirty (30) days before trial. Any
supplementation of discovery required by the rule shall be made in a timely manner.

9.

WITNESS DISCWSURES:

Each party shall disclose the existence and

identity of intended or potential expert or lay witnesses to the extent required by interrogatories or
other discovery requests propounded by another party. There is no independent duty to disclose
expert or Jay witnesses except as required to adequately respond to discovery requests or
supplement prior responses. If discovery requests seeking disclosure of expert witnesses and the
information required to be disclosed pursuant to l.R.C.P. Rule 26(b)(4)(A)(i)&(ii) are
propounded, a plaintiff upon whom such requests are served shall, in good faith, disclose the
existence and identity of potential or intended expert witnesses, including the disclosures required
by 1.R.C.P. Rule 26(b)(4)(A)(i)&(ii) at the earliest opportunity, and in no event later than one
hundred-twenty (120) days before trial. A defendant upon whom such requests are served shall,
in good faith, identify any potential or intended expert witnesses, including the disclosures
required by l.R.C.P. Rule 26(b)(4)(A)(i)&(ii) at the earliest opportunity, and in no event later than
seventy-five (75) days before trial.
Any party upon whom discovery is served who inrends or reserves the right to call any
expert witness in rebuttal or sum:buttal shall, in good faith, identify such experts, including the
disclosures required by l.R.C.P. Rule 26(b)(4)(A)(i)&(ii) at the earliest opportunity, and in no
event later than forty-two ( 42) days before trial.
SCHEDULING ORDER
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Any party upon whom discovery requests are served seeking disclosure of lay wi1nesses
shall, in good faith, disclose the identity of all such wi1nesses at the earliest opportunity, and in no
event later than sixty (60) days before trial. Absent a showing of good cause and a lack of unfair
prejudice to any other party, any witness who has not been timely disclosed will not be permitted

to testify at trial.
10.

EXRmlTS AND EXHIBIT LISTS:

When and to the extent required to

respond to interrogatories,, requests for production or other discovery requests propounded by
another party, a party must identify and disclose any documentmy, 1llngible or other exhibits that
party intends or reserves the right to offer at trial. Absent a showing of good cause and a lack of
unfair prejudice to all other parties, any exhibit which has not been timely disclosed will be
excluded.

Without regard to whether discovery concerning a party's exhibits has been

propounded, not less than seven (7) days prior to trial, each party shall: (A) lodge with the Clerk
a completed exhibit list in the form attached to this order (Exh. 1 attached) together with one
complete, duplicate marked set of that party's proposed exhibits for the Judge's use during trial;
and (B) deliver to counsel for each other party a copy of the completed exhibit list and duplicate
copy of that party 's marked exhibits.· The exhibit list and duplicate copies need not include
exhibits which will be offered solely for the purpose of impeachment. Unless otherwise ordered,
the plaintiff shall identify exhibits beginning with number "101," and the defendant shall utilize
exhibits beginning with number "201."
11.

AUDIO-VISUAL AND OTHER EQUIPMENT.

Counsel are expected to

notify the Court no later than the pretrial conference of any need for audio-visual or other special
equipment. The Court provides a portable television and VHS-format VCR, a small x-ray
viewer, easel and podium. Counsel may furnish and utiliz.e any additional equipment but must
make all such equipment available for use by opposing counsel. Counsel who furnishes their own
equipment should make appropriate arrangements to set it up in advance so that prolonged delays
are not required.

SCHEDULING ORDER
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12.

JURY INSTRUCTIONS: Jwy instructions and verdict forms requested by a

party shall be prepared in conformity with I.R.C.P. 5l(a), and shall be filed with the Clerk (with

copies to Chambers) at least fourteen (14) days before trial. The Jwy Instructions shall include
the elements of proof for each cause of action; statement of claims; undisputed facts; and the
elements of proof for each affinnative defense. If the jwy instructions submitted are not the

standard ICJI form,

any

proposed instruction shall be submitted with supporting legal authority.

Counsel shall also include a computer disc containing the instructions for use by the court.
Requested instructions not timely submitted may not be included in the court's preliminary or
final charge. Parties may submit additional or supplemental instructions to address unforeseen

issues or disputes arising during trial. To the extent possible, proposed instructions and verdict
forms shall be printed in 12-point, "Times New Roman" typeface like that contained in this order.
The Court has prepared "stock" instructions, copies of which can be obtained upon request. The
parties may, but are not required to submit additional stock instructions.

13.

JUROR QUESTIONS: In accordance with I.R.C.P. 47(q), the Court has the

discretion to permit jurors to submit written questions.

If juror questions are pennitted by the

Court, counsel are permitted to review all questions betbre they are posed to a witness, and
register any objection or comment on the reconi in the absence of the jwy before any juror
questions are posed. After a witness has responded to any juror questions, counsel are permitted
(beginning with the party who called the witness) to pose follow-up questions provoked by juror
questions or witness responses.
14.

TRIAL BRIEFS: The Court encourages (but does not require) the submission

of trial briefs which address important substantive or evidentiary issues each party expects to
arise during trial. Any trial briefs shall be prepared, exchanged between the parties, and lodged
with the Clerk (with copies to Chambers) at least ten (10) days prior to trial.
15.

REQUEST TO VACATE TRIAL SETl'ING: In setting cases for trial, the

Court has taken into account the needs of the parties and the case, availability and convenience of
SCHEDULING ORDER
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counsel, as well as its own personnel, facilities and the interests of counsel and parties in other
pending cases. A request to vacate or continue an existing trial setting works inconveniences and
hardships on the Court, its staff and other litigants, and impairs the Court's ability to efficiently
manage its docket and calendar. For these reasons, requests {including stipulations) to vacate or

continue a trial will be granted

211b'. in the face

of unusual and unforeseen circumstances, and

when the interests of substantial justice to the litigants so require. Any party requesting or

stipulating to vacate a trial setting must submit a specific written statement concerning the
reasons for the request, and must certify, in writing, that the request or stipulation has been
discussed with the parties represented by counsel, and such parties have no objection to the
request or stipulation. An order granting a request to vacate or continue a irial setting may be
conditioned upon terms {including ordets that the requesting party or attorney reimburse other

parties or their attorneys for attorneys fees incurred for preparation which must be repeated or

expenses advanced in anticipation of the trial setting which cannot be avoided or recovered). An
order vacating or continuing a trial setting shall not serve to alter the deadlines set forth in this
order, and unless otherwise stipulated or ordered, the specific calendar dates associated with any
deadlines shall be adjusted in reference to the new or amended trial date.

16.

SANCTIONS FOR NON-COMPLIANCE: A failure to comply with this order

or the deadlines it imposes in a timely manner subject a non-compliant party and/or counsel to an
award of sanctions pursuant to l.R.C.P. 16(i) and/or other applicable rules, statutes or case
precedent

DATEDtbis..2:tdayof

\,lv/y

,201_}

<Jffe!J$
istrict Judge
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
The undersigned certifies that on the

L

day o f ~

2o!2., caused a

true and correct copy of the fon,going SCHEDULING ORDER,~OTI~E OF TRIAL SETTING

AND INITIAL PRETRIAL ORDER to be served upon the following persons in the following
manner.

Plaintiff Counsel:
Ionad,an Grover

Mailed

L

Hand Delivered

P.O. 160

Tremonton, UT 84337
Mailed /

Defendant Counsel:
Blake Hall
1075 S. Utah Avenue, Suite 150
Idaho Falls, ID 83402

Hand Delivered

Laurie McCall, Deputy Clerk
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EXBIBlT LIST

-----~DISTRICT JlJDGE
-----~DEPUIYCLERK
-----~COURT REPORTER
CASE: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

CASE NO. _ _ _ _ _ _ __

DATE:

vs.

NO DESCRIPTION

""

,

DATE

ID

OFFD

OBJ

ADMIT

,.
·.

Exhibit I to Pre-trial Scheduling Order
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FILED-DISTRIC

T t,;.u v, , •
.

CASE#:_ _ _ __
TIME _ _ _ _ __
~

/'I\JG 1 4 1.l\\ I
":-'-. ,.

1

.·

. ,.

;;cd

l=RK
PATTY TEMPLE, CL-

i..u----' DEPUTY

~·. _ _ _

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF MINIDOKA

)
)
)
)

VICTOR RODGER BLISS,
Petitioner(s),

Case No. CV-2017-334

)

vs.
MINIDOKA IRRIGATION DISTRICT,

_____________
Respondent(s).

Order of Assignment by
Administrative District Judge

)
)
)
)
)
)

The above entitled case is currently assigned to the Honorable John K. Butler.
However, in the interest of judicial economy, it has become necessary to reassign this
case. By this Order, Judge John K. Butler is not disqualifying himself.
NOW THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED the above-entitled case is
reassigned to the Honorable Michael P. Tribe for all further proceedings.
Dated: August 10, 2017

. RICHARD BEVAN
Administrative District Judge
Fifth Judicial District

C:
ORDER OF REASSIGNMENT
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
Tue undersigned hereby certifies that on the

JJt!:... day of August , 2017, she

caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER to be served upon the following
persons in the following manner;
Judge Mike Tribe

(x) Email

Jonathan Grover
PO Box 160
Tremonton, UT 84337

(x) mail

Blake Hall
1075 S. Utah Avenue, Suite 150
Idaho Falls, Id 83402

(x) Mail

Dated this

;f':

day August, 2017

Patty Temple, Clerk of the Court

Certificate of service
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Electronically Filed
3/6/2018 4:17 PM
Fifth Judicial District, Minidoka County
Tonya Page, Clerk of the Court
By: Michelle Perry, Deputy Clerk

BLAKE G. HALL, ESQ.
SAM L. ANGELL, ESQ.
HALL ANGELL & ASSOCIATES, LLP
1075 S Utah Avenue, Suite 150
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83402
Telephone (208) 522-3003
Fax (208) 621-3008
!SB Nos. 2434 and 7012
bgh@hasattorneys.com
sla(@,hasattorneys.com
Attorneys for Defendant
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF MINIDOKA
VICTOR RODGER BLISS,
Case No. CV-2017-334
Plaintiff,

AFFIDAVIT OF BLAKE G. HALL
V.

MINIDOKA IRRIGATION DISTRICT,
Defendant.
STATE OF IDAHO )
: ss.
County of Bonneville )
BLAKE G. HALL, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and states as follows:
1.

That I am over the age of eighteen ( 18) and am competent to testify in this matter.

I make this affidavit based on my own personal knowledge unless otherwise indicated. This
affidavit is made under penalty of perjury.
2.

I am an attorney of record for Defendant Minidoka Irrigation District.

AFFIDAVIT OF BLAKE G. HALL - I
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3.

On November 9, 2017, Defendant took the deposition of Plaintiff Victor Bliss on

the facts of this matter. A true and correct copy of the relevant deposition excerpts are attached
hereto as Exhibit A.
4.

Attached hereto as Exhibit B is a true and correct copy of a Farm Lease

agreement between Plaintiff and Alan Woodland. This lease was produced by Plaintiff during the
course of discovery in this case.
5.

Attached hereto as Exhibit C is a true and correct copy of the March 19, 2012,

Senate State Affairs Committee meeting minutes
FURTHER YOUR AFFIANT SAYETH NAUGHT.
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SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO, before me the undersigned, a Notary Public in and for said
State, this _b_ day of March, 2018.

LESLIE GEORGESON
Notary Public

State of Idaho

y comm1ss

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I served a true copy of the foregoing document upon the following
this __{p__ day of March, 2018, by the method indicated below:
Jonathan R. Grover, Esq.
EVANS GROVER BEINS
52 West Main Street
PO Box 160
Tremonton, UT 84337
Fax: 435-257-6592
Email: jgrover@egb-law.com

[ X] Mailing
[
] Hand-Delivery
[
] Facsimile
[ X] Email
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EXHIBIT A
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF MINIDOKA

VICTOR RODGER BLISS ,

)

) Case No. CV-2017-334

Plaintiff,

)

vs.
MINIDOKA IRRIGATION DISTRICT ,

)

Defendant .

DEPOSITION OF VICTOR RODGER BLISS
November 9, 2017

REPORTED BY:
AMY HORSLEY, C . S.R. No. 714 , R.P.R.
Notary Public
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Victor Rodger Bliss
November 9, 2017

Bliss v.
Minidoka Irrigation District
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Q . Where?
A. Ongoing training through the government and
crops that we grow, the universities.
Q . Are you talking about the University ofldaho
extension facilities?
A. Yeah, they put on a school for the beet
program and weeds.
Q. Do you receive a certificate or anything when
you attend those?
A. Not from them, no.
Q. Okay. We'll come back to that, then, in a
second. Other than CSI, have you received any other
type of certificate or diploma other than your high
school diploma and CSI?
A. No.
Q. Then with regard to the extension programs
that you attend, the University ofldaho extension
service -- that's what it's referred to, right?
A. Possibly.
Q. Okay. What programs have you attended there?
You mentioned, I think, a beet program and a -A. Soil and waters, fertility. You know, there's
irrigation schoolings that are put on. I go to a lot of
those things. I mean, I think -- what was it? Last
year or the year before, I mean, they had a deal in here
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wife reside there with you? Does anybody live with you
other than your current wife?
A. No.
Q. Okay. Do you farm any land other than the 250
acres that you own?
A. I'm semi-retired.
Q. Okay. So here's what I'm trying to
understand: Some people own 250 acres, and then they
lease or rent another 250 acres. And I take it from
your answer you're not renting any property for farming
purposes?
A. Yes.
Q. Are you actually farming the 250 acres that
you own, or are you leasing it to someone else?
MR. GROVER: Do you understand that? You look
confused.
THE WITNESS: Yeah.
MR. GROVER: Okay.
THE WITNESS: Can I say both?
Q. (BY MR. HALL) Sure. You can say both, and
then we'll have you explain it.
A. Okay.
Q . Okay. So you say both. That means, I guess,
that you're both farming and leasing. So explain that
to me.
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at the Best Western, and I went to a class on filters,
irrigation filtering. Loved it. All kinds of stuff.
Anything I can go to.
Q . So any extension courses that you can attend,
you've attempted to do that so as to assist you in your
farming abilities and habits?
A . Yes.
Q . Okay. You told me where you lived. And is
that residence at 298 North 850 West, is that on your
farm?
A. I live there.
Q. That's what I wanted to understand is, do you
live on your farm?
A. You're going to -- I don't understand.
Q . Well, what I'm trying to find out is -- maybe
I'll try it this way: How many acres of farmland do you
own?
A. Somewheres over 250.
Q. All of it located in Minidoka County?
A. Yes.
Q. So thinking of those 250 acres, approximately,
of farmland that you own, your house where you live, is
that on some of that 250 acres?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. And does anyone other than your current
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A. I had some health issues. I have had a verbal
contract with another man. My health has improved. I
go out and work on my farm probably every day and his
too. I help.
Q. Okay. When did these health issues arise that
caused you to lease the property with this verbal
agreement with someone else?
A. Somewheres after -- probably in the 2000s plus
time frame.
Q. And who is the individual that you have this
verbal agreement with that is farming the property?
A. Alan, A-1-a-n, Woodland.
Q. And where does Mr. Woodland reside?
A. Minidoka County, I believe, to the best ofmy
knowledge.
Q. So help me understand. You said sometime in
the early 2000s, if I remember correctly -A. I believe that's when I -Q. -- you entered into this agreement with
Mr. Alan Woodland for him to farm your property,
correct?
A. Yes.
Q. And what were the terms of that verbal
agreement?
A . It was kind of a sharecrop.

M & M Court Reporting Service
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And I take it during the lease of both the homeplace and
Mom's place, like the pivots, the hand lines and wheel
lines, the ongoing maintenance of the hand lines and the
wheel lines fall to your renter -A. Yes.
Q. -- Mr. Woodland, correct?
A. Yes.
Q. Where do you get your irrigation water for
Mom's place?
A. Minidoka Irrigation.
Q. And for the homeplace?
A. A&B.
Q. I'm not familiar with A&B. What is that?
A. Another irrigation company.
Q. And that's -- do the A&B stand for anything,
or is it just A&B Irrigation District?
A. Yes.
Q. Yes what? You just know that it's A&B?
A. No. The "A" part stands for a certain area,
and the "B" part stands for another area.
Q. Okay.
A. There's river water, and there's deep wells.
So that's A and B.
Q. Is it an irrigation district or a canal
company, A&B?
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area that says "Land of Bliss," correct?
A. Yes.
Q. And when you're referring to the Bliss
property, that's your property?
A. Yes.
Q. And is that the property you refer to as Mom's
place?
A. Yes.
Q. And that's the 80 acres, correct?
A. Yes.
Q. And then on the second page, I think that's
just a color photo of the same property; is that
correct?
A. Yes.
Q. And it says -- "Bliss" is written in a
particular area as well, correct?
A. Yes.
Q. And that again is Mom's place, right?
A. Yes.
Q. Now, you indicated that back in 2000, early
2000s, when you entered into this oral agreement with
Mr. Woodland, you told him that there were problems on
Mom's place, correct?
A. Yes.
Q. And the problems dealt with the ability to get
Page 41
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A. I don't -- oh, irrigation.
Q. Irrigation district?
A. Yes.
Q. And that's where you get your water for the
homeplace?
A. Yes.
Q. And does it come out of the river, or is it
out of deep wells?
MR. GROVER: Just answer what you know.
THE WITNESS: Both.
Q. (BY MR. HALL) Okay.
A. Can I -Q. That's fine. Now, with regard to Mom's place,
that's the one you told me that you get the water out of
the Minidoka Irrigation District, right?
A. Yes.
(Deposition Exhibit 2 marked.)
Q. (BY MR. HALL) Mr. Bliss, I'm handing you
what's been marked as Deposition Exhibit 2 and ask if
you recognize these two pages.
A. Oh, two pages. Yes.
Q. And what do these two pages depict?
A. Maps of the Bliss property and MID's canal.
Q. Okay. And when we talk about Bliss property,
there's -- on the first page in the center there's an
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water?
A. Yes.
Q. What were the problems?
A. MID had allowed changes to be made, or they
made changes that became the issues.
Q. When were the changes made?
A. I guess I'd have to refer to our paperwork and
start from there.
Q. Well, just the best of your recollection.
A. I can't.
Q. So it was sometime before 2000?
A. Oh, yes. Yes.
Q. Okay. So sometime -- how long before 2000
were these changes made that caused the problem?
A. Somewhat before. I would have to look at the
paperwork, and we could start.
Q. Okay. What changes were made?
A. The first thing was the undertow check was put
in. Excuse me, maybe that's not what I should say. The
original check was converted to an undertow. That's, I
guess, what I'd like to say.
Q. Okay. What was the original kind of check?
A. A spillover with a half, and then the other
half was a solid gate that could be lifted up and down.
Q. And you own shares in the irrigation district,
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or do you just simply own inches of water?
MR. GROVER: Objection to the extent it calls
for an expert opinion. Go ahead.
THE WITNESS: MID has never measured, tried to
measure -- they've never done nothing to even -- when we
flood irrigated, you -- and the ditch rider would come
around and either -- you would call and ask, or he would
come around and say, It's your tum. You took.
Q. (BY MR. HALL) Sure. But under your deed,
there would have been an indication as to what water
right you had, correct?
A. No.
Q. You've never joined the Snake River
Adjudication? You've never acquired through the
adjudication what your water rights are in MID?
MR. GROVER: Objection to the extent it calls
for a legal conclusion.
THE WITNESS: MID holds our water in for us,
and I guess they are supposed to deliver it to us. No,
we received no paperwork.
Q. (BY MR. HALL) Okay. And to your knowledge,
you've never received any documentation when you
acquired the property as to how many inches of water
came with the property?
A. Yes, that's correct.
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Q. This last harvest? What did you do?
A. Helped in the beet.
Q. Doing what?
A. Haul beets.
Q. Like driving truck?
A. Yeah. Yes, excuse me.
Q. And what were you paid for that?
A. The going rate per haul.
Q. What was that?
A. There's different rates.
Q. I don't care what the different rates are
going to be. I just want to know what you got paid.
What did Mr. Woodland pay you?
A . We have not settled up yet.
Q. So you haven't been paid anything yet?
A. Yes.
Q. Now, back with regard to Exhibit 2, you were
telling me -- you were starting to tell me about what
you believe the changes were that were made by MID on
the irrigation. You told me they had taken the original
check out and put an undertow check in. Any other
changes that they had made?
A. Yes. Our -- yes.
Q. What other changes?
A. Our paperwork goes into that in detail.
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MR. GROVER: Counsel, we've been going about
an hour. So would it be okay ifwe took a short recess?
MR. HALL: Sure, yeah.
MR. GROVER: Okay.
(Break taken.)
Q. (BY MR. HALL) Okay. Back on the record.
Mr. Bliss, you were telling me that you'd go
out and try to help on the farm as well, when you're
able to, correct?
A. Yes.
Q. But Mr. Woodland doesn't pay you anything
extra for your services, does he?
A. I guess you're going to have to clarify.
Q. Well, you get cash rent, correct?
A. Yes.
Q. When you go out and work on the farm to help
him, does he pay you something in addition to the cash
rent that you get?
A. Yes.
Q. What does he pay you?
A. Custom rates.
Q. So what's the last type of work that you did
for him on the farm? When is the last time you worked
for Mr. Woodland on the farm?
A. I guess harvest.
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Q. I want to know from you what other changes you
believe were made.
A. They have moved the canals.
Q. The canal that was moved, is that on Exhibit
2? Can you identify the canal that was moved on Exhibit
2?
A. Not all of it.
Q. Okay. What can you identify as being moved on
Exhibit 2?
A . The land of Knopp. Oh. Can I back up? I
need to go one page at a time. This is all Exhibit 2,
right?
Q. Right.
A. Okay.
Q. Page 1 and page 2.
A. So land of Knopp was moved. Then ifwe go to
the next page -Q. I'm assuming the land wasn't moved, but are
you talking about the canal being moved?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. I'm just trying to get clarified. So
when you talk about, on page 2, the canal being moved,
what are you -A. Is this page 2?
Q. No, the next page.
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A. Oh, okay.
Q. What are you saying was moved?
MR. HALL: Let the record reflect that the
witness has written "Page 2" on page 2 of Exhibit 2.
MR. GROVER: Yeah, don't write on those unless
he asks you to, okay?
THE WITNESS: Oh, oh. I'm sorry.
Q. (BY MR. HALL) It's okay. I'd have stopped
you if I thought it was a big problem.
So if we start over here on the left-hand side
of the page.
A . Okay, yes.
Q. Okay. Maybe -- and you can see there's some
yellow. Is that the canal?
A. Existing now, yes.
Q. Okay. And how was it modified?
A. If you look where the R. Knopp, that white
area, that used to be where the canal come across, right
down here.
Q . Okay. So the canal was relocated on the Knopp
property?
A. Yes.
Q. And do you know why it was relocated on the
Knopp property?
A. No.
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Q. Okay. Forty feet to the east -- or not the
east, excuse me -- to the -A. East, east, east.
Q. It is east?
A. (Witness nodded.)
Q. Okay. So 40 feet to the east of the property
line between the Knopps and Bliss is where they changed
the check?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. Any other modifications that -- and I
think you said that that was done sometime prior to
2000?
A. I'd like to refer to our paperwork before I
make a date.
Q. Well, if you have some paperwork that you
believe is available to you, go aright ahead. I don't
care.
MR. GROVER: Just answer as best you can,
unless you brought something with you to refer to.
THE WITNESS: Oh, oh. Okay. Somewheres
around in the 2000 year range, but the check was done in
the '90s.
Q. (BY MR. HALL) Okay. And the check was
changed out in the '90s, correct?
A. (Witness nodded.)
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Q. Okay. And how, if any way, did that affect -MR. GROVER: I'm going to object -MR. HALL: -- the water -- let me finish the
question. Then you can do your objection.
Q. (BY MR. HALL) How, ifin any fashion, did
that affect the water delivery to you?
MR. GROVER: I'll object to the extent it
calls for an expert opinion. Go ahead.
THE WITNESS : I do not run MID's water. All I
know is why I don't get it. It's just not there.
Q. (BY MR. HALL) Okay. So the water just
doesn't get delivered to you; is that what you're
saying?
A. Yes.
Q. And then are there any other modifications?
Oh, first of all, let me ask on page 2, where was this?
Can you see on there the undertow check location? Would
it be shown on that exhibit?
A. Yes.
Q. Can you just point for me about where that
would be?
A. (Witness complied.)
Q. So that's at the point where the water enters
your property, where the canal enters your property?
A. Say, 40 feet past.
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Q. Is that a yes?
A. Yes, excuse me.
Q. Then the relocating of the canal on the Knopp
property occurred in the early 2000s?
A. Yes, to the best of my knowledge.
Q. Any other modifications that you claim
occurred with regard to the MID canal?
A. Yes.
Q . What?
A. So looking at page 2. And you see the
Dallolio name there?
Q. Yes.
A. And then you see the McCall name too?
Q. Yes.
A. The white angle was the original canal.
Q. Okay.
A. And then the white to the north used to be the
old drain.
Q . Okay. And so the canal was modified to follow
some straight lines rather than -A. The yellow, yeah.
Q. The yellow straight lines rather than on this
diagonal, correct?
A. No.
Q. Okay. What do you mean by no? I thought you
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said it was relocated.
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. And when did that relocation occur?
A. Three to five years after Randy Knopp.
Q. So sometime in the -A. I back up. Forgive me. That's where the
issue -- okay. Dallolios owned this 80 here to the
west. McCalls owned the last 160 there. The Dallolio
people made the yellow line change. The Dallolio people
did. And so that was a change.
Q. And when did they make that change?
A. They might have made that before the Knopp
people made the change. I'm not sure who made the first
change.
Q. Okay.
A. But, yes, there was a change there.
Q. Okay.
A. So yeah.
Q. And how, if at all, did that modification of
the canal affect the delivery of water to your property?
MR. GROVER: Objection to the extent it calls
for an expert opinion. Go ahead.
THE WITNESS: I don't know if they removed
the -- there used to be a check in the Dallolio
property, and we were no longer allowed to use it.
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A. I believe so.
Q. Okay. Do you know whether or not there are
any easements across your property?
MR. GROVER: Object to the extent it calls for
a legal conclusion. Go ahead.
THE WITNESS: No, they're -- no.
Q. (BY MR. HALL) You're not aware of any Bureau
of Reclamation easements that the irrigation district
utilizes for the canal?
MR. GROVER: Same objection.
THE WITNESS: I guess, correct. Yes, yes.
Q. (BY MR. HALL) Yes what?
A. Yes.
Q. Youareaware-A. No, no.
Q. Okay. I mean, it's pretty confused right now,
so let's make sure we try and clarify this.
A. Okay.
Q. My question is, are you aware of Bureau of
Reclamation easements that Minidoka Irrigation District
utilizes for their canal?
MR. GROVER: Same objection.
THE WITNESS: No.
Q. (BY MR. HALL) Never spoken to your son about
that?
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Q. (BY MR. HALL) No longer allowed to use what?
A. The check that would back the water there.
Q. Okay.
A. Or we -- yeah, there was issues. We asked and
talked to the irrigation people, and they made some
modifications.
Q. Who made some modifications?
A. Minidoka Irrigation District.
Q. What kinds of modifications did they make?
A. They come back to the Bliss property, and they
dumped some rock in the canal to try to back it up.
Q. And was that effective?
A. No.
Q. And then did you ask them to do anything
additional?
A. Yes.
Q. What did you ask them to do?
A. Put a new check in.
Q. And did that occur?
A. No.
Q. When did you ask them to put that new check
in?
A. The same year that they made this yellow mark
change.
Q. So sometime in the '90s?
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A. No.
Q. Are you aware of any state or county
easements?
A. Yes.
Q. What state or county easements are you aware
of?
A. The 200 North Road.
Q. You're pointing to that red line on the bottom
of page 2?
A. (Witness nodded.)
Q. Is that correct?
A. Yes.
Q. And that is a county road?
A. Yes.
Q. And you believe that's a county easement?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. But you're not aware of any other
easements on your property other than the county road?
A. Yes.
Q. On the partial property in Exhibit 2, what was
grown there last year, this current growing season?
MR. GROVER: Objection; vague and ambiguous.
THE WITNESS: Potatoes.
Q. (BY MR. HALL) Okay. So that would be what
we'd refer to as the 2017 growing season, right?
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Q. And at least as it -- the location of this
canal, Lateral 1712, that crosses your property, it
remains in the same location as it always has since
you've owned the property?
A. Yes.
Q. At some point did you build a canal crossing,
a bridge or a canal crossing of some sort, across this
canal?
A. Yes.
Q. And that was in 2013?
A . To the best ofmy knowledge.
Q. Where, approximately, is that crossing located
on Exhibit 2, if you can tell me?
A. To the west -- or the east side of the
property, east side of the property.
Q. So what we would call -- if we're looking at
page 1 of Exhibit 2, it would be on the right-hand side
of your property?
A. Yes.
Q. Across the canal, right? Is that a yes?
A. Yes.
Q. Thank you. When you -- prior to building that
bridge or crossing, did you contact Minidoka Irrigation
District and get permission to do so?
MR. GROVER: Objection to the extent it calls
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A. Mike Wilkins.
Q. And did you speak with Mr. Wilkins?
A. Yes.
Q. And what, if anything, did Mr. Wilkins tell
you?
A. He told me to contact the manager.
Q. And who was that?
A. Billy Thompson.
Q. What, if anything, did Mr. Thompson tell you?
A. He said he would visit with the board and get
back to me.
Q. Okay. And then what happened?
A. Nothing.
Q. So no one ever got back to you?
A. Then a few years later, when it become -- when
it become necessary, I started again. My ditch rider
was Leland Tracy.
Q. So when was it you started the first time
around?
A. Oh, ten years ago.
Q. Okay. And then the second time, when was
that, that you started the second time around with
Mr. Tracy?
A. Three years before Alan Woodland started
helping me farm, three to four years, best of my
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for a legal conclusion. Go ahead.
THE WITNESS: I guess you'll have to restate
the question or change it.
Q. (BY MR. HALL) Okay. Prior to building what
you've identified -A. Okay.
Q. -- as a bridge across the canal, prior to
building that, did you contact Minidoka Irrigation
District and get permission from them to put that
crossing in?
MR. GROVER: Same objection.
THE WITNE SS: Yes.
Q. (BY MR. HALL) To whom did you speak?
A . I started with the ditch rider.
Q. Who was that?
A. I think I started -- to the best of my
knowledge, I started with Jared Bingham.
Q. Who was Jared Bingham at the time?
A. This water system -- well, he was the rider
for this lateral.
Q. Okay. And what did Mr. Bingham tell you, if
anything?
A. He told me to talk to my board member and go
from there.
Q. And who was that? Who was the board member?
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knowledge.
Q. Okay. So that would have been approximately
ten years ago?
A. Yes.
Q. And when you contacted Mr. Tracy, what, if
anything, were you told?
A. To contact my board member.
Q. And did you do that?
A. Yes.
Q. And who was that?
A. Mike Wilkins.
Q . What did he tell you to do?
A. He told me I needed to talk to Dan Davidson.
Q. And who is that?
A. The manager.
Q. Did you speak with him?
A. Yes.
Q. And what, if anything, did he tell you?
A. He said he would come out and take a look.
Q. And did he?
A. Yes.
Q. And then what?
A. He said he would get back to me. And late
that fall he called me up and said -- well, heavens.
Oh, he started out and said I needed to go to the Bureau
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A. Before I talked to Leland Tracy.
Q. Do you remember the year that that occurred?
A. No, sir.
Q. That was sometime prior to Mr. Woodland
starting to farm your property, though, right?
A. Yes.
Q. So that would have been more than ten years
ago -A. Approximate.
Q. -- that that crossing was injured or damaged?
Excuse me.
A. To the best ofmy knowledge.
Q. Okay. In any event, I still don't
understand -- then you say you sent them back some kind
of a letter, and then what happened?
A. Two years went by. We now, I'm saying
Mr. Woodland and myself, in the spring, before the
potatoes were going to be planted, we proceeded and put
in a crossing.
Q. And as I understand it, that was in the spring
of 2013, correct?
A. Best ofmy knowledge.
Q. Okay.
A. Put in a crossing, and I went to the hospital.
Q. At the time that the new crossing was put in
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Q. Okay. Were you ever notified that you needed
to remove that crossing?
A. Yes.
Q. By whom?
A. Minidoka Irrigation District.
Q. When did that occur?
A. The next year that we had beets following the
potatoes.
Q. So in 2014?
A. Approximately three weeks before we were going
to harvest the beets. Yes.
Q. And who told you that you needed to remove it?
A. You'll have to rephrase the question.
Q. Well, you said that Minidoka Irrigation
District told you that it needed -- that the crossing
needed to be removed because you didn't have a permit
for it, correct?
A. Yes.
Q. I'm trying to find out if there was a
particular individual who told you that, if they did
that in writing or what you recall.
A. It was in writing.
Q. What, if anything, did you do upon receipt of
that documentation?
A. I contacted an attorney.
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across Lateral 1712 by you and Mr. Woodland in 2013, did
you have a crossing agreement entered into with Minidoka
Irrigation District?
A. No.
MR. GROVER: Objection to the extent it calls
for a legal conclusion. Go ahead.
THE WITNESS: I don't believe so.
Q. (BY MR. HALL) Did you have a crossing
agreement executed and agreed to by the Bureau of
Reclamation?
MR. GROVER: Same objection.
THE WITNESS: We were working on it with them.
Q. (BY MR. HALL) Okay. And when you say you
were working on it, that means you didn't have one that
had already been signed, correct?
A. Yes.
Q. And you still don't have one that's been
signed, do you?
A. Yes.
Q. Yes what?
A. Yes, we do not.
Q. Okay. In any event, you went ahead and put
this crossing in, in the spring of 2013. What, if any,
problems did that create?
A. None.
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Q. Did you remove the crossing?
A. No.
Q. And it hasn't been removed to this date,
correct?
A. Yes.
Q. And it remains in the same condition now as it
has since 2013, correct?
A. Yes.
Q. And you've also been notified that you needed
to fill out an application with the Bureau of
Reclamation for this crossing, correct?
A. Yes.
Q. And you were sent a copy of what that
application -- a copy of that Bureau of Reclamation
application, correct?
A. No.
Q. After receiving notice from -- I think you
said it was in 2014 -- from Minidoka Irrigation District
that you needed to get a permit for that crossing from
the Bureau of Reclamation, on how many occasions have
you contacted Bureau of Reclamation to acquire such a
permit?
MR. GROVER: Objection to the extent it
mischaracterizes the witness's prior testimony. Go
ahead.
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the movements, had made the changes.
Q. So you're talking about back in the 1990s?
A. Yes.
Q. Any other forms of discrimination?
A. We could stay here all day, sir.
Q. That's okay with me.
A. Okay. Some ofmy neighbors, they supplied
chemicals to them to spray the weeds.
Q. Okay. "They" meaning?
A. MID, Minidoka Irrigation District.
Q. And have you made a request for them to supply
chemicals to you?
A. Yes.
Q. To whom did you make that request?
A. The management.
Q. Give me a name of someone you made that
request to.
A. Billy Thompson.
Q. And how long ago was that?
A. Ten years ago, fifteen years ago. I don't
know.
Q. Okay.
A. I can't think of the fellow's name before him.
Q. So the last time you made a request for them,
for MID, to provide chemicals to you to be able to spray
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ago when you made the request that he provide chemicals
so you could spray your weeds?
A. No.
Q. Okay. Did he tell you that that was something
they no longer did?
A. Didn't want to explain himself.
Q. You're not aware of anybody else receiving
those types of chemicals in the last five or six years,
are you?
A. I have not talked to other water users here
lately to try to see what's going on.
Q. So then you'd agree with me, you're not aware
of anybody else having received chemicals from the
irrigation district in the last five or six years to
spray their weeds, correct?
A. In the meeting, in the board meeting, they
have talked about those things. And they wouldn't say
yes or no.
Q. You still haven't answered my question, so -A. I don't know. I don't know.
Q. Okay. In your Complaint you allege a breach
of contract, and you state that you had a contract with
Minidoka Irrigation District, but we have not been
provided with a copy of that contract. Do you have a
copy of the contract?
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the weeds was IO or 15 years ago?
A. No.
Q. When was the last time you made that request?
A . Since Dan Davidson has been the manager.
Q. That doesn't mean anything to me. I just need
to know, when's the last time you made that request?
A. I don't know.
Q. Five years ago?
A. I can't remember.
Q. Six years ago?
A. Probably that, yes.
Q. Sometime prior -A. When the new board -- when the new manager
come on, I went and tried to ask again.
Q. So whenever that new manager came on is when
you -- is the last time you asked?
A. Yes.
Q. And what were you told?
A. No, I have been to many board meetings and
listened. I have not been allowed to speak in the board
meetings.
Q. That wasn't what my question -A. Okay.
Q. So I'll move to strike that. My question was,
what did Mr. Davidson tell you this five or six years
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MR. GROVER: Object to the extent it calls for
any type oflegal conclusion. But go ahead.
THE WITNESS: No.
Q. (BY MR. HALL) When did you enter into a
contract with Minidoka Irrigation District?
MR. GROVER: Same objection.
THE WITNESS: All water users have the same
agreement on MID that they -- that I guess they hold the
water for us, and we pay to get the dams and the water
held and stored and delivered.
Q. (BY MR. HALL) And what is your annual
payment?
A. It changes as the board sees fit.
Q. Well, what was it last year?
A. 3,600 and something, if you got the discount.
Q. And how do you get the discount?
A. By paying at a certain date.
Q. And is that what you did?
A. Yes.
Q. You're not aware of any written contract
between you and Minidoka Irrigation District, are you?
MR. GROVER: Objection; legal conclusion. Go
ahead.
THE WITNESS: No.
Q. (BY MR. HALL) You explained to me earlier how
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A. Yes.
Q. And so he would be the one that would be
responsible to get a hold of Minidoka Irrigation
District so that he'd have water?
MR. GROVER: Objection; calls for a legal
conclusion.
THE WITNESS: I guess you're going to have to
restate that or -Q. (BY MR. HALL) Well, when Mr. Woodland wants
to irrigate the farm -- and I assume he wants to
irrigate the farm from time to time, right?
A. Yes.
Q. Do you contact Minidoka Irrigation District on
his behalf to tell them that he needs water?
A. At times. At times.
Q. Okay. And at other times he contacts them
directly?
A. Yes.
Q. And has Mr. Woodland ever told you that he was
having a problem, in the time that he's been farming the
property, in getting adequate water?
A. Yes.
Q. When's the last time he told you that?
A. This spring when we was trying to set the
chemical on the potatoes.
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Q. So there wasn't water that was passing Knopps'
property onto your property? Was the water stopping at
your headgate?
A. No.
Q. So there was water flowing into your property?
A. Yes.
Q. You just wanted more water?
A. Yes.
Q. And so after you made that call, did they come
and get you more water?
A. I can't answer that.
Q. You didn't stick around?
A. No.
Q. Okay. And you never talked to Mr. Woodland as
to whether or not he got enough water?
A. Yes, by night we were able to run.
Q. So by that evening they were able to get you
enough water to accomplish what you needed to get
accomplished?
A. Yes.
Q. So here's where my confusion is, is that -does everyone on this lateral line have the same right
to the same amount of water, or does it vary from farmer
to farmer?
MR. GROVER: Object to the extent it calls for
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Q. What did he tell you?
A. He asked me to come over and try to help.
Q. Try to help what?
A. Get some water.
Q. What did you do to try to help get some water?
A. I went over, looked the situation over, called
the manager, called the ditch rider. I had a new phone,
so I didn't know those numbers. I tried to get some
help.
Q. And what, if anything, happened?
A. I was able to talk to the ditch rider. He
said he turned it on that morning.
Q. Okay.
A. And we'd called the day before. I asked him
where the -- where he turned it on from. He would not
answer. I said, Unless you turned it on right there at
our headgate, there wasn't any. I asked him if he'd
been to our headgate that morning to see ifwe could
take any, if he had opened our headgate for us. He had
not done anything.
Q. Okay. So was there water in the canal as it
crossed Knopps' property?
A. Yes.
Q. But your headgate was closed?
A. Yes.
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speculation. But go ahead and answer.
THE WITNESS: I cannot answer that.
Q. (BY MR. HALL) Okay.
A. Because MID won't explain it to me. I guess
we'd have to refer to the paperwork.
Q. Did Minidoka Irrigation District ever
physically stop water from going onto your property?
MR. GROVER: Objection to the extent it calls
for speculation.
THE WITNESS: I can't answer that.
Q. (BY MR. HALL) You're not aware of anyone from
Minidoka Irrigation District ever physically stopping
water from going onto your property, correct?
A. Well, that's an unanswerable question.
Q. Well, either you're aware of them doing
something, or you're not aware. So I'm just trying to
find out if you're aware of anyone doing something to
prevent water from going onto your property into this
canal that's across your property.
MR. GROVER: I guess I would object on the
basis of being vague and ambiguous. I mean, are you
talking about headgates? Are you talking about anything
as it applies to the water?
MR. HALL: Anything.
THE WITNESS: Well, I guess then I could say
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1

yes.
Q. (BY MR. HALL) Okay. What did they do?
A. This check was way too high to ever hold the
water back for my use.
Q. Okay.
A. And they locked it open.
Q . You're making reference to the chain and
padlock that they put on the gate wheel?
A . Yes.
Q. When did they do that?
A. I don't know.
Q. Now, ifl understand it, you were accused of
removing the chain and the padlock from the wheel at
that gate crossing?
A. Yes.
Q. When was that?
A. June29,2017. Or'l6.
Q. Okay.
A. One of the two years. Year before, year
before. I think it's been a year now, yeah. 2016.
Q . That's what I have down is -A. Yeah.
Q. -- June of 2016.
A. Okay, yes.
Q. Did you, in fact, remove the chain and
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Q. -- the lock and the wheel itself?
A. No.
(Deposition Exhibit 3 marked.)
Q. (BY MR. HALL) I'm handing you what's been
marked as Deposition Exhibit 3. The document we have is
not signed, and so I'm just trying to make sure I
understand. It indicates here that this is a letter
dated 11 /29 of 2013. Do you see that?
A. Yes.
Q. And it's addressed to the Board of Directors
of the Minidoka Irrigation District, and it appears to
be a letter that you sent?
A. Yes, I believe so.
Q. Do you see on the last page -- there's three
pages there, so -- what I'm trying to get at is, because
it's not signed, I just want to make sure that this a
document that you actually prepared and sent.
A. Yes. This was our own copy that we kept at
our house, and I didn't figure I needed to sign it.
Q. Okay. And it makes reference to Circle
Triangle Ranches. Who is Circle Triangle Ranches?
A. That's my farm name.
Q. And is that a corporation? What is it?
A. DBA.
Q. Now, you wrote this letter. And isn't it
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padlock?
A. Yes.
Q. And why?
A. On Frank Hunt's permission.
Q. Who's Frank Hunt?
A. Chairman of the board.
Q. Okay. So tell me about that, how you got that
permission.
A. I called him. He come out. I toured him
around. That night I called his house again, and he
gave me permission.
Q. What did he tell you?
A . Go get you some water.
Q. Okay. And so that's what you did?
A. Yes.
Q. And then after that you were accused of not
having permission to remove it?
A. Yes.
Q. By whom?
MR. GROVER: Objection to the extent it calls
for speculation.
THE WITNESS: I don't know who.
Q. (BY MR. HALL) You did more than just take the
lock off, right? You actually took -A. No.
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correct that they told you then -- by "they" I mean the
Minidoka Irrigation District -- told you that you would
need to contact the Bureau of Reclamation to get
permission to put the crossing in?
A. It was before this letter.
Q. Before that letter, they told you that you
needed to contact the Bureau of Reclamation?
A. I believe so.
Q. Okay. Why did you send this letter to
Minidoka Irrigation District if you'd already been told
that you would have to get permission from the Bureau of
Reclamation?
A. No, I had not talked to the Reclamation then.
Q. But you'd already been told -A. Well, no, I guess I'd talked to them, but I
sent this in response to their crossing agreement from

MID.
Q . Okay.
(Deposition Exhibit 4 marked.)
Q. (BY MR. HALL) I'm handing you now what's been
marked as Deposition Exhibit 4. Do you recognize that
document?
A. Yes.
Q. And this letter is dated, it appears, June 9th
of 20 I 6, correct?
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of the canal bank, you would have no reason to dispute
that, correct?
A. Yes. Let's see. Is yes meaning that I would
not?
Q. You would not dispute what they said if
that's -A. Then it's no.
Q. Then no what?
A. No, I would dispute it.
Q. Okay. So how could you dispute it if you
don't know where the personal property was located?
A. Because you're asking me where the canal was
or is or -Q. Well, how close to the edge of the canal
bank -- you know what a canal bank is, I assume?
A. Yes, sir. Yes, sir.
Q. Okay. And if you look at a canal bank, it has
a tow on it, right?
A. Yes.
Q. So from the tow on the canal bank, how far
away from the tow on that canal bank was your personal
property that you claim that was damaged?
A. Undetermined, sir.
Q. So you don't know?
A. That's -- yeah, that's the best word I could
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Q. Okay. So you documented the date and time
that these personal property items were injured?
A. No. Well -- no.
Q. Why did you not preserve that evidence?
A. I did not have a camera during some of it. I
called my board director and had him come look at the
damage.
Q. So you don't know what year that occurred?
A. There's been, over the years, lots. Just it's
ongoing. Ongoing, sir. Ongoing.
Q. Well, we know that some ofit happened ten
years ago. You say it's ongoing. What damage has
occurred in the last two years?
A. Flooded my farm, that I can think of right
offhand.
Q. And you told me about the spring runoff?
A. No.
Q. Okay. What additional flooding, then, are you
making reference to?
A. They overtopped the canal.
Q. When?
A. The year we had beets in there.
Q. When?
A. I can't give you a date right now.
Q. So you don't know what year?
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give you is undetermined.
Q. So if the canal -- excuse me. If the
irrigation district employees indicate that they -- that
the personal property was within 5 feet of the tow of
that canal, you would have no basis to dispute that,
correct?
A. Yes, I would have reason to dispute it.
Q. Explain your basis to dispute it, then.
A. Randy Knopp has moved the canal. It was never
there.
Q. So that's your basis?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay.
A. It's an undetermined right-of-way now, being
as he's moved it.
Q. Okay. And you've made reference to the risers
and the pumps and the fences and the main line and the
hand lines being damaged. Did you take pictures of the
damage?
A. That's so vague, I guess I cannot answer.
Q. You don't know whether you took photographs -A. Yes.
Q. -- of the damage to the main line, the hand
lines, the fences, the pumps, and the risers?
A. Yes.
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A. I've got pictures of it that's been supplied
to my lawyer.
Q. So when that occurred you were not farming the
property, correct?
A. Correct.
Q. And that did not have any impact on the cash
rent that you received, correct?
A. Correct.
Q. And you indicate that they placed some dirt on
the property?
A. Yes.
Q. And where did they place dirt?
A. On both boundary fences.
Q. And when did that occur?
A. When they moved the ditch.
Q. So back in 2000, approximately, or the 1990s?
A. Whatever the paperwork shows.
Q. So they haven't placed any dirt since 19 -sometime between 1990 and 2000, correct?
A. Correct.
Q. Did you ever speak to anyone at Minidoka
Irrigation District about this dirt?
A. Yes.
Q. And what, if anything, was said? I realize
it's 20 years ago, but --
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in the 1990s to the early 2000s, and we're now at 2017.
A. Okay. So -Q. Close to 20 years ago. So I may be off by two
or three years. I don't know. But what I'm trying to
understand is, you said you talked to somebody at
Minidoka Irrigation District about the dirt -A. Yes.
Q. -- correct?
A. (Witness nodded.)
Q. And what was the substance of that
conversation?
A. They came out and looked, the board and the
manager, and they said that Randy Knopp was allowed to
do that, and they hadn't taken it back, so it wasn't
their problem.
Q. Okay. And you didn't take any further action?
A. I asked them to remove it and clean it up and
get a setback.
Q. And did they?
A. Can't answer that question either.
Q. Why?
A. It's vague.
Q. Well, either the dirt is still there, or it
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Q. (BY MR. HALL) Who was the manager at the
time?
A. Billy Thompson.
Q. Okay. Who were the board members that came
out?
A. Mike Wilkins, Kowitz, Short, Wes Goff. How
many have I got? I can't remember the last person's
name.
Q. That's fine.
A. And then there was Billy Thompson.
Q. So what year was this?
A. I don't recall.
Q. Well, I thought you said it was associated
with when they relocated the canal.
A. No.
Q. So why was the fence taken out?
MR. GROVER: Objection; speculation. Go
ahead.
THE WITNESS: Billy Thompson and all ofus had
a little talk. I guess Billy Thompson, Mike Wilkins,
and myself and my family were out there. And we showed
them how the dirt was piled right on top of the fence
and was pushing the fence over. He bad nothing to say.
He had -- I complained about the whole situation and
what I thought the laws were and were not, and I thought
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isn't.
A. Now my fence is gone. So is it, or isn't it?
Q. The fence has been gone for, what, 20 years?
A. No.
Q. How long?
A. When they dug, when they went out and did that
then, what I just talked about, they wiped out my fence.
Q. Okay. And how long has that fence been gone,
then?
A. About five -- five, seven. Seven years. I
don't know.
Q. I thought you told me that they realigned that
canal sometime in the 1990s -A. Yes.
Q . -- early 2000s.
A . Yes.
Q. And that's when they would have removed your
fence?
A. No.
Q. Okay. When did they remove the fence, and why
did they remove the fence?
MR. GROVER: Objection; speculation. But go
ahead and answer.
THE WITNESS: The board came out. The manager
was brought out too.

\tin-I snipt"

1
2
3

4
5
6

7

8
9

10

11
12
13

14
15
16

17
18
19

20
21
22
23
24

25

it didn't comply with MID's laws and rules.
Q. (BY MR. HALL) Okay.
A. And at that time we talked about these other
problems, and half of the board left before we even
looked at all the problems. So Mr. Short left.
Mr. Kowitz left. And I can't think of the other guy's
name. I don't know what his name is. I just don't know
what his name is. I -Q. That's fine. But in any event, this event
took place, what, seven, eight, nine, ten years ago?
A. No. Maybe four or five years ago.
Q. You don't have any documentation in your
possession that would clarify the date that this
incident was?
A. I am not sure. Hopefully, the Board of MID
Irrigation, they have record of when they come out. And
probably my board member would know when that was.
MR. HALL: Do you want to take a short break?
MR. GROVER: Sure.
(Break taken.)
(Deposition Exhibits 5 and 6 marked.)
Q. (BY MR. HALL) Mr. Bliss, I'm now handing you
what's been marked as Deposition Exhibit 5. Do you
recognize that document?
A. Yes.
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Q. And what is this?
A . I guess this is my attorney's response.
Q. Okay. The letter says that it's a Jetter to
comply with the Idaho Tort Claims Act. Sometimes these
are referred to as a notice of tort claim. Other than
this notice of tort claim, did you ever send any notices
of tort claim to Minidoka Irrigation District?
MR. GROVER: Objection to the extent it calls
for a legal conclusion.
THE WITNESS: I guess I don't know what that
is.
Q. (BY MR. HALL) Okay. This is the only Jetter
you've ever bad an attorney send to Minidoka Irrigation
District?
A. No.
Q. Okay.
A. Oh, yeah.
Q. So you don't know what a notice of tort claim
is, correct?
A. No. Yeah, I don't know what it is.
Q. So you don't know whether any other notices of
tort claim have ever been sent to you by Minidoka
Irrigation District, correct?
MR. GROVER: Objection; legal conclusion.
THE WITNESS: I believe I have not.

A. They've put all the fill in the ditch and
stuff. And you see how small the ditch is. Yeah, it
3 shows a lot of things. A lot of things.
4
Q. So I see two ditches, I think.
5
A. Maybe there could be a second ditch there. It
6
might be the farmer's own ditch. I'm not sure what that
7
bank is over there.
8
Q. Is this on your property?
9
A. No.
10
Q. Okay. So this is on somebody else's property?
11
A. Yes.
12
Q . And it doesn't -- okay.
13
The next one, 16, what's that picture
14 attempting to depict?
15
A. That's MID there going to work on another
16 canal, I guess.
11
Q. So this is, again, not on your property?
18
A. Yes, that's correct.
19
Q. And this is, you believe, Minidoka Irrigation
2 o District equipment out working on one of their canals?
21
A. Yes.
22
Q. And the next one, 64, what is that?
23
A. 64?
24
Q. Yeah.
25
A. Oh, sorry, I got two. Excuse me.
1

2
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Q. (BY MR. HALL) Okay. I'm now handing you
what's been marked as Deposition Exhibit 6. I just want
to try to go through these. There's a Bates stamp at
the bottom of each one, so we won't -- you see this
number right here? It says PLA 00007. Do you see that,
Mr. Bliss?
A. Yes.
Q. That's what we refer to as a Bates stamp. So
I just want you to go through with me, if you can, for a
few minutes. The first one -- I'll just refer to them
by the last number or the last three numbers -- 007, do
you know who took this picture?
A. Myself.
Q. And when did you take this picture?
A. In the past two, three -- two to three years.
Q. You don't have a specific date when you took
it?
A. Ifl look at my stuff, I could come up with an
exact date and time.
Q. Okay. We'll probably have you do that through
some interrogatories, then.
What is it you're attempting to demonstrate by
this picture? What's it supposed to be showing us?
A. MID has come in and done what you see here.
Q. What's that?
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MR. GROVER: Let's keep those in order.
THE WITNESS: Oh, okay.
Q. (BY MR. HALL) Did you take this picture, 64?
A. Well, mine aren't black-and-white, sir, so -Q. Well, I can only give you what I've got. So
what I'm trying to understand is, did you take this
picture?
A. Possibly.
Q. And what is it you're attempting to depict
here?
A. I guess the lock on a wheel and how far the
stem is up, but you can't even see the stem in this
picture.
Q. And where is this particular location of this
photograph?
A. This might be on Dad and Mom's and my farm.
Q. Okay. And photograph 68 -A. Okay, okay.
Q. -- what is that? What is that a picture of?
A. In the bottom of the picture shows what's left
of my crossing.
Q. So is this location on your property?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. And when you say what's left of your
crossing, this is -- in the forefront of the photograph,
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don't -Q. Did you ever hire anyone to move noxious weeds
from the canal?
A. No.
Q. Or the canal banks?
A. No.
Q. Did you ever remove any noxious weeds on the
canal or canal banks?
A. What do you mean by remove?
Q. Well, cleared it out, removed, cut down.
A. Well, spray.
Q. So you've done some spraying?
A. I spray. Could I get you to clarify that a
little more, please?
Q. I think you've answered the question. I mean,
what you're saying is you've never gone in there
yourself, like, with a mower of some sort and mowed down
the weeds along the canal banks, correct?
A. Yeah, I bought a little rotary mower, and I go
there close somewheres. I don't know that I get up on
the canal bank. I fell off of it before and cracked
some ribs, and so I -- that was with a four-wheeler.
Q. When was that?
A. Oh, three years ago. I was trying to bum, in
the fall, and so --
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Q. So what is it for?
A. For this one here.
Q. For the headgate thing?
A. Yeah.
Q. Okay.
A. Yeah.
Q. That's what I needed to understand. And the
legal costs, same thing, the $93 .44, that was, to the
best of your knowledge, associated with the headgate
incident?
A. Yes.
Q. Then you have lost income, 18 hours. Where
were you working at the time of this incident that you
lost 18 hours' worth of work?
A. On my farms.
Q. Well, the farms were leased out. So what I'm
trying to find out, were you employed somewhere during
that time frame?
A. I feel like my time is valuable too.
Q. Okay. So you didn't have any employment at
the time of this incident and that you lost hours
associated with that employment other than -- anything
other than yourself time, correct?
A. Yes.
Q. And travel costs, that would be you charging
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Q. I'm looking at Exhibit 5, if you've got it
there.
A. Yeah, you can flip. Oh, there it is.
Q. Get these out of your way.
A. Okay.
Q. And in this document you set forth your
damages. So I just want to go through those with you.
You indicate that you are entitled to attorney's fees of
$2,512.50. To whom did you pay those attorney's fees?
A. I guess Mr. Grover.
Q. In association with what?
A. MID charging me with this.
Q. Well, what I'm trying to understand is, are
those attorney's fees that you incurred as a result of
bringing this lawsuit, or are those attorney's fees that
you incurred as a result of the criminal citation that
you received?
MR. GROVER: I object to the extent it calls
for speculation. But answer as best you can.
A. Best I know, it's for this water deal here.
Q. For this lawsuit? The one that we're talking
abouttoday?
A. No.
Q. Okay.
A. No.
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for three trips from where to where?
A. To Rupert.
Q. And then you say copies, 55 copies at 50
cents. What were you copying?
A. My evidence.
Q. And the pictures of -- 22 pictures at a dollar
a picture?
A. The pictures I took of those days.
Q. Okay. And to whom did you pay the dollar per
picture to?
A. That would be, I suppose, like, a Wal-Mart
thing, you know, to have them develop them.
Q. Do you have a receipt for that?
A. I suppose my attorney does. I don't know
where he had them made.
Q. Okay.
A. I made some copies myself and gave to him.
Q. ls that true with regard to the copies as
well? Do you have a receipt for the copies, the one
before that, 55 copies at 50 cents?
A. I'm not sure whether we -- I'm sure we had to
have some made somehow.
Q. Okay. You don't have a receipt for it, is
what I'm getting at?
A. I'm not sure.
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Q. Okay.
A. We try to keep all our tickets.
Q. And we haven't seen any receipts. So if you'd
go through your receipts to see if you have anything to
provide to us, that would be appreciated.
And then you have attorney travel. Is that
for your attorney to travel on the headgate thing?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. And then damage to reputation and
character of$50,000. How did you come up with a figure
of $50,000 for damage to reputation and character?
A. I suppose Mr. Grover helped with that.
Q. Well, has anyone told you that you're held in
lower esteem because of this charge that was dismissed?
A. I have not talked to people about such a
question.
Q. Okay. So no one has told you that they hold
you in lower esteem as a result of the charges, correct?
A. Yes.
Q. Who?
A. Dan Davidson, now. Dan Davidson.
Q. What did he tell you?
A. His statement was something like, I told you
so. Or I'm not sure what his statement was to me. I'll
have to think about that for a minute. But he did make
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stuff.
Q. Okay. But the person you do the most business
with is Mr. Woodland, right?
A. No.
Q. Well, he pays you somewhere between 90- to
l 00,000 a year. Isn't he the person you have the most
economic exchange with?
MR. GROVER: Objection; asked and answered.
THE WITNESS: No.
Q. (BY MR. HALL) Who is, then?
A. I don't know that that's any of your business.
Q. Well, I get to ask the question, and you get
to answer.
A. I guess I don't want to answer.
MR. HALL: Well, then I'm going to leave this
deposition open for further examination until he does
answer, and we can go to the court and have the judge
require him to do that.
Q. (BY MR. HALL) But just so we're clear, so
when the court orders this to occur, you're telling us
that you will not tell us the name of the person that
you have the most economic transactions with, correct?
MR. GROVER: I'd just object on the basis of
relevance.
THE WITNESS: Yes.
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reference to this, to me, at one time. And I was
shocked. I was just shocked that -- yeah, I think it
was verbally that he made this statement to me.
Q. Okay.
A. I'll have to look at my -Q. Look at that and see if -A. -- e-mails, yeah.
Q. And you can supplement your answers
accordingly.
Has anyone told you that they won't do
business with you now as a result of this incident?
A. Well, I just don't talk to people about that.
Q. So the answer would be -A. Or I try not to.
Q. -- no one has told you that they wouldn't do
business with you anymore as a result of the charge that
was brought against you, correct?
MR. GROVER: Object to the extent it's been
asked and answered.
Q. (BY MR. HALL) Isn't that correct?
A. I don't know because people haven't -- I
haven't -- I guess I do business differently than that.
Q. What do you mean you do business differently
than that?
A. Well, maybe I just pay a check when I get my

\ !in l Script "

l

2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
ll

12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

Q. (BY MR. HALL) And you won't tell us whether
or not that person has told you that they will no longer
do business with you as a result of these charges,
correct?
MR. GROVER: Same objection.
THE WITNESS: It necessarily isn't a person.
A business.
Q. (BY MR. HALL) Well, has anyone in that
business told you they would no longer do business with
you because of this charge?
A. No.
Q. Can you point to any lost business that you
have had as a result of these charges?
MR. GROVER: Objection; asked and answered.
THE WITNESS: I don't know, sir.
MR. HALL: Well, again, we'll hold the
deposition open for purposes of being able to get the
answers to those questions. I have no further questions
at this time.
MR. GROVER: Okay. Read and review. I have
no questions.
THE REPORTER: Would you like to purchase a
copy?
MR. GROVER: Yes.
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Farm.Lease
This agreement is between Victor & Tammy Bliss- Landlords 289 N 850W Paul, Idaho
83347 and Alan & Debra Woodland.
Tenant will hereby agree to a cash rent for 225 (+or-) acres for 5 years being 2014
through 2018 and 80 beet Shares.
Tenant agrees to pay all electrical power charges for water.
Will keep irrigation system in good operable condition, and leave it in the same
condition at the end of the lease and pay all repair costs.
Tenant will pay for both parts and labor and be responsible to repair irrigation equipment
during lease and leave it in the same shape.
Land will be fall worked for next years crop when the lease is over.
_If able, Vic and/or Tammy would be allowed to help with harvest by hauling beets with
their own trucks, at a reasonable rate.
Cash rent will be $90,000.00 per year, beet share rent is $8,000.00 per year, for a total of
$ 98,000.00 to be made in two payments. Payments will be made annually Sept. 1,
$40,000.00~!0' $58,000.00
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MINUTES

SENATE STATE AFFAIRS COMMITTEE
DATE:

Monday, March 19, 2012

TIME:

8:00 AM .

PLACE:

Room WW55

MEMBERS
PRESENT:

Chairman McKenzie, Senators Darrington, Davis, Hill, Fulcher, Winder, Lodge,
Malepeai, and Stennett

ABSENT/
EXCUSED:

None

NOTE:

The sign-in sheet, testimonies, and other related materials will be retained with
the minutes in the committee's office until the end of the ·session and will then be
located on file with the minutes in the Legislative Services Library.
Chairman McKenzie called the meeting to order at 8:02 a.m. with a quorum
present.

H 591

RELATING TO UNCLAIMED PROPERTY to authorize the State Treasurer to
establish rules for redemption procedures for certain unclaimed property.
Representative Luker explained that currently, unclaimed property escheats to
the state after ten years without providing a method for the owner to reclaim the
property. Idaho is only one of two states that, after a period of time, escheats
unclaimed property to the state even if there could still be claim on it. This bill
removes that escheat provision with two exceptions. (1} There is a constitutional
provision for cases when the property is disposed of through the state but the
owner was not identified, then the money goes to the school endowment fund. (2}
Property coming from other avenues without owner identification would escheat to
the state. Currently, some of that money goes to the endowment fund after five
years. H 591 expands the holding period to 1O years making it consistent. Those
properties that would escheat would do so after ten years but the properties that
can be identified stays on the unclaimed property rolls. The fiscal note shows
that the requests decline over time but there are still people claiming property
after the ten year period.
Representative Luker said this issue came up last year when they had a property
bill on the House side and as they were discussing it, it became apparent that
some property had escheated to the state and he inquired as to why property was
being taken away when there were people still out there that had a claim on that
property. Senator Davis said his understanding of the bill is that it increases the
time period from five years to ten years. Representative Luker said that was half
of the bill. The other half is if the funds have a name identified with them, then there
was no time limit. After ten years, there would be a transfer to the general fund, but
the people could still make a claim. The claims were estimated to be fairly small at
about an average of $40,000/year out of the annual $2 million transfer. The balance
would decline because most of those funds would have already been recovered.
Chairman McKenzie asked if this affected unclaimed property where the owner
had been identified? Representative Luker said it did because it extended the
claim right in perpetuity.
Senator Darrington wanted clarification that the money that transferred over to
the General Fund could be redeemed out of that fund. Representative Luker said
the claim would be redeemed out of the current transfer going into the General
Fund reducing the amount of that transfer.
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Senator Lodge asked Chairman McKenzie to restate what he said about conflict
of interest if their names were on the list and he complied. Senator Davis
commented that, in his case, the President of the Senate determined that he was a
part of a class and as such, did not have a conflict of interest.
MOTION:

Senator Winder moved, seconded by Senator Fulcher, to send H 591 to the
floor with a do pass recommendation.

VOTE:

The motion carried by a voice vote. Senator Fulcher will be the floor sponsor.

H 635

RELATING TO ADMINISTRATIVE RULES to continue certain administrative rules
in full force and effect until July 1, 2013.
Mike Nugent, Legislative Services Office, said H 635, better known as the "drop
dead bill", continued certain administrative rules in full force and effect until July 1,
2013. He gave a brief history of this bill. Mr. Nugent cited a couple of court cases,
one being a Supreme Court case, Holly Care Center versus the Department of
Employment, where the Court commented that if it could, it would strike down the
right of the legislature to control administrative rules. To ensure control over any
administrative rules the leadership in the legislature came up with Section 67-5292,
Idaho Code, which stated that all administrative rules would continue in temporary
force and effect unless extended by statute. This is that statute and it basically
just re-ups the current administrative rules for another year. Another landmark
case that gave the legislature the ability to reject administrative rules was Knee
versus Arnell in 1989. Control over the administrative rules maintains continuity
and control over the variety of agencies that report to the legislature.

MOTION:

Senator Lodge moved, seconded by Senator Winder, to send H 635 to the floor
with a do pass recommendation.

VOTE:

The motion carried by a voice vote. Senator Lodge will be the floor sponsor.

H 572

RELATING TO CONSOLIDATION OF ELECTIONS to address changes to election
procedures and clarifying candidate affiliation.
Tim Hurst, Chief Deputy, Secretary of State's Office, presented H 572. This
legislation cleaned up various sections of the Idaho Code addressing changes
that needed to be made in election procedures that became apparent during the
first year of the election consolidation. The legislation also makes it clear that
a candidate is required to be affiliated with a political party in order to file for a
partisan office that is to be voted on at a primary election. A copy of his testimony
is attached to the minutes. He indicated the bill addressed such areas as soil
conservation district elections, how results were to be reported in non-partisan
elections, recall elections, and recounts. Mr. Hurst said that Sections 4 and 5 of
the bill clarified two statutes relating to party affiliation required by HB 351 from last
year. Currently, Idaho Code, Section 34-411A, says that an unaffiliated voter can
select a party prior to voting in the primary election. This change tells how to make
that selection prior to appearing at the polls on election day. Section 5 would make
it clear that a candidate filing for a partisan office in the primary election would be
required to be affiliated with the party at the time of filing.
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Senator Lodge referred to page five regarding primary elections and was
concerned whether the records could be accumulated and sent out before election
day given that election day was the cut off date. Mr. Hurst said they had a cutoff
date thirty days before the elections. However, they also had election registration
which sets all of that aside. The statute allows them, in Section 2, line 39, an
unaffiliated elector could select a political party affiliation only prior to voting in the
primary election. Senator Lodge said that at 5:00 p.m., a person could come in
and register for a party affiliation when the books were already closed and ready to
go out to the precincts the next morning. Mr. Hurst said a person was already a
registered voter. The books go out to the polls and it shows in the book which party
they were affiliated with. ff it was blank, that meant they were unaffiliated. Senator
Lodge said that meant they could vote that day, even if they had put their affiliation
in the night before. Mr. Hurst said that was correct.
Chairman McKenzie asked a question about the second page, lines twenty
six-seven, where the line was removed that said the State Soil and Water
Conservation Commission paid for these elections. Why was the language taken
out? Mr. Hurst said that should have been done three years ago when the election
consolidation bill was passed. The counties pay all expenses for elections from
appropriate monies from the legislature. The only time the state agencies, such
as the State Soil and Waster Conservation District, payes for an election was
for the creation of the district.
Chairman McKenzie asked about the process for an affiliated elector to declare
another party or to become unaffiliated. What is the time frame for someone who
had already declared an affiliation to switch parties or become unaffiliated? Mr.
Hurst said that would be the last date for filing for office.
MOTION:

Senator Hill moved, seconded by Senator Fulcher, to send H 572 to the floor
with a do pass recommendation.

VOTE:

The motion carried by a voice vote. Senator Hill will be the floor sponsor.

H 539

RELATING TO THE IDAHO VIDEO SERVICE ACT to establish a process for the
issuance of a state franchise which will facilitate the entry of new providers of
video services into the Idaho market.
Ed Lodge, representing Century Link, presented H 539. This proposal, the
Idaho Video Service Act, established a process for the issuance of a state
franchise which would facilitate the entry of new providers of video services into
Idaho's video service market and encouraged new private capital investment in
broadband infrastructure within the state. The current video service franchising
process required that new entrants in the market negotiate with each individual
city and county as a precondition to being able to provide video services within
the individual local jurisdictions.
Mr. Lodge stated that Idahoans want faster, more ubiquitous high speed internet
for a variety of reasons and advances in technology currently make it possible for
both cable and telecommunications providers to offer voice, high speed internet
and multi-channel video services over the broadband infrastructure. The ability for
telecommunication and cable companies to provide television service over their
broadband networks is a business reason for those companies to enhance their
broadband infrastructure throughout the state. This proposal assured quality of
treatment between incumbent cable providers and new entrants to the Idaho video
service market and, at the same time, would preserve local control and regulation
of local government public rights-of-way. This bill continues the rights of cities
and counties to receive up to a 5% franchise fee for use of public rights-of-way
and continues the opportunity for cities and counties to require video service
providers to make dedicated video channels available to the city or county for
public, educational, and government use. Mr. Lodge said H 539 is supported
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by the Idaho telecommunications industry, the Idaho Cable Telecommunications
Association and the Association of Idaho Cities and has been approved by the
highway districts and counties.
Bill Roden, representing Century Link, provided an overview of the bill addressing
various terms including rights-of-way, franchising entity, governing body, and
incumbent cable service provider. He talked about a system operator which meant
any person or group of persons who provided video service directly, or through
one or more affiliates, owned a significant interest in the system or facilities
through which the video service was provided , and had been issued a certificate of
franchise authority pursuant to the provisions of the chapter. Mr. Roden pointed
out several ways in which video services could be provided under this act. Under
this bill, the incumbent video service provider may, if it choses to do so, opt to
get a certificate of franchise authority and continue its operation under the state
franchise cancelling the local franchise.
Senator Davis said some providers allowed one to have service sent directly to
them, such as !Pads, !Phones and the like. Does this language restricted those
cable network providers from marketing their service within the state of Idaho? Mr.
Roden said no. The video service clause on page two included cable service
but it excluded any video programming provided to persons in their capacity as
subscribers to commercial mobile services or video programming provided as part
of a service that enabled end users to access content, information, electronic mail
or other services offered over the public internet.
Mr. Roden said the most popular way to get a franchise would be part (c) on page
three where it stated that "no person shall act as a video service provider or operate
a video service network within the state of Idaho unless such person had been
granted a certificate of franchise authority to do business in the state of Idaho as a
system operator by the Idaho Secretary of State as authorized by this chapter. "
Senator Davis asked if there was a non-incumbent cable service provider who
wanted to service Ada County, would they negotiate with Ada County or go to the
Secretary of State? Mr. Roden said it was up to the applicant to designate an area
in which they wanted to operate. Senator Davis said that when they negotiated
with the Idaho Secretary of State, if they designated only one county, would the
Secretary of State tell them they had to go talk to Ada County? Mr. Roden replied
no, that would not be permitted under this legislation. Senator Davis asked why
would a non-incumbent service provider elect to file with the Secretary of State
versus the county and what would be some of the policy reasons?Mr. Roden said
it was doubtful that would happen. To the best of his knowledge, most counties
didn't have franchise agreements. He said they had a licensing statute which was
considered, under federal law, to be a franchise.
Mr. Roden said there was a need for a central location to do all of the filing and to
adequately cover the requirements that would normally be covered in a franchise.
He said it was difficult to encourage new providers to come to the state, with over
100 cities in the state that could negotiate individual franchises with each of those
locations.
Senator Davis said that if he were to ask the political subdivisions as defined in
this act whether they support the legislation, would they say yes? Mr. Roden said
it was his understanding they would say yes. He said the two major cities of Boise
and Pocatello have worked out their differences and they were in support of this bill.

SENATE STATE AFFAIRS COMMITTEE

Monday, March 19, 2012-Minutes-Page 4

Page 90

Senator Darrington asked if a non-incumbent operator came in, did the
non-incumbent who received the opportunity, have the right to use the lines of
the cable system of an incumbent operator in exchange for a fee? Mr. Roden
said if Senator Darrington was talking about interconnection of the facilities
that authorized and encouraged using the lines, the legislation did specifically
reference and encourage it.
Mr. Roden talked about the filing fees, amending fees, notices, and fees regarding
the use of public rights-of-way as outlined in the bill.
Senator Winder cited a "friendly" lawsuit between the Ada County Highway
District and the City of Boise about who actually should receive the franchise fees,
since in Ada County there was a broad jurisdiction of ownership under the highway
district. The judge decided in favor of Boise City and said they could retain the
rights to those franchise fees, even though the right-of-way was owned by ACHD.
He said he assumed this did not change that ruling , since the City was showing
their support. Mr. Roden said he was aware of those discussions. The franchise
fees under this bill would go to the political subdivision, i.e., the city or the county
that had regulation in that regard. This bill did provide for authority for the highway
districts, the state of Idaho, and the county or cities that have the responsibility for
maintenance of the streets. The bill specifically provides for additional fees and
license fees to be paid to those jurisdictions in connection with any disturbance or
work that is in the rights-of-ways. There is a provision ensuring those fees don't
become a franchise fee that they should be reasonably related to the jurisdiction.
Mr. Roden said there was no state law existing at this time relating to franchises
providing services to the State of Idaho. One issue they encountered was how do
you define gross revenues related to advertising revenues? Several cities added
in a definition of gross revenue and it included revenues from Home Shopping
Network and other advertising revenues.
Senator Davis said when he looked at the video service provider fee, referring
to the bottom of page seven, it said "for the purposes of this section, subscribers
whose service address is within the jurisdictional limits of a city shall be deemed
city subscribers and those subscribers whose service address is outside the
jurisdictional limits of a city shall be deemed county subscribers." Was the building
address where the service was actually received? Mr. Roden said the fees, in this
case, were tied to the service address.
Senator Davis asked if the legislation would serve as a barrier to technologies.
Mr. Roden said he wanted to go back to the definition of video service which
referred to a service that provided this type of communication, which was primarily
within the public rights-of-way. He said it was not intended to cover anything
related to the internet and referred tothe top of page nine 9. The intent was to
provide reasonable financing for the pay channels.
Mr. Roden explained the issue of "red lining" which is a concept that a video
service provider could determine which areas of political subdivision they were
going to service based upon the income levels of the residents of those particular
areas. H 539 covers this issue extensively to ensure that all subdivisions would
be treated equally by early involvement by the cities, opportunity for mediation,
and court action if necessary. Customer service standards were addressed as
well as issues related to PEG (public, educational or governmental) channels
such as number of channels and fee amounts. Notices to the viewing audience
are required when a channel relocates.
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Mr. Roden thanked the Committee for the opportunity to make his presentation
and he explained it had been a long labor. He said he was very pleased having
the Committee work with him and the Cable Association and to bring all of the
parties together.
Ron Williams, represented the Idaho Cable Telecommunications Association,
testified in support of the legislation and said it had been a long and arduous
process. The process made all competitors in this area neutral, equitable, and
created a competitive market.
Jason Roak, Vice President of Data Research, testified in support of H 539. He
said he believed this bill would encourage competition, streamline the process,
and encourage further investment in the infrastructure.
MOTION:

Senator Winder moved, seconded by Senator Hill, to send H 539 to the floor with
a do pass recommendation.

VOTE:

The motion carried by a voice vote. Chairman McKenzie will be floor sponsor.

RS 21472

RELA.TING TO THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE to provide that the Director
is afforded some latitude in title for the purposes of international trade.
Tom Perry, Counsel to Governor Otter, presented RS21472 stating that the RS
dealt with the Department of Commerce and provided the Director of Commerce
some latitude to use the title of Secretary for the purpose of international trade. He
said it aligned and afforded the same latitude as the Director of the Department of
Agriculture (/.0. § 22-101(4) when conducting business with foreign counterparts.
Senator Stennett said she wanted to make sure she understood that in some
cultures, director was not a high enough status and secretary was more recognized
as being the title that was more elevated. Mr. Perry said that was correct.

MOTION:

Senator Fulcher moved, seconded by Senator Stennett, to send RS 21472
to print.
Senator Davis said he didn't see the reason for this RS to come back for another
Committee hearing and in the interest of time, was it possible for the motion to be
amended to reflect that once it was printed, the Chairman had permission and
authority to submit a Committee report with a recommendation that it "do pass" so
it could get it to the House for consideration? Senator Fulcher said he understood
the reason for the RS and he believed it was a justified reason. However, he
wanted to amend his motion.

AMENDED
MOTION:

Senator Fulcher amended the motion, seconded by Senator Stennett, to send
RS21472 to print with the recommendation to send it directly to the floor with
a do pass recommendation.

VOTE:

The motion carried by a voice vote.

S 1383

RELA.TING TO THE MAINTENANCE AND REPAIR OF DITCHES, CANALS AND
CONDUITS to codify existing law that the owner or operator of such aqueducts is
not liable for wasting water or damage to others that is caused by the acts of third
parties or acts of God.
Chairman McKenzie reminded the Committee they were going on the floor at 9:30
a.m. He said they would try to have the introduction, but they would have to defer
debate until the next meeting. Norm Semanko, Executive Director and General
Counsel of the Idaho Water Users Association, presented this bill.
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Mr. Semanko stated that S 1383 was a replacement for H 398. The Legislative
Committee, composed of 33 individuals from around the state, reviewed this
bill at length. This bill, he said, reaffirmed the responsibilities and obligations
and clarified the applicable duty of care regarding certain waterways. The bill
adopts the standard the courts had applied to avoid wasting of water in Idaho
Code, Section 42- 1203 and to prevent damages to others in Idaho Code, Section
42-1204. It also made clear that wasting water and damage caused , not by an act
or omission of the irrigation delivery entity, but by a third party or an act of God, did
not constitute liability on the part of the delivery entity. This was consistent with
the standard applied by the courts and as a matter of basic fairness . The bill
makes clear that there are no impairments of existing defenses and the belief is, it
would make things clear for the water delivery entities, attorneys, and those on
the bench. This legislation clarified that the owner of a ditch or canal would not be
liable for wasting water or damages caused by others or acts of God.
Mr. Semanko said that at the House hearing, the trial lawyers testified that this
was existing law, and that irrigation districts and canal companies were not liable
for problems caused outside of their control. Without this legislation, it would
become more difficult for water managers to have their operations insured for the
benefit of the water using public. Mr. Semanko further stated, the legislation
would help make sure these canals and ditches could continue to deliver water
to our farms and fields, subdivisions, schools, and parks. Acts of God, as stated
in the bill, must be natural phenomenon, not man-made or artificial. As a result,
floods caused by a failure to properly maintain canals as well as gophers and other
rodents, would continue to be the responsibility of the canal managers. Liability
would continue to be judged on a case-by-case basis under the reasonable care
standard adopted by the courts. More importantly, there would be clarification that
this would not be a strict liability standard on irrigation. However, the legislation
does not provide blanket immunity or eliminate the ability to go to court.
Existing statutes clearly provide that canals must be kept in good repair, ready
to deliver water and to avoid damage to others. This wouldn't change. Canal
managers are responsible for the failure to do so. However, it would be clear in the
statute that as the courts have found, problems caused by third parties and acts of
God, were not the responsibility of the canal managers.

Senator Davis asked if before the word "caused by" could they put "solely caused
by," then the protection would be there and that would do away with the strict
liability. If there was a competing claim between the acts of omissions or the acts of
a third party or the acts of God, then he would have the language needed to arrive
at the comparison. The bill could be sent to the amending order this morning and
we could try to hurry the amendments up, put it on the bill, and have it out of here
by Wednesday or Thursday. He said he thought that could remove the opposition
to the bill or at least soften it enough that instead of putting it off for another day or
two, this bill would be done today. Would that be problematic?
Mr. Semanko said one concern about putting in the word "solely" was that if
the third party or the act of God was responsible and if it was the sole cause.
Their concern was what if it was only a contributing cause. The negative influence
then would be they would be completely responsible because they hadn't met the
threshold of being solely responsible. He said there was language that said that no
defenses would be eliminated and contributory negligence was at least a partial
defense for irrigation districts. He said on their initial read, the word "solely" could
be problematic. If the underlying third party or the act of God clause was not the
sole cause, but it was a contributing factor, would they be altering the common
law to their detriment?
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Senator Davis said the purpose was to suggest that one would not be liable for
the acts of others and that made sense to him and to the Committee. He wanted to
vote for that. Mr. Semanko cited a court case where the court found that, while
storms caused the problem, it was also caused by the fact that the canal company
failed to adequately maintain their dam to manage it correctly, so they were held
liable, at least in part, for that dam. This bill encompasses that concept. The intent
was not to change the foundation standard. The court would divvy up the various
entities who were at fault. But if the word "solely" was put into the bill, then "under
comparative negligence" arguably only existed if it was solely caused by an act of
God or a third party and it still met the threshold of the word "solely" then they could
be held completely responsible. That was the concern of the attorneys. He said
unless he heard otherwise from his group, that word wouldn't work. He said he
would suggest, because it didn't fundamentally alter the comparative negligence
standard, to move the bill to the next session.
Senator Davis said that what he was hearing was that neither the proponents or
the opponents disagreed as to what Mr. Semanko wanted to do. There was just a
disagreement as to what the language did and he guessed they would revisit this
on Wednesday. Mr. Semanko agreed.
Senator Darrington said a real-life example was when there was a big cloudburst
in July when the canals were running, and the water came down and washed into
the canals. Before they could cut it at the head several miles upstream, they had a
problem downstream. This is exactly what is being talking about. Mr. Semanko
said this was correct and it is a serious, important issue.
Senator Stennett commented there were some old canals and no matter what
one tried to do to maintain those, they were probably a bit more compromised than
they were when they were originally constructed. She said she was in complete
agreement with Senator Davis . There was a combination of acts of God and
weather, in addition to the responsibilities of maintaining these waterways, and she
hoped they could come to some sort of compromise.
Chairman McKenzie announced that discussing on S 1383 would be continued at
the next meeting on March 21st.
MINUTES:

The approval of the minutes of February 20, 29 and March 2, 2012 were postponed
until the next meeting on March 21 , 2012.

ADJOURNMENT: Chairman McKenzie adjourned the meeting at 9:32 a.m.

Twyla Melton
Secretary

Seni;itor McKenzie
Chairman
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Fifth Judicial District, Minidoka County
Tonya Page, Clerk of the Court
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BLAKE G. HALL, ESQ.
SAM L. ANGELL, ESQ.
HALL ANGELL & ASSOCIATES, LLP
1075 S Utah Avenue, Suite 150
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83402
Telephone (208) 522-3003
Fax (208) 621-3008
!SB Nos. 2434 and 7012
bgh@hasattorneys.com
sla@hasattorneys.com
Attorneys for Defendant
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STA TE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF MINIDOKA
VICTOR RODGER BLISS,
Case No. CV-2017-334
Plaintiff,
AFFIDAVIT OF RUTH BAILES
V.

MINIDOKA IRRIGATION DISTRICT,
Defendant.
STATE OF IDAHO )
: ss.
County of Bonneville )
RUTH BAILES, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and states as follows:
1.

That I am over the age of eighteen ( 18) and am competent to testify in this matter.

I make this affidavit based on my own personal knowledge unless otherwise indicated. This
affidavit is made under penalty of perjury.
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2.

I am the secretary and treasurer for the Defendant Minidoka Irrigation District

("MID"). I have served in this capacity at all times relevant to this litigation and continue to
serve in this capacity.
3.

As the secretary and treasurer of MID, it is within my duties to act as custodian

for original and duplicate records ofregularly conducted activity of MID, including documents
and information regarding water rights on property held by landowners within the district.
4.

Through my experience and training as secretary of MID, I have personal

knowledge as to the functions, obligations, and agreements held by MID.
5.

MID is an irrigation district formed pursuant to Idaho Code§ 43-101 et seq. MID

is a taxing district which delivers irrigation water to the properties of landowning members of the
district. Membership of the district is involuntary, with assessments collected once a year on all
property held by landowners having MID water rights on their property. MID does not have any
agreements, written or oral, with members of the district. MID delivers irrigation water to
members having water right appurtenant to their property. MID builds, repairs, and maintains
canals, ditches, and structures to deliver water to landowners having water rights appurtenant to
their property. MID regularly repairs and maintains canals, ditches, and water appurtenances that
are under its operation and control. MID has no duty to build, maintain, or repair the private
canals, ditches, or structures owned by district members. MID does not distribute water onto
members' property. Instead, members of the district are responsible for diverting water from a
fixed point of diversion, a headgate, from which point the distribution of water across property
becomes the responsibility of the member. A headgate is a gate or valve at a point of diversion
that can be opened or closed to regulate the flow of water entering a member' s property.
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6.

Members receive water from MID by requesting delivery of water with a ditch

rider, who is tasked by MID with distributing water. After a request is made, a ditch rider then
determines whether there is sufficient water available to grant permission to open the headgate at
the requesting member's property. Once permitted, the member may open the headgate as per the
ditch rider's instruction, and the member may divert water from the canal onto their property to
irrigate crops. The member landowner is tasked with ordering the delivery of water from the
ditch rider and notifying the ditch rider when the member desires to halt delivery of water. The
ditch rider is tasked with monitoring the amount of water diverted onto a member' s property.
7.

MID does not allocate a specific amount of water to each acre or member. Rather,

members are authorized to divert, onto acres with a MID water right appurtenant, sufficient
water to grow a crop, if water is available. MID water can only be delivered onto acres that have
a MID water right appurtenant. The amount of irrigation water available to each member
landowner from MID is not determined by any agreements, written or oral, between the member
and MID.
8.

I know through my position with MID and through personal experience with the

Plaintiff Victor Bliss that he is a resident of Minidoka County who owns 75.87 acres ofland with
MID water rights appurtenant.
9.

MID has provided at least one headgate to allow Plaintiff to divert irrigation water

onto his property.
10.

It is my understanding that in 1998, MID moved a canal that ran along Plaintiffs

property. MID's moving of the canal necessarily required excavation of dirt from the ground,
which was deposited along the bank of the canal. The canal, which runs along Plaintiff's
property, has a high slope, and MID deposited dirt at the bottom of said slope.
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11.

As the property owner, Plaintiff has historically requested delivery of water by

contacting a MID ditch rider. To my knowledge, Plaintiff has never been denied delivery of
water by MID, but has on some occasions had delivery only temporarily delayed until sufficient
water was available for Plaintiffs diversion. Plaintiff has never been given approval to divert
more than the amount of water required to irrigate the 75.87 acres described above.
12.

It is my understanding that Plaintiff leases the 75.87 acres to Alan and Debra

Woodland. Plaintiff has made multiple reports, written and oral, to MID complaining about not
receiving as much water as he would like to have delivered to the 75.87 acres ofland leased by
the Woodlands. To my knowledge, neither Alan nor Debra Woodland have ever reported to MID
that they have received less water than the amount entitled upon request, nor have the
Woodlands complained of, or filed a tort claim alleging, crop damage resulting from a lack of
delivery of irrigation water by MID.
13.

I am personally aware that Plaintiff voluntarily installed a filter screen at the

headgate that is used to divert water onto the 75.87 acres which creates a restriction that
encumbers his ability to deliver water onto his property.
14.

Sometime before June 29, 2016, without the ditch rider's knowledge, someone

began shutting a regulating check structure located in the ditch downstream from the headgate
used to divert water onto Plaintiffs 75.87 acres. This resulted in more water being available to
divert at Plaintiffs headgate but cut off or reduced the amount of water available to downsteam
members of MID who were trying to irrigate at the same time. As a result of these problems,
MID placed a chain and lock on the check structure so that it could not be adjusted without
unlocking the lock.
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15.

On June 30, 2016, I heard from Vance Johnson, assistant watermaster for MID,

that the lock, chain, and wheel used to adjust the check structure had been cut and removed. I
personally overheard a conversation Mr. Johnson had with Plaintiff over speakerphone. During
the conversation, Plaintiff was yelling and swearing. I heard Mr. Johnson ask Plaintiff if he had
removed the lock, chain, and wheel from the check structure, and I heard Plaintiff say "Hell
yeah, and you' re not getting them back."
16.

MID contacted the Minidoka County Sheriff's and reported Plaintiff's activity.

Deputy Ron Stumph responded to MID's complaints, and took witness statements from myself,
Mr. Johnson, Dan Davidson, and Frank Hunt. A true and correct copy of the statement I gave to
Deputy Stumph is attached hereto as Exhibit A.
17.

It is my understanding that charges were filed by the Minidoka County

Prosecuting Attorney against Plaintiff. It is my further understanding that these charges were
ultimately dismissed after the Plaintiff reimbursed the District $75.00 on November 7, 2016, for
the cost of a lock, chain, and check structure wheel.
18.

On March 6, 2017, Plaintiff's attorney delivered a letter to MID, indicating that it

was a notice of tort claim pursuant to the Idaho Tort Claims Act. The notice claimed Plaintiff
experienced damage to his reputation and character due to alleged defamatory statements made
by MID employees to the Minidoka County Sheriff's office. The letter alleged $54,430.16 in
damages for criminal defense and damage to reputation and character. A true and correct copy of
the March 6, 2017 letter is attached hereto as Exhibit B.
19.

To my knowledge, MID has not received any other notice of tort claim from

Plaintiff describing any of the claims stated in Plaintiff's Complaint.
FURTHER YOUR AFFIANT SAYETH NAUGHT.
AFFIDAVIT OF RUTH BAILES - 5

Page 99

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO, before me the undersigned, a Notary Public in and for said
State, this {?~day of March, 2018.

TLt4,;

Residing at:
My commission expires:

%II~

/ / . /'Z<J-Z... /

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that I served a true copy of the foregoing document upon the following
this _£:._ day of March, 2018, by the method indicated below:
Jonathan R. Grover, Esq.
EVANS GROVER BEINS
52 West Main Street
PO Box 160
Tremonton, UT 84337
Fax:435-257-6592
Email: jgrover(a.)egb-law.com

[ X] Mailing
[
] Hand-Delivery
[
] Facsimile
[ X] Email
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R,uth Bailes
July 5, 2016
· ·
·

·

istrict

Thursday morning, June 30, 2016, Vance Johnson (the District's Assistant Watermaster) came
mshing into the office holding his cell out, which was on speaker. Amber Christensen and I
heard Victor Bliss yelling and swearing, ca11ing Vance vulgar names and stating that he didn't
have to order water, he should be able to take it whenever he wanted. When Vance asked if
Victor had taken the wheel, lock and chain, Victor said "he11, yeah, and you're not getting them
back", Then Vance said "if that's the way you are going to be, I want my wheel, lock and chain
back withi~t the next half hour". Victor's response was that all he wanted was a yard stream and
he had spoken with Frank Hunt and he had told him (Victor) that he could have the water, and he
didn't have to order water through the ditchrider, so if he had a problem Vance could call Frank
about it. Vance told ]um that it was because he wasn't ordering the water from the dHchrider that
the gate had been locked in the first place, because Victor kept running the McCalls out of water.
Victor cursed and hung up on Vance.

D- tt
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EVANS, GROVER & BEINS, P.C.
~ATTORNEYS AT LAW~
A Professlonal Corporation
P.O. Box 160 - 52 West Main Street

Tel: (435) 257-6590
fax: (43S) 257-6592
Toll: (866) 486-S950

JONATHAN R. GROVl:R•+
CHRISTOPHER A. BEINS

ron,·,qb·la.w com
• Also admltt~ In Callfomla.
+ Also aclmitt~ in Id.ho.

BRUCE C. EVANS (1956-2010)

February 28, 2017
Via U.S. First Class Mail, Certified, Return
Receipt Requested

Minidoka Irrigation District
Attn: Ruth Bales, Clerk/Secretary
l 00 West 50 South
Rupert, Jdaho 83350

Re:
My Client:

Claim for Damages
Victor Rodger Bliss

Dear Ms. Bales:
I represent Mr. Victor Rodger Bliss. Please consider th.is letter a claim pursuant to the
Idaho tort claims act, IC §6-901 et seq. This claim against your political subdivision arises
under the provisions of said act for actions or omissions. This claim is hereby presented to you
as Clerk/Secretary of Minidoka Irrigation District.
Conduct and Circumstances:

The conduct and circumstances which brought about the injury or damage are as follows:
On or about June 30, 2016, several MlD employees (namely Dan Davidson, Kent Fletcher, Ruth
Bailes, Amber Christensen, Vance Johnson, and others) prepared and executed false voluntary
statements and delivered them to the Minidoka ·c ounty Sheriff regarding an alleged incident
involving Victor Rodger Bliss. The written statements are attached hereto. MID directed and
requested Minidoka County Sheriff to recommend criminal charges against Victor Rodger Bliss
based upon the false statements of fact made in the written statements. Specifically. the
following individuals made the following false statements of fact:
1. Dan Davidson: "Victor said, 'hell ya I took it [lock and wheel from check structure]
and you are not getting it back."' "Vance told me that Ryan Knopp and Luke McCall
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said they say Victor and his wife up at the check structure the night before with a
generator and a grinder."
2. Kent Fletcher:".. . the acts of Mr. Bliss in cutting off the lock and altering the head
gate violate IC 18-4304, 4305, 4306, 4307 and 4309."
3. Ruth Bailes: "[Victor] stating he didn't have to order water, he should be able to take
it whenever he wanted." " ... Victor said, 'hell, yeah, and you're not getting them
[wheel, lock and chain] back .... " .. . Victor kept running the McCalls out of water."
4. Amber Christensen: "[Victor] saying he didn't have to order water and he should be
able to take it whenever he wants." "[Victor] said, 'hell, yeah, and your not getting it
[wheel, lock and chain] back."' "[Victor] kept running the McCalls out of water."

5. Vance Johnson: "Victor cut the Pad lock and chain off the wheel and shut the wheel
off. So it ran Luke Mcall out of water." "So He [Victor Bliss] cut the Padlock and
chain off and lowered the gate off. So that's why Luke Mcall ran out of water."
After a full review of the facts of the case, the false statements of these individuals named
herein, and other evidence, the Minidoka County Attomey's Office consented that the charges
were unsupported and dismissed all charges against Victor Rodger Bliss. But for the false
statements of these employees named above, no criminal charges would have been filed against
Victor Rodger Bliss in the first instance.

Injmy and Damage:
Victor Rodger Bliss was injured and damaged. He was forced to incur attorney fees and
legal costs to defend himself against criminal charges based on these false statements. He lost
time from work and his farming operation and income associated therewith. He incurred out of
pocket expenses for travel costs, copies, picture(s), and other expenses.
Victor Rodger Bliss' reputation and character were defamed and damaged with these
false statements made by your employees. These false statements were written on a statement
form provided to the Minidoka Sheriffs Office in violation ofIC §18-2602 & I 8-5413. These
false statements were made with criminal intent. Fmther, these false statements w~re made with
malice toward Victor Rodger Bliss to discredit him in the agricultural community, damage his
reputation and character and discredit his ability to conduct his agricultural business in the
surrounding area.

Time and Place:
The time and place the injury and damage occurred. The damage occurred on
approximately September 20, 2016. The place where the injury occurred was in Minidoka
County, State ofldaho. It is understood that these statements where all delivered to the
Minidoka County Sheriff Deputy at MID's place of business, which is 100 West 50 South,
Rupert, Idaho 83550. Victor Rodger Bliss did not receive notice or discovery of these written
statements until a discovery response was served on him from the Minidoka County Attorney's
Office inside the criminal case, and a face-to-face conference was held with Lance Stevenson
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and Robert Hemsley on September 20, 2016.
Names of all Persons:

Victor Bliss, Tammy Ann Moser-Bliss, Frank Hunt, Dan Davidson, Kent Fletcher, Ruth
Bailes, Amber Christensen, Vance Johnson, Eric Watterson, Rob Stumph, Luke McCall, Ryan
Knopp, Alan Woodward, Lance D. Stevenson, Michael P. Tribe, Robert S. Hemsley, Chris
Draper, Jeanine Dilwo11h, and any other persons yet to be determined.
Amount of Damages:

Victor Rodger Bliss suffered damages as follows:
I. Attorney fees: ·

$2,512.50

2. Legal costs:

$

3. Lost Income (18 hours@$35.30):
4. Travel costs (3 trips 14 miles RT@ .54):
5. Copies (55 copies at .50):
6. Pictures (22 color copies at $1.00):
7. Attorney Travel (216 miles at .54):
8. Damage to Reputation & Character:

$ 635.40
22.68
27.50
22.00
116.64
$50,000.00
$54,430.16

TOTAL

93.44

$
$
$
$

Residence of Claimant:

At the time of the filing of the claim and for a period of six (6) months immediately prior
to the time the claim arose, Victor Rodger Bliss was a resident at 289 North 850 West, Paul,
Minidoka County, Idaho.
Pursuant to the Idaho to11s claims act, you have ninety (90) days to approve this claim.
If you have any questions or concerns, you may contact my office.
Respectfully,

JRG/ht
Enclosures
cc:

Victor Bliss
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Electronically Filed
3/6/2018 4:14 PM
Fifth Judicial District, Minidoka County
Tonya Page, Clerk of the Court
By: Michelle Perry, Deputy Clerk

BLAKE G. HALL, ESQ.
SAM L. ANGELL, ESQ.
HALL ANGELL & ASSOCIATES, LLP
1075 S Utah A venue, Suite 150
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83402
Telephone (208) 522-3003
Fax (208) 621-3008
!SB Nos. 2434 and 7012
bgh@hasattorneys.com
sla@hasattorneys.com
Attorneys for Defendant
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF MINIDOKA
VICTOR RODGER BLISS,
Case No. CV-2017-334
Plaintiff,
AFFIDAVIT OF DAN DAVIDSON
V.

MINIDOKA IRRIGATION DISTRICT,
Defendant.
STATE OF IDAHO )
: ss.
County of Bonneville )
DAN DAVIDSON, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and states as follows:
1.

That I am over the age of eighteen (18) and am competent to testify in this matter.

I make this affidavit based on my own personal knowledge unless otherwise indicated. This
affidavit is made under penalty of perjury.
2.

I am the manager of the Defendant Minidoka Irrigation District ("MID"). I have

served in this capacity at all times relevant to this litigation and continue to serve in this capacity.
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3.

On June 30, 2016, I had heard from Vance Johnson, assistant watermaster for

MID, that the lock, chain, and wheel used to adjust the check structure at Plaintiff's property had
been cut and removed. I personally overheard a conversation Mr. Johnson had with Plaintiff over
speakerphone. During the conversation, Plaintiff was yelling and swearing. I heard Mr. Johnson
ask Plaintiff if he had removed the lock, chain, and wheel from the check structure, and I heard
Plaintiff say "Hell yeah I took it, and you are not getting it back."
4.

MID contacted the Minidoka County Sheriff's and reported Plaintiff's activity.

Deputy Ron Stumph responded to MID's complaints, and took witness statements from myself,
Mr. Johnson, Ruth Bailes, and Frank Hunt. A true and correct copy of the statement I gave to
Deputy Stumph is attached hereto as Exhibit A.
5.

MID occasionally removes noxious weeds within its easements and right-of-ways

along irrigation canals, ditches, and appurtenances which MID owns, operates and controls. MID
only provides this service when necessary and economically feasible, and does so to the best of
its ability within time constraints and resources available.
FURTHER YOUR AFFIANT SA YETH NAUGHT.
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SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO, before me the undersigned, a Notary Public in and for said
State, this£ day of March, 2018.

----Nota
ic
Residing at: ___:_:::::...oc:.,..ci..~~-,,--,.~!...:...!..,,-,L---My commissi
. ~---'-+-~
U --z. I

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I served a true copy of the foregoing document upon the following
this ~ day of March, 2018, by the method indicated below:
Jonathan R. Grover, Esq.
EV ANS GROVER BEINS
52 West Main Street
PO Box 160
Tremonton, UT 84337
Fax: 435-257-6592
Email: jgrover~egb-law.com

[ X] Mailing
[
] Hand-Delivery
[
] Facsimile
[ X] Email
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EXHIBIT A
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My name Is Dan Davidson. I am the man
ager of Minidoka Irrigation District. On the 301
h of June
our assistant water master, Vance Johnson cam
e In with his phone on speaker mode. The pers
on
he was
speaking with was Victor Bliss. He was complain
ing about not having enough water on the bott
om end
of the 1712 Lateral. He was also complaining
that the check structure near his pump was lock
ed. Vance
asked him If he removed the lock and wheel from
the check structure and Victor said "hell ya I took
It
and you are not getting It back" Vance told him
that he needed to return It or he was going to
call the
sheriff. Victor yelled some more and then told
Vance that Frank Hunt, our board chairma
n told him he
could take the water and then he hung up the
phone. Vance told me that Ryan Knopp and Luke
McCall
said that they saw Victor and his wife up at the
check structure the night before with a generat
or and a
grinder, Vance also said that Luke McCall rece
ived an automated text message from his pivo
t
downstream of the check structure Informing
him that the pivot was off because of low wat
er.
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Electronically Filed
3/6/2018 4:12 PM
Fifth Judicial District, Minidoka County
Tonya Page, Clerk of the Court
By: Michelle Perry, Deputy Clerk

BLAKE G. HALL, ESQ.
SAM L. ANGELL, ESQ.
HALL ANGELL & ASSOCIATES, LLP
1075 S Utah Avenue, Suite 150
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83402
Telephone (208) 522-3003
Fax (208) 621-3008
!SB Nos. 2434 and 7012
bgh@hasattorneys.com
sla@hasattorneys.com
Attorneys for Defendant
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF MINIDOKA
VICTOR RODGER BLISS,
Case No. CV-2017-334
Plaintiff,
AFFIDAVIT OF FRANK HUNT
V.

MINIDOKA IRRIGATION DISTRICT,
Defendant.
STATE OF IDAHO )
: ss.
County of Minidoka )
FRANK HUNT, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and states as follows:
1.

That I am over the age of eighteen ( 18) and am competent to testify in this matter.

I make this affidavit based on my own personal knowledge unless otherwise indicated. This
affidavit is made under penalty of perjury.
2.

I the former chairman of the Board of Directors for the Defendant Minidoka

Irrigation District ("MID"). I served in this capacity at all times relevant to this litigation.
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3.

On June 29, 2016, while I was still a board member of MID, I met with Plaintiff

Victor Bliss regarding some concerns he had about the amount of water he was receiving.
Specifically, Plaintiff was concerned that a pump in his irrigation system was not receiving
enough water. Plaintiff told me that pipe movers had informed him that there was not enough
water in his ditch, and that the pump would have to be turned off. I then told Plaintiff "it
sound[ed] like he needed more water in the ditch." I did not make any recommendation to
Plaintiff to remove the lock, chain, or wheel used to adjust the check structure behind the
headgate on his property, and I did not make an agreement with Plaintiff to provide him more
water.
4.

On June 30, 2016, I learned that the lock, chain, and wheel on the check structure

had been cut and removed. After learning the lock had been cut, I believed Plaintiff to have been
the culprit. I contacted Plaintiff and asked why he had cut the lock, to which Plaintiff responded
"I don't know anything about a lock and I have already talked to my attorney."
5.

MID contacted the Minidoka County Sheriff's and reported Plaintiff's activity.

Deputy Ron Stumph responded to MID' s complaints, and took witness statements from myself,
Vance Johnson, Ruth Bailes, and Dan Davidson. A true and correct copy of the statement I
provided to Deputy Stumph is attached hereto as Exhibit A.
FURTHER YOUR AFFIANT SA YETH NAUGHT.
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FRANK HUNT

SUBSCRIB~ AND SWORN TO, before me the undersigned, a Notary Public in and for said
State, this ~ day of March, 2018.

Res1
Myconum

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby ce1tify that I served a true copy of the foregoing document upon the following
this~ day of March, 2018, by the method indicated below:
Jonathan R. Grover, Esq.
EVANS GROVER BEINS
52 West Main Street
PO Box 160
Tremonton, UT 84337
Fax: 435-257-6592
Email: jgrover@egb-Jaw.com

[ X] Mailing
[
] Hand-Delivery
[
] Facsimile
[ X] Email
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Voluntary Statement from Frank Hunt
Chahman of the Board
Minidoka llTigation District
August 24, 2016

For at least a couple of years, Victor Bliss has had complaints against M.I.D. Some of them
probably are legitimate, and some, not so much. He has threatened lawsuits and gotten into
shouting matches at Board meetings. When he called me in late June of 2016 with more
complaints, I suggested we meet together, just the two of us, and visit about things. I thought
that just he and I, with no intenuptions, could work at least a few things out. A date was set for
the morning of June 29. It soon became apparent to me that he was more interested in
complaining than resolving.
One item was his pump that he said at times would not get enough water. The pump sits on a
high part of the MID lateral and even though eve1ything was running good at the time, I agreed
that it would be better if the ditch was fuller. I also noticed a locked head gate controlling the
amount of water going past his pump to downstream users. I also noticed that the on.ly way the
ditch rider could check on the water level at the pump was to walk nearly a quarter of a mile to
the pump; there is no road. This makes it difficult to monitor the ditch level.
I spent two or three hours with Victor and went home. Later that evening I received a call from
Victor saying that the pipe movers had decided there was not enough water in the ditch and shut
the pump off. He asked what was he to do? I said it sounds like he needed more water in the
ditch. I though that was a brilliant statement, backed by a lifetime of iITigating.
I should stop here for a minute and explain that I am a third generation fatmer on MID. All my
life (and my father before me), we would tweak the head gate. When the lateral got too low, we
would open it up a touch; when it was too full, we would lower it. My neighbors all did the
same; there were no problems and all lived in harmony. So without saying anything more to him,
I left it at that. My intent was that he would turn in a little more water at the head of the ditch.
But alas, not all neighborhoods are the same.
The next morning I got a call from the District's office asking ifI had told Victor to cut the lock
on the head gate controlling the water going downstream and shut if off, thus shutting off the
downstream water users. I did not and would not tell anyone to cut a lock nor would I ever tell
someone to take someone else's water. That morning I met with Dan Davidson, the Manager, at
the above-mentioned head gate when Victor rode up h1 his motorbike. The first thing I said to
him was, "Victor, why did you cut that lock? Don't you know that's a Federal offenser He
replied, "I don't know anything about a lock and I have already talked to my attomey." Had I
told him to cut the lock, I thhlk he would have said, "because you told me to."
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Electronically Filed
3/6/2018 4:05 PM
Fifth Judicial District, Minidoka County
Tonya Page, Clerk of the Court
By: Michelle Perry, Deputy Clerk

BLAKE G . HALL, ESQ.
SAM L. ANGELL, ESQ. .
HALL ANGELL & ASSOCIATES, LLP
1075 S Utah Avenue, Suite 150
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83402
Telephone (208) 522-3003
Fax (208) 621-3008
!SB Nos. 2434 and 7012
bgh@hasattorneys.com
sla@ hasattorneys.com
Attorneys for Defendant
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STA TE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF MINIDOKA
VICTOR RODGER BLISS,
Case No. CV-2017-334
Plaintiff,

DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

V.

MINIDOKA IRRIGATION DISTRlCT,
Defendant.
Defendant MINIDOKA IRRIGATION DISTRJCT, by and through counsel ofrecord,
HALL ANGELL & ASSOCIATES, LLP, and pursuant to I.R.C.P. 56, hereby move this Court
for an order granting summary judgment in this matter. This motion is based upon the record,
pleadings, memorandum in support, and affidavits in support filed herewith. Oral argument is
requested.
DATED this _.lL day of March, 2018.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I served a true copy of the foregoing document upon the following
this ____t?_ day of March, 20 I 8, by the method indicated below:
Jonathan R. Grover, Esq.
EV ANS GROVER BEINS
52 West Main Street
PO Box 160
Tremonton, UT 84337
Fax: 435-257-6592
Email: jgrover@egb-law.com

[ X] Mailing
[
] Hand-Delivery
[
] Facsimile
[ X] Email
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Electronically Filed
3/6/2018 4:11 PM
Fifth Judicial District, Minidoka County
Tonya Page, Clerk of the Court
By: Michelle Perry, Deputy Clerk

BLAKE G. HALL, ESQ.
SAM L. ANGELL, ESQ.
HALL ANGELL & ASSOCIATES, LLP
1075 S Utah Avenue, Suite 150
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83402
Telephone (208) 522-3003
Fax (208) 621-3008
!SB Nos. 2434 and 7012
bgh@hasattorneys.com
sla@hasattorneys.com
Attorneys for Defendant
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF MINIDOKA
VICTOR RODGER BLISS,
Case No. CV-2017-334
Plaintiff,
AFFIDAVIT OF VANCE JOHNSON
V.

MINIDOKA IRRIGATION DISTRICT,
Defendant.
STATE OF IDAHO )
: ss.
County of Minidoka )
VANCE JOHNSON, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and states as follows:
1.

That I am over the age of eighteen (18) and am competent to testify in this matter.

I make this affidavit based on my own personal knowledge unless otherwise indicated. This
affidavit is made under penalty of perjury.
2.

I am the assistant watermaster for Defendant Minidoka Irrigation District

(" MID"). I have served in this capacity at all times relevant to this litigation and continue to
serve in this capacity.
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3.

On June 30, 2016, MID discovered that the lock, chain, and wheel used to adjust

the check structure behind the headgate at Plaintiffs property had been cut and removed. That
same day, I spoke with three other farmers in the district, Luke McCall, and Ryan and Randy
Knopp. Luke McCall and Ryan Knopp told me that they had witnessed Plaintiff Victor Bliss and
his wife cut the padlock and chain off the check structure. I eventually managed to call Plaintiff,
who began to yell and swear at me. Plaintiff told me that he had he had cut the lock, chain, and
wheel and lowered the headgate himself.
4.

I placed my conversation with Plaintiff on speakerphone in the presence of Ruth

Bailes and Dan Davidson. I asked Plaintiff if he had removed the lock, chain, and wheel from the
check structure, and he told me he had taken it and that MID was not getting it back.
5.

MID contacted the Minidoka County Sheriff's and reported Plaintiffs activity.

Deputy Ron Stumph responded to MID' s complaints, and took witness statements from myself,
Ms. Bailes, Mr. Davidson, and Frank Hunt. A true and correct copy of the statement I gave to
Deputy Stumph is attached hereto as Exhibit A.
FURTHER YOUR AFFIANT SAYETH NAUGHT.
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VANCE~SON

SUBSCRIB~ AND SWORN TO, before me the undersigned, a Notary Public in and for said
State, this ~ day of March, 2018.

~
j

~

RUTH S. BAILES
NOTARY PUBLIC
STATE OF IDAHO

J "'•tf;-:t~~:"!T"~~·~';_.f""r~y~11!"
- -,-V,~

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby ce1tify that I served a true copy of the foregoing document upon the following
this ~ day of March, 2018, by the method indicated below:
Jonathan R. Grover, Esq.
EVANS GROVER BEINS
52 West Main Street
PO Box 160
Tremonton, UT 84337
Fax:435-257-6592
Email: jgrover@egb-law.com

[ X] Mailing
[
] Hand-Delivery
[
] Facsimile
[ X] Email
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Idaho Falls, Idaho 83402
Telephone (208) 522-3003
Fax (208) 621-3008
JSB Nos. 2434 and 7012
bgh@hasattomeys.com
sla@hasattomeys.com
Attorneys for Defendant
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF MINIDOKA
VICTOR RODGER BLISS,
Case No. CV-2017-334
Plaintiff,

DEFENDANT'S MEMORANDUM IN
SUPPORT OF SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

V.

MINIDOKA IRRIGATION DISTRICT,
Defendant.
COMES NOW Defendant, by and through counsel of record, HALL ANGELL &
AS SOCIATES, LLP, and hereby submits this Memorandum in Support of its Motion for
Summary Judgment as follows:

INTRODUCTION
Before the Court is Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment on all claims by Plaintiff
as well as Defendant's counterclaims. This case arises out of a relationship between Plaintiff
Victor Bliss, a resident of Minidoka County, and the Defendant Minidoka Irrigation District
("MID"). Plaintiff filed a notice of tort claim for defamation, and subsequently filed the instant
action on other grounds. Plaintiffs Complaint alleges breach of contract, breach of fiduciary
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duty, trespass, wrongful prosecution, intentional infliction of extreme emotional distress, and
also seeks declaratory relief.
Plaintiff's claims for breach of fiduciary duty, trespass, wrongful prosecution, and
intentional infliction of extreme emotional distress cannot be raised because he failed to file a
requisite notice of tort claim on these claims prior to filing the instant action. Nonetheless, even
on their merits, none of Plaintiff's claims are valid, and as such, summary judgment is
appropriate as to each claim. First, Plaintiff cannot establish a prima facie case for breach of
fiduciary duty because Plaintiff cannot establish requisite duty, and has failed to provide
evidence of breach of a duty as to create a genuine issue of material fact. Second, Plaintiff's
claims for trespass necessarily fail because he has produced no evidence of any damages, and the
alleged acts of trespass Plaintiff pled occurred outside the applicable statute of limitations.
Third, Plaintiff's claim for wrongful prosecution necessarily fails because MID is
immune from claims for malicious prosecution, and MID is not a prosecutor for the purposes of
a prima facie case. Fourth, Plaintiff cannot create a genuine issue of material fact to survive
summary judgment on his claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress because Plaintiff
has not provided any evidence to show that MID' s alleged actions were outrageous, nor has he
provided any evidence that he experienced any emotional distress. Fifth, Plaintiff's breach of
contract claims fail because he cannot create a genuine issue of material fact that any contract,
written or oral, existed between himself and MID, and any alleged breach of contract occurred
outside of the applicable statute of limitations. Lastly, Plaintiff's claim for declaratory relief is
not justiciable because he has not pled any actual right in controversy. Plaintiff cannot create a
genuine issue of fact for any of his claims. Therefore, this Court should grant Defendant's
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Motion for Summary Judgment because there is no genuine issue of material fact that precludes
dismissal for Plaintiff's claims.
Additionally, Defendant seeks summary judgment on its counterclaims raised against
Plaintiff. Plaintiff has testified that he has built a crossing over MID's right-of-way on Lateral
1712 without permission from MID, and that he currently maintains the crossing despite requests
to remove it from MID. As such, MID can demonstrate that there is no genuine issue of material
fact that Plaintiff is committing a continuing trespass upon MID's right-of-way, and that
declaratory relief is necessary to repair the situation.
STATEMENT OF FACTS

1.

Defendant Minidoka Irrigation District is an irrigation district formed pursuant to

Idaho Code § 43-101 et seq. MID is a taxing district which delivers irrigation water to the
properties oflandowning members of the district. (Affidavit of Ruth Bailes, ,r 5). Membership of
the district is involuntary, with assessments collected once a year on all property held by
landowners having MID water rights on their property. (Bailes Aff., ,r 5). MID does not have any
agreements, written or oral, with members of the district. (Bailes Aff., ,r 5).
2.

MID delivers irrigation water to members having water right appurtenant to their

property. (Bailes Aff., ,r 5). MID builds, repairs, and maintains canals, ditches, and structures to
deliver water to landowners having water rights appurtenant to their property. (Bailes Aff., ,r 5).
MID regularly repairs and maintains canals, ditches, and water appurtenances that are under its
operation and control. (Bailes Aff., ,r 5). MID has no duty to build, maintain, or repair the private
canals, ditches, or structures owned by district members. (Bailes Aff., ,r 5).
3.

MID does not distribute water onto members' property. (Bailes Aff., ,r 5). Instead,

members of the district are responsible for diverting water from a fixed point of diversion, a
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headgate, from which point the distribution of water across property becomes the responsibility
of the member. (Bailes Aff., ,r 5). A headgate is a gate or valve at a point of diversion that can be
opened or closed to regulate the flow of water entering a member's property. (Bailes Aff., ,r 5).
4.

Members receive water from MID by requesting delivery of water with a ditch

rider, who is tasked by MID with distributing water. (Bailes Aff., ,r 6). After a request is made, a
ditch rider then determines whether there is sufficient water available to grant permission to open
the headgate at the requesting member's property. (Bailes Aff., ,r 6). Once permitted, the member
may open the headgate as per the ditch rider's instruction, and the member may divert water
from the canal onto their property to irrigate crops. (Bailes Aff., ,r 6). The member landowner is
tasked with ordering the delivery of water from the ditch rider and notifying the ditch rider when
the member desires to halt delivery of water. (Bailes Aff., ,r 6). The ditch rider is tasked with
monitoring the amount of water diverted onto a member's property. (Bailes Aff., ,r 6).
5.

MID does not allocate a specific amount of water to each acre or member. (Bailes

Aff., ,r 7). Rather, members are authorized to divert, onto acres with a MID water right
appurtenant, sufficient water to grow a crop, if water is available. (Bailes Aff., ,r 7). MID water
can only be delivered onto acres that have a MID water right appurtenant. (Bailes Aff., ,r 7). The
amount of irrigation water available to each member landowner from MID is not determined by
any agreements, written or oral, between the member and MID. (Bailes Aff., ,r 7).
6.

MID occasionally removes noxious weeds within its easements and right-of-ways

along irrigation canals, ditches, and appurtenances which MID owns, operates and controls.
(Affidavit of Dan Davidson, ,r 5). MID only provides this service when necessary and
economically feasible, and does so to the best of its ability within time constraints and resources
available. (Davidson Aff., ,r 5).
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7.

Plaintiff Victor Bliss is a resident of Minidoka County who owns approximately

75.87 acres ofland within the district. (Affidavit of Blake G. Hall, Ex. A, Deposition of Victor
Bliss, 23:8-20). Plaintiffs 75.87 acres has MID water rights appurtenant. (Bailes Aff., ,i 8).
8.

MID has provided at least one headgate to allow Plaintiff to divert irrigation water

into his property. (Bailes Aff., ,i 9).
9.

In 1998, MID moved a canal that ran along Plaintiff's property. MID deposited

dirt that was necessarily excavated from the canal onto the canal bank. The canal has a high
bank, with dirt deposited along its sides. (Bailes Aff., ,i 10).
10.

Since at around the early 2000's, Plaintiff has leased out the property to Alan and

Debra Woodland for $90,000 per year, as well as 80 beet shares for $8,000 per year. (Bliss
Depo., 24:23-32:7). In 2013, Plaintiff and the Woodlands entered into a five-year written lease
agreement for the same terms, with the lease terminating at the end of 2018. (Id.; Hall Aff., Ex.
B, Farm Lease).
11.

As the property owner, Plaintiff has historically requested delivery of water by

contacting a MID ditch rider. (Bailes Aff., ,i 11; Bliss Depo., 89:25-91 :4). Plaintiff has never
been denied delivery of water by MID, but has on some occasions had delivery only temporarily
delayed until sufficient water was available for Plaintiff's diversion. (Bailes Aff., ,i 11 ). Plaintiff
has never been given approval to divert more than the amount of water required to irrigate the
75.87 acres. (Bailes Aff., ,i 12). Despite never being denied delivery, Plaintiff has made multiple
reports, written and oral, to MID complaining about not receiving as much water as he would
like to have delivered to the 75.87 acres of land leased by the Woodlands. (Bailes Aff., ,i 12).
Neither Alan nor Debra Woodland have ever reported to MID that they have received less water
than the amount entitled upon request, nor have the Woodlands complained of, or filed a tort
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claim alleging, crop damage resulting from a lack of delivery of irrigation water by MID. (Bailes
Aff., ii 12).
12.

Plaintiff voluntarily installed a filter screen at the headgate that is used to divert

water onto the 75.87 acres which creates a restriction that encumbers his ability to deliver water
onto his property. (Bailes Aff., ,i 13).
13.

Sometime before June 29, 2016, without the ditch rider's knowledge, someone

began shutting a regulating check structure located in the ditch downstream from the headgate
used to divert water onto Plaintiff's 75.87 acres. (Bailes Aff., ,i 14). This resulted in more water
being available to divert at Plaintiff's headgate but cut off or reduced the amount of water
available to downsteam members of MID who were trying to irrigate at the same time. (Bailes
Aff., ,i 14). As a result of these problems, MID placed a chain and lock on the check structure so
that it could not be adjusted without unlocking the lock. (Bailes Aff., ,i 14; Bliss Depo., 97:698:11).
14.

On June 29, 2016, Plaintiff met with Frank Hunt, then a member of the Minidoka

Irrigation District Board of Directors, regarding some concerns he had about the amount of water
he was receiving. (Bliss Depo., 98:12-99:18; Affidavit of Frank Hunt, ,i 3). Specifically, Plaintiff
was concerned that a pump in his irrigation system was not receiving enough water. (Hunt Aff., ,i
3). Plaintiff informed Mr. Hunt that pipe movers had informed him that there was not enough
water in his ditch, and that the pump would have to be turned off. Mr. Hunt then told Plaintiff "it
sound[ ed] like he needed more water in the ditch." (Hunt Aff., ,i 3). Mr. Hunt did not make any
recommendation to Plaintiff to remove the lock, chain, or wheel from the check structure, and he
did not make an agreement with Plaintiff to provide him more water. (Hunt Aff., ,i 3).
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15.

On June 30, 2016, MID discovered that the lock, chain, and wheel used to adjust

the check structure had been cut and removed. (Bailes Aff., ,i 15). After learning from MID that
the lock had been cut, Mr. Hunt believed Plaintiff to have been the culprit. Mr. Hunt asked
Plaintiff why he had cut the lock, to which Plaintiff responded "I don't know anything about a
lock and I have already talked to my attorney." (Hunt Aff., ,i 4).
16.

That same day, Vance Johnson, assistant watermaster for MID, spoke with three

other farmers in the district, Luke McCall, and Ryan and Randy Knopp. (Affidavit of Vance
Johnson, ,i 3). Luke McCall and Ryan Knopp informed Mr. Johnson that they had witnessed
Plaintiff and his wife cut the padlock and chain off the check structure. (Johnson Aff., ,i 3). Mr.
Johnson eventually managed to call Plaintiff, who began to yell and swear at Mr. Johnson.
(Johnson Aff., ,i 3). Plaintiff told Mr. Johnson that he had he had cut the lock and chain and
lowered the headgate himself. (Johnson Aff., ,i 3).
17.

Mr. Johnson' s conversation with Plaintiff was overheard by other MID

employees, namely Ruth Bailes and Dan Davidson. (Bailes Aff. , ,i 15; Affidavit of Dan
Davidson, ,i 3). When Mr. Johnson asked Plaintiff if he had removed the lock, chain, and wheel
used to adjust the check structure, Ms. Bailes and Mr. Davidson heard Plaintiff say some
variation of"Hell yeah I took it, and you' re not getting it back." (Bailes Aff., ,i 15; Davidson
Aff., ,J 3)
18.

MID contacted the Minidoka County Sheriff's and reported Plaintiffs activity.

Deputy Ron Stumph responded to MID' s complaints, and took witness statements from Mr.
Johnson, Ms. Bailes, Mr. Davidson, and Mr. Hunt. (Hunt Aff., ,i 5, Ex. A; Johnson Aff., ,i 4, Ex.
A; Bailes Aff., ,i 16, Ex. A; Davidson Aff., ,i 4, Ex. A). Charges were filed by the Minidoka
County Prosecuting Attorney against Plaintiff. These charges were ultimately dismissed after the
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Plaintiff reimbursed MID $75.00 on November 7, 2016 for the cost of a lock, chain, and check
structure wheel. (Bailes Aff., ,r 17).
19.

On March 6, 2017, Plaintiffs attorney delivered a letter to MID, indicating that it

was a notice of tort claim pursuant to the Idaho Tort Claims Act. (Bailes Aff., ,r 18, Exhibit B).
The notice claimed Plaintiff experienced damage to his reputation and character due to alleged
defamatory statements made by MID employees to the Minidoka County Sheriffs office. (Bailes
Aff., ,r 18, Ex. B). The letter alleged $54,430.16 in damages for criminal defense and damage to
reputation and character. (Bailes Aff., ,r 18, Ex. B).
20.

Plaintiff incurred costs associated with defending his criminal suit, and he

believes a MID employee holds him in lower esteem. (Bliss Depo., 135:1-139:4). Plaintiffhas
testified that he is not aware of having lost any business as a result of MID's alleged actions.
(Bliss Depo., 141 :8-15).
21.

On April 17, 2017, Plaintiff filed his Complaint in the instant action. However,

Plaintiffs Complaint did not include the same defamation claim as his March 6, 2017 notice of
tort claim. Instead, Plaintiffs Complaint included claims for breach of contract, breach of
fiduciary duty, trespass, declaratory relief, wrongful prosecution, and intentional infliction of
extreme emotional distress. MID has not received any other notice of tort claim from Plaintiff
describing any of the claims stated in Plaintiffs Complaint. (Bailes Aff., ,r 19).

LEGAL STANDARD
In considering a motion for summary judgment, the Court may properly grant a motion
for summary judgment only where there are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving
party is entitled to judgment as a matter oflaw. I.R.C.P. 56(c). In determining whether any issue
of material fact exists, courts construe all facts and inferences contained in the pleadings,
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depositions, and admissions, together with the affidavits, if any, in a light most favorable to the
non-moving party. Partout v. Harper, 145 Idaho 683, 685, 183 P.3d 771, 773 (2008). The court
draws all inferences and conclusions in the non-moving party's favor and if reasonable people
could reach different conclusions or draw conflicting inferences, then the motion for summary
judgment must be denied. Zimmerman v. Volkswagen ofAmerica, Inc., 128 Idaho 851,854, 920
P .2d 67, 70 (1996).
However, if the evidence shows no disputed issues of material fact, then summary
judgment should be granted. Smith v. Meridian Joint School District No. 2, 128 Idaho 714, 718,
918 P.2d 583,587 (1996); Loomis v. City ofHailey, 119 Idaho 434,437,807 P.2d 1272, 1275
(1991 ). A mere scintilla of evidence or only slight doubt as to the facts is not sufficient to create
a genuine issue for purposes of summary judgment. Samuel v. Hepworth, Nungester & Lezamiz,
Inc., 134 Idaho 84, 87, 996 P.2d 303, 306 (2002). The non-moving party "must respond to the

summary judgment motion with specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial." Id.
ARGUMENT

I.

PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS.
A. Counts II, III, and V of Plaintiff's Complaint Must Be Dismissed Because Plaintiff
Failed to File the Requisite Notice of Tort Claim Pursuant to I.C. § 6-901 et seq.
As an overall matter, Plaintiffs Counts II, III, and V of his Complaint should be

summarily dismissed because he failed to file the requisite notice of tort claim with the clerk or
secretary of the Minidoka Irrigation District for those counts. Idaho Code § 6-906 requires that
"[a]ll claims against a political subdivision arising under the provisions of this act and all claims
against an employee of a political subdivision for any act or omission of the employee within the
course or scope of his employment shall be presented to and filed with the clerk or secretary of
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the political subdivision within one hundred eighty (180) days from the date the claim arose or
reasonably should have been discovered, whichever is later." The primary function of notice
under the Idaho Tort Claims Act (ITCA) is to put the governmental entity on notice that a claim
against it is being prosecuted, and notice serving that function is sufficient unless the
governmental entity is misled to its injury. Van v. PortneufMedical Center, 147 Idaho 552, 212
P .3d 982, footnote 3 (2009).
The purpose of the notice requirement is to "(1) save needless expense and litigation by
providing an opportunity for amicable resolution of the differences between parties, (2) allow
authorities to conduct a full investigation into the cause of the injury in order to determine the
extent of the state's liability, if any, and (3) allow the state to prepare defenses." Mitchell v.
Bingham Memorial Hosp. , 130 Idaho 420, 424, 942 P.2d 544, 548 (1997) (quoting Pounds v.
Denison, 120 Idaho 425, 426-27, 816 P.2d 982, 983-84 (1991)). A plaintiff is not exempt from

notice of claim requirement because of substantial actual notice having been given; thus,
compliance with notice requirements of the ITCA is a mandatory condition to bringing suit, the
failure of which is fatal to a claim, no matter how legitimate. McQuillen v. City ofAmmon, 113
Idaho 719, 722, 747 P.2d 741 , 745 (1987); LC.§ 6-908.
In this case, Plaintiff's Counts II, III, and V must be dismissed because he did not file a
notice oftort claim to adequately put MID on notice that those claims would be brought.
Plaintiff's February 28, 2017 letter to MID only described injury and damages arising out of
alleged defamatory statements, with alleged damages in the form of injury to reputation and
character. The only claim Plaintiff put MID on notice of through the letter was for defamation.
Plaintiff did not provide any additional notice to MID. (Bliss Depo., 117:21-118:25). Plaintiff's
Complaint ultimately did not even include a claim for defamation, and instead included three
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claims for damages for negligent and/or wrongful conduct - breach of fiduciary duty, trespass,
and wrongful prosecution/intentional infliction of extreme emotional distress.
Plaintiff was required to give MID a notice of tort claim for Counts II, III, and V pursuant
to §§ 6-906 and 6-908, and his failure to do so is necessarily fatal to his claims. MID was not
adequately put on notice of potential claims for breach of fiduciary duty, trespass, and wrongful
prosecution/intentional infliction of extreme emotional distress through Plaintiffs letter that only
alleged defamation. As such, MID could not have conducted or have reason to conduct any
meaningful investigation into the cause of such claims, nor put together any defenses for those
claims, because MID would not have had any reason to anticipate those claims being brought.
Therefore, because Plaintiff failed to file the requisite notice of tort claim, Counts II, III, and V
should be dismissed with prejudice.
B. Count II of Plaintifrs Complaint Must Fail Because Plaintiff Cannot Demonstrate
Breach of an Alleged Fiduciary Duty.

Defendant reiterates that Plaintiffs tort claim for breach of fiduciary duty must fail
because Plaintiff failed to file requisite notice of tort claim pursuant to J.C. § 6-901 et seq.
However, even if the Court allows Plaintiff to entertain his claim for breach of fiduciary duty, the
claim fails because Plaintiff cannot a genuine issue of fact that Defendant owed a fiduciary duty
to Plaintiff or that Defendant breached any such alleged duty.
1.

Idaho Code, Title 42 Defines the Duties Imposed on An Irrigation District.

Plaintiff is misinformed as to the source of MID's obligations relating to the maintenance
of canals and delivery of irrigation water. MID is an irrigation district, a creation of state
government, and its duties and obligations are controlled by state statute. See generally, Idaho
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Code, Title 43 . The applicable duties governing the irrigation district are set forth by Idaho Code,
Title 42. The applicable duties of an irrigation district can be summarized as follows:
Duties Imposed on Irrigation District

Statute
§ 42-1201

•

§ 42-1205

•

Keep canals full of water during irrigation season (April 1November 1).
Maintain the flow as full as possible to ensure water users receive
water entitlement.
Maintain the banks of canals in good order and repair so they are
ready to receive water by the first of April.
Construct canals as necessary to properly deliver water to persons
having rights to use the water.
Keep and maintain the embankments thereof in good repair, in
order to prevent waste of water during the irrigation season.
Not permit a greater quantity of water to be turned into the canal
than can be easily contained.
Note: The purpose of this section is to prevent wasting and useless
discharge and running away of water.
To carefully keep and maintain the canals and embankments in
good repair and condition so as to not damage or in any way injure
the property or premises of others.
To clean, maintain and repair canals with equipment that is
commonly used or reasonably adapted for the work.
Deposit debris and other matter taken from the canals onto the
banks.
Construct bridges over canals that satisfy required specifications .

§ 42-1206

•

To repair ditches located on common property.

•
§ 42-1202

•
•

§ 42-1203

•
•

•
§ 42-1204

•
•
•

As a statutorily created entity, the duties of the entity are statutorily defined. Absent,
however, is any duty imposed on the District that are owed to individual landowners within the
district, specifically to repair and maintenance of its canals and relative to flooding. The District
has no obligation to manage, prevent, or otherwise handle floodwaters. In fact, Idaho Code§ 421203 and § 42-1204 specifically articulate that an irrigation district is only responsible for its
water:
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The owners or constructors of such ditches, canals, works or other
aqueducts, while responsible for their own acts or omissions, shall not be
liable for damage or injury caused by: (1) The diversion or discharge of
water into a ditch, canal, works or other aqueduct by a third party without
the permission of the owner or owners of the ditch, canal, works or other
aqueduct; (2) Any other act or omission of a third party, other than an
employee or agent of the owner or owners of the ditch, canal, works or other
aqueduct; or (3) An act of God, including fire, earthquake, storm or similar
natural phenomenon.

LC.§§ 42-1203 and 42-1204.
Irrigation districts owe no duty to prevent seasonal floods. Idaho Code § 42-1204
specifically recognizes that "owners or constructors of such ditches, canals, works or other
aqueducts, while responsible for their own acts or omissions, shall not be liable for damage or
injury caused by: ... (3) An act of God, including fire, earthquake, storm or similar natural
phenomenon." Idaho Code § 42-1204. Idaho law also clearly recognizes the Act of God

defense. Harper v. Johannesen, 84 Idaho 278, 286, 371 P.2d 842 (1962); Johnson v. Burley
Irrigation District, 78 Idaho 392, 398, 304 P.2d 912 (1956). Although a precise definition has

not been clearly established under Idaho law, Idaho Code§ 42-1204 suggests that an Act of God
are storms or similar natural phenomenon. The Johnson court characterized an "act of God" as
one that "proceeds from the force of nature alone, to the entire exclusion of human agency." 78
Idaho at 398-99, 304 P.2d at 916. The Harper court defined an "act of God" as "those events and
accidents which proceed from natural causes and cannot be anticipated or guarded against or
resisted." 84 Idaho at 286, 371 P.2d at 846.
Idaho Code§ 42-1204 was amended in 2012 and the legislative history confirms the
strong legislative desire to shield an irrigation district from liability for damages caused by acts
of God or third parties. As confirmed by the March 19, 2012 Senate State Affairs Committee
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notes, the amendment was proposed to codify existing law that the owner of a canal is not liable
for damage to others that is caused by the acts of God. (Hall Aff., Ex. C, p. 6). Further, that the
amendment was intended to clarify for the water delivery entities, attorneys, and those on the
bench, that liability does not exist where the damage is caused by an Act of God. (Hall Aff., Ex.
C, p. 7). In that same hearing, Senator Darrington provided an example of what the legislation
was intended to clear up:
Senator Darrington said a real-life example was when there was a big
cloudburst in July when the canals were running, and the water came
down and washed into the canals. Before they could cut it at the head
several miles upstream, they had a problem downstream. This is exactly
what is being talked about. Mr. Semanko said this is correct and it is a
serious, important issue.
(Hall Aff., Ex. C, p . 8). When addressing the Act of God, it was specified that an Act of
God must be a natural phenomenon and not man-mad or artificial. (Hall Aff., Ex. C, p. 7).
Ultimately, the clear pronouncement of the Idaho Legislature is that liability does not exist for
damages caused by an Act of God. As noted above in the legislative history, the Legislature was
concerned about clarifying that liability was limited to the irrigation districts own water and not
the water from a third party or an act of God.
The duties Plaintiff claims the MID breached are not actual duties imposed on the
District. Specifically, MID does not owe any individual fiduciary duties to Plaintiff, owing only
those duties found in I.C. § 42-1201 et seq. Plaintiff has not provided any evidence to
demonstrate the existence of any duties outside those prescribed by Idaho Code. As such, there is
no genuine issue of material fact as to what duties MID owed as an irrigation district. Therefore,
summary judgment is appropriate.
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2.

Plaintiff Has Not Demonstrated the Existence of a Fiduciary Duty.

As shown above, MID's duties are established by statute, and MID does not owe
individual duties to landowners within the district beyond its duties prescribed by LC. § 42-1201

et seq. However, even assuming MID could owe fiduciary duties to individual landowners,
Plaintiff has not alleged any facts or provided any evidence of the existence of a fiduciary duty
owed to Plaintiff by MID. "To establish a claim for breach of fiduciary duty, plaintiff must
establish that defendants owed plaintiff a fiduciary duty and that the fiduciary duty was
breached." Sorensen v. Saint Alphonsus Reg'/ Med. Ctr., Inc., 141 Idaho 754, 760, 118 P.3d 86,
92 (2005) (quoting Tolley v. THI Co., 140 Idaho 253,261 , 92 P.3d 503, 511 (2004)). The first
step in determining whether or not there has been a breach of fiduciary duty is to establish the
existence of a fiduciary relationship. "A fiduciary relation exists between two parties when one is
under a duty to act or to give advice for the benefit of the other upon a matter within the scope of
the relation." Podolan v. Idaho Legal Aid Services, Inc. , 123 Idaho 937,946, 854 P.2d 280,289
(Ct. App. 1993) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 874 comment a (1979)).
"A fiduciary relationship does not depend upon some technical relation created by or
defined in law, but it exists in cases where there has been a special confidence imposed in
another who, in equity and good conscience, is bound to act in good faith and with due regard to
the interest of one reposing the confidence." Steams v. Williams, 72 Idaho 276, 288, 240 P.2d
833, 840-41 (1952) (citing Staab v. Staab, 160 Kan. 417, 163 P.2d 418; Renegar v. Bruning, 190
Oki. 340, 123 P.2d 686; Dyblie v. Dyblie, 389 III. 326, 59 N.E.2d 657; and Szekeres v. Reed, 96
Cal.App.2d 348, 215 P.2d 522). "The facts and circumstances must indicate that the one reposing
the trust has foundation for his belief that the one giving advice or presenting arguments is acting
not in his own behalf, but in the interests of the other party." Burwell v. South Carolina Nat.
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Bank, 288 S.C. 34, 340 S.E.2d 786, 790 (1986) (quoted in Idaho First Nat. Bank v. Bliss Valley
Foods, Inc., 121 Idaho 266, 278, 824 P.2d 841, 853 (1991)).

The Idaho Court of Appeals has stated, " [e]xamples of relationships from which the law
will impose fiduciary obligations on the parties include when the parties are: members of the
same family, partners, attorney and client, executor and beneficiary of an estate, principal and
agent, insurer and insured, or close friends." Mitchell v. Barendregt, 120 Idaho 83 7, 844, 820
P.2d 707, 714 (Ct. App. 1991). Idaho appellate courts have also identified relations that do not
give rise to a fiduciary relationship as a matter oflaw. See, e.g., Country Cove Dev., Inc. v. May,
143 Idaho 595, 150 P .3d 288, 296 (2006) ("a debtor-creditor relationship does not give rise to a
fiduciary duty"); and Wade Baker & Sons Farms v. Corp. ofPresiding Bishop ofChurch ofJesus
Christ ofLatter-Day Saints, 136 Idaho 922, 928, P.3d 715, 722 (Ct. App. 2002) ("no fiduciary

duty ordinarily arises between parties to an arm's length business transaction").
Here, Plaintiff has not demonstrated or even alleged facts sufficient to establish the
existence of a fiduciary relationship between himself and MID necessary for a fiduciary duty.
MID is not an entity owing responsibilities to Plaintiff to act in his best interests or on his behalf.
MID and Plaintiff do not share a relationship as any of those listed by the court in Mitchell. As
such, Plaintiff has not demonstrated facts to support the existence of a fiduciary relationship
between himself and MID, and his claim must fail.

3.

Plaintiff Has Not Demonstrated Breach of Any Duties Owed by MID.

There is also no genuine issue of fact that MID did not breach any alleged duty. As
established above, MID owes certain duties under statutory law. Plaintiff has not provided any
evidence to demonstrate that MID failed to perform any of the duties listed under J.C. § 42-1201
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et seq. Therefore, to the extent that Plaintiff claims MID failed to perform any duties pursuant to
Idaho Code, those claims must fail.
Additionally, Plaintiff has not provided any evidence that Plaintiff breached any alleged
fiduciary duty. Plaintiff alleges MID owed Plaintiff fiduciary duties to maintain and repair its
canals and ditches and to deliver water to Plaintiff. While Plaintiff has not established the
existence of a fiduciary relationship to create these duties, even supposing such a relationship
exists, Plaintiff cannot create a genuine issue of material fact MID breached these duties. MID
regularly repairs and maintains its canals, ditches, and appurtenances. Plaintiff has not produced
any evidence to show otherwise. MID delivered irrigation water to Plaintiff upon request and in
the amount to which Plaintiff was entitled as water right. MID never denied any request for
delivery of water from Plaintiff. Again, Plaintiff has provided no evidence to show otherwise. As
such, Plaintiff cannot create a genuine issue of material fact as to breach of alleged fiduciary
duties to repair, maintain, and deliver, and no reasonable jury could differ on the fact that MID
carried out its duties.
Plaintiff also has not presented any evidence to support his insistence of an existing duty
to prevent seasonal flooding. Plaintiffs claim regarding flooding is inextricably tied to MID' s
building, repair, and maintenance of its canals, ditches, and water appurtenances. Plaintiff has
not provided any evidence to show that MID had a duty beyond such repair and maintenance as
to prevent acts of god such as seasonal flooding. Additionally, as shown above, MID does
regularly repair and maintain its canals, ditches, and appurtenances. Plaintiff cannot create a
genuine issue of material fact on a supposed fiduciary duty to prevent seasonal flooding when
MID has evidenced that it does in fact repair and maintain its canals, ditches, and appurtenances,
and when statutory law expressly provides immunity from suit for Acts of God. Therefore,
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summary judgment is appropriate on Plaintiffs fiduciary claims for failure to create a genuine
issue of material fact as to breach.
4.

Plaintiff Failed to File Suit Within the Applicable Statute of Limitations.

Additionally, Plaintiffs claim for breach of fiduciary duty fails because he did not bring
the claim within the applicable statute of limitations. Breach of a fiduciary duty falls under the
"catch-all" statute of limitations under Idaho Code § 5-224, and must be commenced within four
(4) years after the cause of action shall have accrued. See Jones v. Runft, Leroy, Coffin &
Matthews, Chtd. , 124 Idaho 607, 873 P.2d 861 (1994). Plaintiffs alleged acts of breach by MID

are for the following: an undertow check location change sometime in the l 990' s, a relocation of
a canal on neighboring property around the year 2000, and some modifications by MID and
requests for modifications by Plaintiff sometime in the 1990's. (Bliss Depo., 44: 17-52: 1).
Plaintiff filed the instant action on April 17, 2017, placing the relevant date for statute of
limitations purposes at April 17, 2013. Each of these alleged acts by MID occurred well outside
the applicable four-year statute of limitations under § 5-224. Therefore, because Plaintiff failed
to file within four-years of the occurrence of the alleged acts of breach, summary judgment is
appropriate, and Plaintiffs claims for breach of fiduciary duty should be dismissed with
prejudice.
C. Count III of Plaintifrs Complaint Must Fail Because the Statute of Limitations Has
Expired on Any Alleged Acts of Trespass, and Plaintiff Cannot Establish a Prima
Facie Case for Trespass.
1.

Plaintiff Failed to File Suit Within the Applicable Statute of Limitations.

Defendant reiterates that Plaintiffs claim for trespass should be summarily dismissed
because he failed to file the requisite notice of tort claim. However, even if the Court allows
Plaintiffs trespass claim to go forward, Plaintiffs claim must be dismissed because all alleged
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trespass occurred well outside the applicable statute of limitations. Idaho Code § 5-218, titled
"Statutory liabilities, trespass, trover, replevin, and fraud", provides a three-year statute of
limitations for "an action for trespass upon real property." See e.g. Young Electric Sign Co. v.
State ex rel. Winder, 135 Idaho 804, 25 P.3d 117 (2001)
Here, Plaintiff has failed to show any alleged instance of trespass by MID or its
employees that occurred within the applicable statute oflimitations. Plaintiff alleged in his
Complaint that MID "placed dirt, soil and other items from its canal on top of a fence owned by
Bliss, damaging the fence and personal property near the fence." Plaintiff did not plead facts
concerning when such alleged trespass and damage occurred. However, Plaintiff has testified
that the moving of dirt referred to in his Complaint occurred somewhere between five and twenty
years before filing his notice of tort claim. (Bliss Depa., 113 :9-11 7: 11 ). MID did place dirt on a
canal bank, within MID' s right-of-way, when excavating earth to move a canal along Plaintiffs
property in 1998. It appears that the alleged instance of trespass Plaintiff refers to in his
Complaint is the 1998 moving of a canal, almost twenty years before the date of filing his
Complaint. As such, the acts of trespass alleged by Plaintiff occurred well outside the three-year
statute of limitations. Therefore, Plaintiff cannot bring a claim for trespass, and Count III should
be dismissed with prejudice.
2.

MID is Immune From Suit for Depositing Debris on its Right-of-Way.

Further, Plaintiff cannot file suit for trespass against MID for allegedly depositing dirt
taken from the canal onto the canal banks. Idaho Code § 42-1102 provides, among other things,
that an irrigation district has a right-of-way along a canal that passes through the property of a
landowner within the district. Section 42-1102 also grants an irrigation district the right to
"deposit on the banks of the ditch or canal the debris and other matter necessarily required to be
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taken from the ditch or canal to properly clean and maintain it, but no greater width ofland along
the banks of the canal or ditch than is absolutely necessary for such deposits shall be occupied by
the removed debris or other matter." I.C. § 42-1102 (West through 2018).
The incident at issue in Plaintiffs Complaint occurred in 1998, when MID moved a
canal. MID' s moving of the canal necessarily required excavation of dirt from the ground, which
was deposited along the bank of the canal. The canal, which runs along Plaintiff's property, has a
high slope, and MID deposited dirt at the bottom of said slope. The deposited dirt was within
MID's right-of-way along the canal, and Plaintiff has not provided any evidence to counter this
fact. As such, There is no genuine issue of fact that MID had a right to deposit dirt where it did
in 1998. Therefore, summary judgment is appropriate as to trespass.

3.

Plaintiff Has Not Provided Facts Demonstrating Damage Caused by Alleged
Acts of Trespass.

Additionally, Plaintiff has not established any damage, even nominal damages, as a result
of alleged acts of trespass. Generally, the plaintiff in a trespass action has the burden to prove a
causal connection between the defendant's alleged wrongful conduct and the plaintiffs injury, as
well as the extent of the injury sustained. Nelson v. Holdaway Land and Cattle Co., 107 Idaho
550, 552, 691 P.2d 796, 799 (Ct. App. 1984) (citing Mercer v. Shearer, 84 Idaho 536, 374 P.2d
716 (1962); Alm v. Johnson, 75 Idaho 521,275 P.2d 959 (1954)). While a plaintiff may be
entitled to nominal damages for trespass, the Idaho Supreme Court has held that in a trespass
case a judgment will not be reversed for the purpose of permitting the recovery of nominal
damages where no questions of costs and no important or substantial rights are involved. Alm,

supra.
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Here, Plaintiff has not alleged any actual damages, even nominal, as a result of MID's
alleged trespass over five years ago. Plaintiff has not produced any quotes, receipts, or invoices
for repairs. Plaintiff has testified that he was not farming the land in question at the time of the
alleged trespass, and that the alleged trespass did not have any impact on the cash rent he
collected for the land. (Bliss Depo., 113:3-8). Plaintiff has not pied any facts or provided any
evidence of any actual or nominal damages to his property as a result of any alleged trespass. As
such, there is no genuine issue of fact as to whether Plaintiff was damaged as a result of any
alleged trespass. Therefore, summary judgment is appropriate, and Plaintiffs claims for trespass
should be dismissed with prejudice.
D. Count V Must Fail Because Plaintiff Cannot Establish a Prima Facie Case for
Wrongful Prosecution or Infliction of Extreme Emotional Distress.
1.

Defendant is immune from suit for Plaintiff's "Wrongful Prosecution" claim.

Plaintiff included a claim for "wrongful prosecution" within Count V of his Complaint,
which is considered a claim for "malicious prosecution" under Idaho law. Radell v. Beeks, 115
Idaho 101 , l 03, 765 P .2d 126, 128 (1988) (indicating that an action for "wrongful civil
proceedings" is synonymous with malicious prosecution). Idaho law provides that "a
governmental entity and its employees while acting within the course and scope of their
employment and without malice or criminal intent shall not be liable for any claim which: ...
arises out of assault, battery, false imprisomnent, false arrest, malicious prosecution, abuse of
process, libel, slander, misrepresentation, deceit, or interference with contract rights." I.C. § 6904 (emphasis added). Plaintiff has alleged that the Defendant engaged in wrongful prosecution.
The Defendant and its employees are immune from claims of malicious prosecution during the
course and scope of their employment absent a showing "malice or criminal intent." I.C. § 6-904.
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The claims asserted by Plaintiff in his Complaint all arise out of facts that Plaintiff
characterizes as some kind of scheme of malicious prosecution. MID and its employees are
immune from state law claims of "malicious prosecution." To overcome this immunity, Plaintiff
must establish that the MID acted with "malice or criminal intent" in the discharge of its duties.
Plaintiff has not provided any evidence to suggest that MID acted with "malice or criminal
intent" . Therefore, MID is immune from suits for malicious prosecution.

2.

Even if immunity under the ITCA did not apply, Plaintiff has not established
the elements for a "wrongful prosecution" claim.

Even if MID is not immune from claims for malicious prosecution, Plaintiffs claim
necessarily fails because MID is not a "prosecutor" for the purposes of a malicious prosecution
action. "Actions for malicious prosecution are not favored in law and, thus are limited by
requiring the plaintiff to establish several elements." Badell, 115 Idaho at 102, 765 P.2d at 127

(citing Luther v. First Banko/Troy, 64 Idaho 416, 133 P.2d 717 (1943)). The elements are as
follows: (1) That there was a prosecution; (2) That it terminated in favor of the plaintiff; (3) That
the defendant was the prosecutor; (4) Malice; (5) Lack of probable cause; and (6) Damages
sustained by the plaintiff. Myers v. City ofPocatello, 98 Idaho 168, 559 P .2d 1136 (1977).
Plaintiff cannot maintain a claim for malicious/wrongful prosecution against Defendant
because Defendant is not a "prosecutor". Because MID is not a prosecutor, Plaintiff cannot
establish a prima facie case for malicious prosecution, and there is no genuine issue of fact for a
jury. Therefore, summary judgment is appropriate, and Count V should be dismissed with
prejudice.
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3.

Plaintiff Has Not Demonstrated Facts to Support a Claim of Intentional
Infliction of Extreme Emotional Distress.

Plaintiff also alleges intentional and/or reckless infliction of extreme emotional distress
as part of Count Vin his Complaint. Plaintiff's claims for intentional and/or reckless infliction of
emotional distress must fail because he cannot establish a prima facie case for intentional
infliction of emotional distress. To recover for intentional infliction of emotional distress, a
plaintiff must show that (I) the defendant's conduct was intentional or reckless, (2) the conduct
was extreme and outrageous, (3) there was a causal connection between the wrongful conduct
and the plaintiffs emotional distress, and (4) the emotional distress was severe. Johnson v.

McPhee, 147 Idaho 455,464 (Ct.App. 2009).
Liability for this intentional tort is generated only by conduct that is very extreme.

Edmondson v. Shearer Lumber Products, 139 Idaho 172, 180 (2003). The conduct must be not
merely unjustifiable; it must rise to the level of "atrocious" and "beyond all possible bounds of
decency," such that it would cause an average member of the community to believe that it was
outrageous. Id. Examples of conduct that has been deemed sufficiently extreme and outrageous
by Idaho courts include: an insurance company speciously denying a grieving widower's cancer
insurance claim while simultaneously impugning his character and drawing him into a prolonged
dispute, Walston v. Monumental Life Ins. Co. , 129 Idaho 211, 219- 20 (1996), prolonged sexual,
mental, and physical abuse inflicted upon a woman by her co-habiting boyfriend, Curtis v. Firth,
123 Idaho 598, 605- 07 (1992), recklessly shooting and killing someone else's donkey that was
both a pet and a pack animal, Gill v. Brown, 107 Idaho 1137, 1138- 39 (Ct.App. 1985), and real
estate developers swindling a family out of property that was the subject of their lifelong dream
to build a Christian retreat, Spence v. Howell, 126 Idaho 763, 773- 74 (1995).
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Here, Plaintiff has failed to show that MID intentionally or recklessly engaged in any
wrongful conduct. Further, Plaintiff cannot show that any of MID' s actions rose to the level of
"atrocious" and "beyond all possible bounds of decency" such that it would cause an average
member of the community to believe that it was outrageous. MID employees provided written
statements recalling to the best of their knowledge events concerning and conversations with
Plaintiff. Lastly, Plaintiff has not presented any evidence of having experienced emotional
distress. Plaintiff has only testified that he has incurred costs associated with defending his
criminal suit, and that he believes a MID employee holds him in lower esteem. (Bliss Depo.,
135: 1-139:4). Plaintiff has testified that he is not aware of having lost any business as a result of
MID's alleged actions. (Bliss Depo., 141 :8-15).
There is no genuine issue of fact with regard to Plaintiffs claim for intentional infliction
of extreme emotional distress. No reasonable jury could differ on the fact that MID did not
engage in any actions arising to the level of "atrocious" and "beyond all bounds of decency", nor
could they differ on the fact that Plaintiff has not shown any evidence of emotional distress
caused by MID' s alleged actions. Therefore, summary judgment is appropriate on Plaintiffs
claim for intentional infliction of extreme emotional distress, and Count V of his Complaint
should be dismissed in its entirety and with prejudice.

E. Count I Must Fail Because Plaintiff Failed to Establish a Breach of Contract.
Plaintiffs breach of contract claim must fail because he cannot establish a prima facie
case for breach of contract. A breach of contract is non-performance of any contractual duty of
immediate performance. Idaho Power Co. v. Cogeneration, Inc., 134 Idaho 738, 746-47, 9 P.3d
1204, 1212-13 (2000) (citing Enterprise, Inc. v. Nampa City, 96 Idaho 734,740, 536 P.2d 729,
735 (1975) (quoting RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 3 I 2 (1932))). It is a
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failure, without legal excuse, to perform any promise, which forms the whole or part of a
contract. Id. (citing Hughes v. Idaho State University, 122 Idaho 435,437, 835 P.2d 670, 672
(Ct.App.1992) (quoting BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 188 (6th ed. 1990))). To prevail on a
claim for breach of contract a plaintiff must prove "(a) the existence of the contract, (b) the
breach of the contract, (c) the breach caused damages, and (d) the amount of those damages. "
Hull v. Giesler, 156 Idaho 765, 774, 331 P .3d 507, 516 (2014) (quoting Mosel! Equities, LLC v.
Berryhill & Co., 154 Idaho 269,278,297 P.3d 232,241 (2013)). The burden of proving the

existence of a contract and fact of its breach is upon the plaintiff, and once those facts are
established, the defendant has burden of pleading and proving affirmative defenses, which
legally excuse performance. Id. (citing O'Dell v. Basabe, 119 Idaho 796, 813, 810 P.2d 1082,
1099 (1991 )).
Idaho courts have recognized three types of contractual arrangements. First is the express
contract wherein the parties expressly agree regarding a transaction. Continental Forest
Products, Inc. v. Chandler Supply Co., 95 Idaho 739, 743,518 P.2d 1201, 1205 (citing
Alexander v. O'Neil, 77Ariz.316, 267 P.2d 730 (1954)). Secondly, there is the implied in fact

contract wherein there is no express agreement but the conduct of the parties implies an
agreement from which an obligation in contract exists. Id. ( citing Clements v. Jungert, 90 Idaho
143, 408 P.2d 810 (1965)). The third category is called an implied in law contract, or quasi
contract. Id. However, "a contract implied in law is not a contract at all, but an obligation
imposed by law for the purpose of bringing about justice and equity without reference to the
intent or the agreement of the parties and, in some cases, in spite of an agreement between the
parties." Id. (citing Hixon v. Allphin, 76 Idaho 327, 281 P.2d 1042 (1955); McShane v. Quillin,
47 Idaho 542, 277 P 554 (1929); 3 Corbin on Contracts, s 561, at p. 276 (1960)). It is a nonDEFENDANT'S MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 25
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contractual obligation that is to be treated procedurally as if it were a contract, and is often
referred to as quasi-contract, unjust enrichment, implied-in-law contract or restitution. Id.
Here, there is no question of fact as to whether there existed an express contract. Plaintiff
and MID have not entered into an express agreement. There is no written set of terms or
conditions agreed upon by the parties, nor is there a verbal agreement between them. The
relationship between MID and Plaintiff is not a contractual one; rather, it is a relationship
between a taxing district and a landowner within the district. MID is a taxing district formed
under Idaho Code§ 43-101 et seq. , and has duties and obligations prescribed by law. These
duties are not established by individual agreements, but by the provisions of Title 43 of the Idaho
Code. Plaintiff has not provided any evidence of written or verbal agreements between himself
and MID to change the duties and obligations owed by MID under Title 43.
Plaintiff has alleged two specific instances of breach: (1) that MID allegedly failed to
deliver "adequate water in a reasonably [sic] fashion whereby Bliss could receive delivery of the
water on his farm property"; and (2) that MID allegedly failed to "maintain and repair the canals,
ditches, and other water appurtenances for the delivery of water to Bliss." (See Complaint, ,r,r 18
and 19). However, Plaintiff has not provided any evidence of any contemporaneous agreements
augmenting the duties and obligations MID owes under Title 43.
Pursuant to Titles 42 and 43, Plaintiff is not entitled to "adequate water" to water his
property. Plaintiff is entitled to the water right prescribed to his property, totaling 75.87 acres of
water right. Pursuant to Idaho Code § 42-220, "when water is used for irrigation, no such license
or decree of the court allotting such water shall be issued confirming the right to the use of more
than one second foot of water for each fifty (50) acres ofland so irrigated[ ....]". As such,
Plaintiffs maximum water right is approximately 1.52 seconds feet of water for his entire 75.87
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acres located within the district. MID has delivered Plaintiffs entitled water when requested, and
has never denied a request for delivery. MID was not required to supply more than to which
Plaintiff was entitled. Plaintiff has testified that he has not received any documentation as to how
much water he is entitled to, indicating that his position that he is entitled to "adequate" water to
deliver to his property is uninformed. (Bliss Depo., 41 :25-42:25). As such, Plaintiffs breach of
contract claim must fail because no reasonable jury could differ on the fact that there is no
agreement between MID and Plaintiff for delivery of "adequate" water, and that MID did not
breach any such alleged agreement by supplying him with his entitled share.
Additionally, Plaintiff cannot establish an agreement providing for repair and
maintenance of canals other than those which MID is required to repair and maintain by law.
MID is required only to provide canals and appurtenances to run irrigation water along Plaintiffs
property. MID has built, repaired, and maintained the canals and appurtenances. However, it is
Plaintiffs sole responsibility to direct water from these canals and appurtenances to supply water
to his property. Plaintiff has provided no evidence of any agreement between himself and MID
that creates a duty for MID to build, maintain, and repair canals, ditches, or appurtenances for the
direct delivery of water onto Plaintiffs property. Therefore, Plaintiffs breach of contract claim
must fail because no reasonable jury could differ on the fact that there is no agreement between
MID and Plaintiff for MID to maintain and repair the canals, ditches, and other water
appurtenances for the delivery of water to Plaintiff beyond those required under Titles 42 and 43.
Even if the Court were to entertain the idea of a contractual arrangement between
Plaintiff and MID, Plaintiff cannot establish a prima facie case for breach of contract because he
has not provided any evidence of damages. To prove the element causation, a plaintiff must
demonstrate "he was injured and his injury was the result of the defendant's breach; ' both
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amount and causation must be proven with reasonable certainty."' Hull, 156 Idaho at 774, 331
P.3d at 516 (quoting Harris, Inc. v. Foxhollow Constr. & Trucking, Inc., 151 Idaho 761 , 770, 264
P.3d 400, 409 (2011)). "[E]ven if the plaintiff establishes that ' he has been legally wronged, he
may not recover damages unless he has been economically ' injured."' Melaleuca, Inc. v. Foeller,
155 Idaho 920, 924, 318 P.3d 910,914 (2014) (quotingBergkamp v. Martin, 114 Idaho 650, 653,
759 P.2d 941, 944 (Ct. App.1988)).
Here, Plaintiff has not provided any evidence that he has suffered damages due to any
alleged breach of contract. Plaintiff has testified that he leases the property in question to another
individual, and that he has received all rents owed on the property. Plaintiff has not testified that
he has experienced any damage as a result of alleged breach. Therefore, Plaintiff cannot establish
a prima facie case for breach of contract, and his claims must necessarily fail.
Lastly, Plaintiffs breach of contract claims should be dismissed because the alleged acts
of breach occurred well outside any applicable statute oflimitations. As stated above, MID does
not have any agreements with Plaintiff regarding the delivery of water and/or the maintenance
and repair of canals, ditches, and water appurtenances. However, even supposing such
agreements do exist, the alleged instances of breach testified to be Plaintiff occurred outside any
applicable statute oflimitations for contracts. Idaho Code§ 5-216 provides that " [a]ny action
upon any contract, obligation or liability founded upon an instrument in writing" must be
brought within five (5) years. As for oral contracts, Idaho Code § 5-217 provides that such
actions must be brought within four (4) years. Thus, the earliest relevant date for Plaintiffs
breach of contract claims for the purposes of statute of limitations is April 17, 2012, five years
before the date of Plaintiffs filing his Complaint.
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Here, all of Plaintiff's alleged acts of breach occurred before April 17, 2012. Plaintiff
alleges several instances that he believes to be breach of contract by MID: an undertow check
location change sometime in the 1990' s, a relocation of a canal on neighboring property around
the year 2000 (likely MID's relocation of a canal in 1998), and some modifications by MID and
requests for modifications by Plaintiff sometime in the l 990' s. (Bliss Depo., 44: 17-52:1).
Plaintiff has alleged instances of supposed breach that occurred more than seventeen years prior
to the filing of this suit. Seventeen years falls well outside of the applicable five-year statutory
period for written contracts, as well as the four-year statutory period for oral contracts. Plaintiff
has not provided any further instances of alleged breach of any existing contract within the
applicable statutory periods. Plaintiff's breach of contract claims must fail because they were not
brought within the applicable statute of limitations. Therefore, summary judgment is appropriate
on Plaintiff's breach of contract claims, and they should be dismissed with prejudice.

F. Count IV Must Fail Because Plaintiff Has Failed to State a Claim for which
Declaratory Relief can be Granted.
Plaintiff has included a claim for declaratory relief in his Complaint as Count IV.
However, Plaintiff has not made any allegations regarding any acts or omissions by MID or its
employees as to state a claim upon which declaratory relief can be granted. Declaratory
judgments and requests for declaratory relief under Idaho law are governed by the Uniform
Declaratory Judgment Act, codified under Idaho Code§ 10-1201, et seq. To warrant grant of
declaratory relief, there must be a real and substantial controversy admitting of specific relief
through a conclusive decree rather than through a merely advisory opinion as to what the law
would be upon a hypothetical state of facts, and the plaintiff's danger must be present. See Wylie
v. State, Idaho Transp. Bd. , 253 P.3d 700, 151 Idaho 26 (2011). As such, a declaratory judgment
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action must involve a justiciable controversy. Paslay v. A &B Irrigation District, 162 Idaho 866,
869, 406 P.3d 878,881 (2017).
"Idaho has adopted the constitutionally based federal justiciability standard." Id (quoting
Davidson v. Wright, 143 Idaho 616, 620, 151 P.3d 812, 816 (2006)). Standing is an essential

element of a justiciable claim. Van Valkenburgh v. Citizens for Term Limits, 135 Idaho 121, 125,
15 P.3d 1129, 1132 (2000). Standing requires (1) a distinct injury in fact, (2) fairly traceable to
the conduct from which a plaintiff seeks relief, and (3) a substantial likelihood that the requested
relief will remedy or prevent the injury. Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 , 112
S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992); Coal.for Agric. 's Future v. Canyon Cnty., 160 Idaho 142,
146,369 P.3d 920,924 (2016); Schneider v. Howe, 142 Idaho 767, 772, 133 P.3d 1232, 1237
(2006). "Standing may be predicated upon a threatened harm as well as a past injury." Id. (citing
Harris v. Cassia Cnty., 106 Idaho 513,516,681 P.2d 988, 991 (1984)). However, the injury

must be "actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical." Tucker v. State, 162 Idaho 11, 19,
394 P.3d 54, 62 (quoting State v. Philip Morris, Inc., 158 Idaho 874,881,354 P.3d 187, 194
(2015)). Since standing is jurisdictional, it can be raised at any time, and the Court has a duty to
raise it sua sponte. Arambarri v. Armstrong, 152 Idaho 734, 738, 274 P.3d 1249, 1253 (2012)
(citations omitted).
Plaintiffs claims for declaratory relief is not justiciable because he has failed to allege
any rights or status at issue that are actually in controversy. Within his Complaint, Plaintiff
alleges the following rights: (I) access to adequate water for his crops; (2) requirements for
water deliverability; (3) control of noxious weeds; and (4) director meetings open to the public.
Plaintiff has not alleged any facts that the aforementioned rights have been breached or are
threatened or endangered. Plaintiff has not presented any actual and existing facts of a right to
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"adequate water" beyond the water he is entitled to under his water right, and has not provided
evidence to suggest MID has failed to provide the water to which he is entitled. Plaintiff has not
pied any facts alleging that MID did not make water deliverable pursuant to times and schedules
set forth by MID. Plaintiff has not pied any facts alleging that MID failed to control noxious
weeds upon and within its own canals and ditches. Plaintiff has not established any specific right
requiring MID to control noxious weeds on Plaintiff's own property. Lastly, Plaintiff has not
pied any facts alleging that MID has not made director meetings open to the public. As such,
without alleging any facts showing an actual controversy, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim
upon which declaratory relief can be granted.
Further, Plaintiff's claim for declaratory reliefrelative to the control of noxious weeds
fails because Plaintiff himself has a duty to remove noxious weeds along MID' s right-of-way on
his property. Idaho Code § 22-2407 provides that "[i]t shall be the duty and responsibility of all
landowners to control noxious weeds on their land and property." LC. § 22-2407(1) (West
through 2018). MID has provided removal of noxious weeds on property bordering irrigation
canals, ditches, and appurtenances when necessary and economically feasible. (Davidson Aff., ,i
5). However, pursuant to LC. § 22-2407(1 ), it is still incumbent upon landowners themselves to
remove and control noxious weeds on their property. Plaintiff has not identified any source
imposing a duty on MID to control noxious weeds on Plaintiff's property. Any alleged failure to
control noxious weeds is due to Plaintiff's own failure to remove noxious weeds pursuant to LC.

§ 22-2407(1 ), and Plaintiff cannot seek declaratory relief to require MID to control noxious
weeds on his property for him. As such, there is no justiciable issue for declaratory relief within
Plaintiff's Complaint. Therefore, summary judgment is appropriate as to Count IV of Plaintiff's
Complaint, and it should be dismissed with prejudice.
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II.

DEFENDANT'S COUNTERCLAIMS.
A. There is No Genuine Issue of Material Fact that Plaintiff Trespassed by
Constructing a Crossing Without Permission.
Summary judgment should be granted on Defendant's counterclaim for trespass because

there is no genuine issue of material fact that Plaintiff constructed a crossing into and over
Lateral 1712 without permission from MID. Idaho law clearly states that an owner of a canal has
an obligation to clean, repair, and maintain its canals. See Sellers v. Powers, l 120 Idaho 250, 815
P.2d 448 (1991); see also I.C. §§ 42-1102 and 42-1209. Idaho Code§ 42-1102 provides MID a
right-of-way across Plaintiffs property along Lateral 1712, and indicates that the right-of-way
shall include, but is not limited to, the right to enter the land across which
the right-of-way extends, for the purposes of cleaning, maintaining and
repairing the ditch, canal or conduit, and to occupy such width of the land
along the banks of the ditch, canal or conduit as is necessary to properly do
the work of cleaning, maintaining and repairing the ditch, canal or conduit
with personnel and with such equipment as is commonly used, or is
reasonably adapted, to that work.
LC. § 42-1102. Section 42-1102 also reveals in relevant part, "[t]he existence of a visible ditch,
canal or conduit shall constitute notice to the owner, or any subsequent purchaser, of the
underlying servient estate, that the owner of the ditch, canal or conduit has the right-of-way and
incidental rights confirmed or granted by this section." As such, the existence of a visible canal is
prima facie evidence of a valid right-of-way in favor of the owner of the canal. It is undisputed
that Lateral 1712 is a visible canal on Plaintiffs property, thus granting a right-of-way to MID.
Section 42-1102 continues:

No person or entity shall cause or permit any encroachments onto the
right-of-way. including public or private roads, utilities, fences, gates,
pipelines, structures, or other construction or placement of objects, without
the written permission of the owner of the right-of-way, in order to ensure
that any such encroachments will not unreasonably or materially interfere
with the use and enjoyment of the right-of-way. Encroachments of any
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kind placed in such right-of-way without permission of the owner of
the right-of-way shall be removed at the expense of the person or
entity causing or permitting such encroachment, upon the request of
the owner of the right-of-way, in the event that any such encroachments
unreasonably or materially interfere with the use and enjoyment of the
right-of-way.
(Emphasis added). The owner of the ditch is the dominant estate holder, whereas the landowner
where the ditch is located is the servient estate holder. See, e.g., Abbott v. Nampa Sch. Dist. No.
131, 119 Idaho 544, 549-50, 808 P.2d 1289, 1294-95 (1991). Thus, the owner of the servient

estate is permitted to make use of the property to the extent that it does not unreasonably
interfere with the dominant estate owner's enjoyment of the easement. See Carson v. Elliott, 111
Idaho 889, 890, 728 P.2d 778, 779 (Ct. Ap .. 1986); Boydstun Beach Ass 'n v. Allen, 111 Idaho
370, 377, 723 P.2d 914, 921 (Ct. App. 1986).
Idaho Code § 42-1209 mirrors LC. § 42-1102, and prohibits any person or entity from
causing or permitting any encroachment onto the right-of-way, " including any public or private
roads, utilities, fences, gates, pipelines, structures or other construction or placement of objects,
without the written permission of the irrigation district." Pursuant to the above authority,
encroachments of any kind are prohibited in the easement unless the servient landowner received
permission from the irrigation district.
Here, it is undisputed that Plaintiff built and continues to maintain a crossing over Lateral
1712 without permission from MID. As such, Plaintiffs structure is unlawfully encroaching on
Defendant's right-of-way. There is no genuine issue of material fact that Plaintiff trespassed into
MID' s right-of-way by building a crossing into and over Lateral 1712 without permission from
MID. Plaintiff originally sought to build a crossing over Lateral 1712 in March 2013, at which
time he was told by Dan Davidson that he would have to get permission from the Bureau of
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Reclamation before MID would agree to let Plaintiff build the crossing. Additionally, MID
provided Plaintiff with a "Request to Cross Waterway" document, which MID told Plaintiff
would need to be signed in order to get permission to build the crossing. Without signing the
" Request to Cross Waterway" and without obtaining permission for the Bureau of Reclamation,
Plaintiff proceeded to build the crossing anyway in 2013. (Bliss Depo., 62:1-10, 70:20-71 :21).
Plaintiff has maintained the crossing since 2013 without receiving any permission from MID or
the Bureau of Reclamation. (Id.) Plaintiff received a written request from MID that he remove
the crossing in 2014, but he has refused to remove the crossing, and it remains there to this day.
(Bliss Depo., 71 :22-73 :8).
There is no genuine issue of material fact that Plaintiff built a crossing on MID' s right-ofway. Additionally, there is no genuine issue of material fact that Plaintiff did not receive
requisite permission under I.C. § 42-1102 to build the crossing. Finally, there is no genuine issue
of material fact that Plaintiff has not removed the crossing at the request of MID, and that he
continues to maintain the trespassing crossing to this day. As such, there is no genuine issue of
material fact remaining for trial that Plaintiff is engaged in an ongoing trespass upon MID's
right-of-way. Therefore, summary judgment is appropriate as to MID's counterclaim for
trespass.

B. Defendant is Entitled to Declaratory Relief for Encroachments Plaintiff Built on
Defendant's Right-of-Way.
MID should be granted declaratory relief to restrain Plaintiff from trespassing onto
MID's right-of-way along Lateral 1712 by placing and/or erecting encroachments on the rightof-way. MID is entitled to declaratory relief because it has established a justiciable, real and
substantial controversy of a right being threatened by ongoing behavior by Plaintiff. Specifically,
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Plaintiff has trespassed upon MID' s right-of-way by building and maintaining the crossing over
Lateral 1712 without permission from MID.
Plaintiff is maintaining a continuing trespass onto MID 's right-of-way, limiting MID' s
ability to operate, repair, and maintain its canals, ditches, and water appurtenances. Plaintiff has
indicated that his trespass will continue. (Bliss Depo., 73: 1-12). There is no genuine issue of
material fact that MID 's rights with regard to its access and control of its right-of-way are
threatened by Plaintiffs trespass, and that declaratory relief is necessary to prevent further
trespass by Plaintiff. Therefore, summary judgment is appropriate as to MID's counterclaim for
declaratory relief.
CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, Defendant requests that the Court grant its Motion for Summary
Judgment, and that all of Plaintiffs claims be dismissed in their entirety and with prejudice.
DATED this ~

day of March, 2018.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF MINIDOKA

VICTOR RODGER BLISS,

Case No.: CV-2017-334

Plaintiff,
vs.
MINIDOKA IRRIGATION DISTRICT,

MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Defendant.

COMES NOW PLAINTIFF VICTOR RODGER BLISS, pursuant to Rules 7 and 56 of the
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure and hereby respectfully submits this Memorandum in Opposition
to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, with accompanying exhibits.
STATEMENT OF DISPUTED MATERIAL FACTS
1.

"Defendant Minidoka Irrigation District is an irrigation district ... Membership of the

district is involuntary, with assessments collected once a year on all property held by landowners
having MID water rights on their property. MID does not have any agreements, written or oral,
with members of the district."
Disputed Material Fact: Beginning on approximately February 11, 1927, and as early as March
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15, 1926 1, Defendant Minidoka Irrigation District (hereafter referred to as "MID") entered into a
series of written contracts with the United States of America, Department of the Interior, Bureau
of Reclamation, providing for management of water rights and easements. (See first and last
pages of Minidoka Project Contracts, dated 02/11/1927, 03/19/1929, 01/01/1935, 03/02/1936,
12/12/1950, 02/02/1960, 08/24/1961, 07/22/1980, and 08/02/1985 attached hereto as "Exhibit
1"). As a landowner with water entitlements covered by these contracts, Bliss receives irrigation
water from MID pursuant to implied contract, quasi-contract and trust relationships wherein
MID is required to provide and deliver water to each of the district landowners. (See Deposition
of Victor Rodger Bliss taken November 9, 2017, relevant portions of which are attached hereto
as "Exhibit 2", at 38:8-10; 39:13-16; 40:3-10; 42:18-20; cf. Idaho Const., Art.15, Sec.4&5).
2.

MID delivers irrigation water to members having water right appurtenant to their property.

MID builds, repairs, and maintains canals, ditches, and structures to deliver water to landowners
having water rights appurtenant to their property. MID regularly repairs and maintains canals,
ditches, and water appurtenances that are under its operation and control. MID has no duty to build,
maintain, or repair the private canals, ditches, or structures owned by district members.
Disputed Material Fact: MID does not deliver water to Bliss which he is entitled to receive.
(Exhibit 2 at 47: 11-13). MID does not maintain their canals, ditches, and structures, allowing
weeds and grasses to grow and disrupt water flow. (See Deposition of Prank Hunt (Former
Chaitman of Board of Directors of MID), relevant portions of which are attached hereto as
"Exhibit 3", at 11:4; 63:4-12; Deposition of Wes Goff(Former Member of Board of Directors of
MID), relevant portions of which are attached hereto as "Exhibit 4", at 10:12-25, 11: 1-9, 11 :21-

1
Bates# DEFENDANTS 000311 indicates there was a previous contract dated March 15, 1926, however, Bliss was unable to locate a contract
with this date produced by MID in this case.
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23, 12: 10-20, 17:5-9, 32: 1-4, 34:6-12; Deposition of David Warr (Ditch Rider for MID), relevant
portion of which are attached hereto as "Exhibit 5", at 6:3-11; 28:19-22; 46:24-25; 47:1-9; 49:47; Two Pictures of MID Canal on Bliss property, attached hereto as "Exhibit 6"). An MID
ditchrider "mostly ... guess(es)" how much water to turn down to a water user such as Bliss
when an order is placed. (Exhibit 3 at 30:8-22).
4.

Members receive water from MID by requesting delivery of water with a ditch rider, who

is tasked by MID with distributing water. ... The member landowner is tasked with ordering the
delivery of water from the ditch rider and notifying the ditch rider when the member desires to
halt delivery of water.

Disputed Material Fact: Ordering water from a ditch rider is only one way MID has provided
for members to receive water; another way is by contacting Board Members who are over the
canal area servicing the particular member, or the Chairman of the Board. (See Minidoka
Irrigation District Operating Policies dated February 28, 1994, attached hereto as "Exhibit 7", at
P .2, Par. l O (no specific requirement to contact ditch rider to order water); Voluntary Statement
of Frank Hunt dated August 24, 2016, attached hereto as "Exhibit 8" (" ... it sounds like he
[Bliss] needed more water in the ditch .... [m ]y intent was the he [Bliss] would turn a little more
water at the head of the ditch.... "); Exhibit 3 at 31 :20-21; Deposition of Danny John Davidson
taken March 12, 2018, relevant portions of which are attached hereto as "Exhibit 9", at 116: 1011 ("And if there's a problem with the ditch rider, he [farmer] should talk to the watermaster.").
An MID ditchrider "mostly ... guess( es)" how much water to turn down to a water user such as
Bliss when an order is placed. (Exhibit 3 at 30:8-22).
5.

MID does not allocate a specific amount of water to each acre or member. Rather, members

are authorized to divert, onto acres with a MID water right appurtenant, sufficient water to grow a
Page 3 of 39

Page 163

crop, if water is available. MID water can only be delivered onto acres that have a MID water right
appurtenant. The amount of irrigation water available to each member landowner from MID is not
dete1mined by any agreements, written or oral, between the member and MID.

Disputed Material Fact: An MID ditchrider "mostly ... guess(es)" how much water to turn
down to a water user such as Bliss when an order is placed. (Exhibit 3 at 30:8-22). MID is to
"keep a flow of water therein sufficient to the requirements of such persons as are properly
entitled to the use of water therefrom ... " LC. §42-1201. There are measured agreements
between MID and Bliss controlling the amount of irrigation water available to Bliss during any
specific order. (Exhibit 9 at 44:9 to 45:16; 48:12 to 51:8).
6.

MID occasionally removes noxious weeds within its easements and right-of-ways along

irrigation canals, ditches, and appurtenances which MID owns, operates and controls. MID only
provides this service when necessary and economically feasible, and does so to the best of its ability
within time constraints and resources available.

Disputed Material Fact: MID is capricious and arbitrary in its maintenance responsibilities and
does not remove noxious weeds within its easements or rights-of-way, canals or ditches along
the Bliss' property. (Exhibit 3 at 34:18-22; Exhibit 4 at 10:12 to 11:15, 18:17 to 19:12, 20:9-17;
Exhibit 5 at 29:23 to 30:6; 46:24 to 47:12; 49:4-7; Exhibit 6).
8.

MID has provided at least one headgate to allow Plaintiff to divert irrigation water into his

property.

Disputed Material Fact: The headgate Bliss must use to access his water is ineffective in
allowing Bliss to consistently divert sufficient irrigation water. (Exhibit 3 at 11 :2-11, 21: 12-16,
27:11-17; Exhibit 4 at 11 :21-23, 12:10-20, 17:5-10, 29:2-6, 32:1-4, 34:6-12; Exhibit 9 at 94:914; 101 :13 to 102:11).
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9.

In 1998, MID moved a canal that ran along Plaintiffs property. MID deposited dirt that was

necessarily excavated from the canal onto the canal bank. The canal has a high bank, with dirt
deposited along its sides.

Disputed Material Fact: MID wrongfully placed dirt/soil on Bliss' property partially covering
and destroying boundary fencing on at least two different occasions: once in 1998 and again
about 4-5 years ago. (Exhibit 2 at 113:9-13, 116: 19-25, 117:9-11; Exhibit 4 at 10:17-24; Exhibit
9 at 42:10-11).
11.

As the property owner, Plaintiff has historically requested delivery of water by contacting a

MID ditch rider. Plaintiff has never been denied delivery of water by MID, but has on some
occasions had delivery only temporarily delayed until sufficient water was available for Plaintiffs
diversion. Plaintiff has never been given approval to divert more than the amount of water required to
irrigate the 75.87 acres. Despite never being denied delivery, Plaintiff has made multiple reports,
written and oral, to MID complaining about not receiving as much water as he would like to have
delivered to the 75.87 acres ofland leased by the Woodlands. Neither Alan nor Debra Woodland
have ever reported to MID that they have received less water than the amount entitled upon request,
nor have the Woodlands complained of, or filed a tort.

Disputed Material Fact: The Board of Directors of MID upon inspecting MID's delivery of
water to Bliss described it as a "Mickey Mouse setup," lower water than desirable, wasting
water, and (MID) "in the wrong on this." (Exhibit 3 at 11:4-11, 27:11-21; Exhibit 4 at12:10-20,
17 :5-23, 31 :25 to 32:4, 34:6-12). The amount of water Bliss is entitled to receive is 4 to 5 acre
feet per acre of ground. (Exhibit 9 at 48:12 to 50:8). An MID ditchrider "mostly ... guess(es)"
how much water to tum down to a water user such as Bliss when an order is placed. (Exhibit 3 at
30:8-22). Bliss had to drill a new well because he was unable to get enough water from MID

Page 5 of39

Page 165

canal system. (Exhibit 2 at 129:2-15).
12.

Plaintiff voluntarily installed a filter screen at the headgate that is used to divert water onto

the 75.87 acres which creates a restriction that encumbers his ability to deliver water onto his
property.

Disputed Material Fact: A landowner, such as Bliss, has authority from MID to place a filter
screen in front of their headgate. (Exhibit 9 at 91 :14-17). A screen is necessitated in Bliss' case
by the fact that MID does not maintain Bliss' ditch. (See Disputed Material Facts from
paragraphs 2 & 6 above; Exhibit 2 at 125:5-14). The Board of Directors of MID upon inspecting
MID's delivery of water to Bliss described it as a "Mickey Mouse setup", lower water than
desirable, wasting water, and that (MID) was "in the wrong on this." (Exhibit 3 at 11 :4-11,
27:11-21; Exhibit 4 at 17:5-9; 32:1-4; 34:6-12).
14.

On June 29, 2016, Plaintiff met with Frank Hunt, then a member of the Minidoka Irrigation

District Board of Directors, regarding some concerns he had about the amount of water he was
receiving. Specifically, Plaintiff was concerned that a pump in his i1Tigation system was not receiving
enough water. Plaintiff informed Mr. Hunt that pipe movers had informed him that there was not
enough water in his ditch, and that the pump would have to be turned off. Mr. Hunt then told Plaintiff
"it sound[ed] like he needed more water in the ditch." Mr. Hunt did not make any recommendation
to Plaintiff to remove the lock, chain, or wheel from the check structure, and he did not make an
agreement with Plaintiff to provide him more water.

Disputed Material Fact: During Mr. Hunt's meeting with Bliss he observed a lock and chain
on the headgate. (Exhibit 3 at 12:1-5, 23:16-21, 27:11-21). Mr. Hunt, knowing there was a
chain and lock that would stop Bliss from turning the gate, told Bliss, he "needed more water."
(Exhibit 3 at 30:23 to 32: 1; Exhibit 8). Mr. Hunt explained that during his whole life the
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individual landowners had regulated and "tweaked" headgates. (Exhibit 8). Mr. Hunt further
stated, "[m]y intent was that he (Bliss) would turn in a little more water at the head of the ditch."
(Exhibit 8).
16.

That same day, Vance Johnson, assistant watermaster for MID, spoke with three other

farmers in the district, Luke McCall, and Ryan and Randy Knopp. Luke McCall and Ryan
Knopp informed Mr. Johnson that they had witnessed Plaintiff and his wife cut the padlock and
chain off the check structure. Mr. Johnson eventually managed to call Plaintiff, who began to
yell and swear at Mr. Johnson. Plaintiff told Mr. Johnson that he had he had cut the lock and
chain and lowered the headgate himself.
Disputed Material Fact: Plaintiff objects. The facts presented are inadmissible hearsay

pursuant to Idaho Rules of Evidence, Rule 802.
17.

Mr. Johnson's conversation with Plaintiff was overheard by other MID employees,

namely Ruth Bailes and Dan Davidson. When Mr. Johnson asked Plaintiff if he had removed the
lock, chain, and wheel used to adjust the check structure, Ms. Bailes and Mr. Davidson heard
Plaintiff say some variation of "Hell yeah I took it, and you're not getting it back."
Disputed Material Fact: Plaintiff objects. The facts presented are inadmissible hearsay

pursuant to Idaho Rules of Evidence, Rule 802.
18.

MID contacted the Minidoka County Sheriffs and reported Plaintiffs activity. Deputy ·

Ron Stumph responded to MID's complaints, and took witness statements from Mr. Johnson, Ms.
Bailes, Mr. Davidson, and Mr. Hunt. ... after the Plaintiff reimbursed MID $75.00 on November 7,
2016 for the cost of a lock, chain, and check structure wheel.
Disputed Material Fact: MID is an entity and therefore an employee or agent of MID would

have had to make a call or report to law enforcement on behalf of MID, therefore, Plaintiff
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objects on the basis ofldaho Rules of Evidence, Rule 601 and 602. Moreover, Plaintiff objects
as the facts presented are inadmissible hearsay pursuant to Idaho Rules of Evidence, Rule 802.
Mr. Hunt was aware of the lock and chain, low water at Bliss' headgate, and told Bliss he needed
more water, and his intent was for Bliss to turn more water in. (See Disputed Material Facts at
paragraphs 12 & 14). Plaintiff further objects that he reimbursed MID $75.00 on the basis that
there is no citation to the record for this alleged fact, and furthermore that this evidence is
inadmissible pursuant to Idaho Rules of Evidence, Rule 502.
20.

Plaintiff incmTed costs associated with defending his criminal suit, and he believes a MID

employee holds him in lower esteem. Plaintiff has testified that he is not aware of having lost any
business as a result ofMID's alleged actions.

Disputed Material Fact: Bliss sustain multiply categories of damages relating to MID's alleged
actions, such as legal fees and costs; damage to his reputation; damage to fencing; receiving less
water and no maintenance on the canal/ditch servicing his property resulted in lost time, business
and earnings and increased costs for Bliss. (See damages worksheet provided to MID, attached
hereto as "Exhibit 10"; See Letter from EGB to MID dated February 28, 2017, attached hereto as
"Exhibit 11"; Exhibit 5 at 6:3-11, 28:19-22, 46:24 to 47:9, 49:4-7; Exhibit 4 at 10:12 tol 1:9).
21.

On April 17, 2017, Plaintiff filed his Complaint in the instant action. However, Plaintiffs

Complaint did not include the same defamation claim as his March 6, 2017 notice of tort claim.
Instead, Plaintiffs Complaint included claims for breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty,
trespass, declaratory relief, wrongful prosecution, and intentional infliction of extreme emotional
distress. MID has not received any other notice of tort claim from Plaintiff describing any of the
claims stated in Plaintiffs Complaint.

Disputed Material Fact: Notice of Bliss' claims has been provided to MID on numerous
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occasions, with multiply responses received denying each claim. (Exhibit 10 & 11; See Circle
Triangle Ranch Invoice dated 7/23/2015 - DEFENDANTS 000022, Letter from Flectcher to
Bliss dated 8/12/2015 -PLA 001091, Letter from EGB to Flecher dated 9/9/2015 - PLA
001092-94; Letter from Fletcher to EGB dated 10/20/2015 - PLA 001095-96, Letter from EGB
to Fletcher dated 11/23/2015 - PLA 001097-99; Letter from ICRMP to Grover dated 3/10/2017
-PLA 001120, Letter from ICRMP to Grover dated 5/4/2017 -DEFENDANTS 000058, all
attached hereto as "Exhibit 12"). The Chairman of MID Board Frank Hunt recognized that
"Victor Bliss has had complaints against M.I.D. Some of them probably are legitimate ... ", yet
failed to resolve Bliss' legitimate complaints. (Exhibit 10 at first paragraph; Exhibit 3 at 9:8 to
10:12).
ADDITIONAL FACTS

1. On June 28, 2016, Frank Hunt, then a member and Chairman of the Board of Directors
for MID who has authority by state statute to" ... do any and every lawful act necessary to
be done that sufficient water may be furnished to the lands of the district for irrigation
purposes" said to Bliss it sounds like you need more water. (Exhibit 8; LC. §43-304).
2. Mr. Hunt, after having visited the Bliss property received a call from Bliss later that
evening and in the context of the conversation he was having with Bliss regarding Bliss
not having sufficient water, authorized Bliss to take necessary measures to get more
water by saying, " ... it sounds like you need to have more water turned in the ditch."
(Exhibit 3 at 21:1-16; Exhibit 8).
3. Mr. Hunt was also aware from his earlier visit to the Bliss property that the headgate
Bliss would need to adjust to raise the water level in the ditch had a lock and chain on it.
(Exhibit 3 at 23:16-21, 27:15-17).
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4. Frank Hunt stated "[m]y intent was that he (Bliss) would turn in a little more water at the
head of the ditch." (Exhibit 8).
5. Chairman Hunt also states that, "All my life (and my father before me), we would tweak
the head gate. When the lateral got too low, we would open it up a touch; when it was
too full, we would lower it. My neighbors all did the same ... So without saying anything
more to him I left it at that." (Exhibit 8).
6. Mr. Hunt, as Chairman of the Board of Directors for MID, inspected Bliss' access to
irrigation water and described it as a "Mickey Mouse setup"; the rest of the Board kind of
agreed, and that just an overtop of the spill would work better. (Exhibit 3 at 11 :5-11 ).
7. Frank Hunt, Chairman of the Board for MID stated, "[f]or at least a couple of years,
Victor Bliss has had complaints against M.I.D. Some of them probably are legitimate ..
." (Exhibit 8).
8. Mr. Goff, a former Board Member of MID, also stated the recommendation was to
change the headgate for the water to flow over rather than a combination of over and
under because, "[r]ight now where it flows underneath, it still wastes a lot of water
because they're not going to regulate it at the end." (Exhibit 4 at 17:5-9).
9. Wes Goff stated the headgate servicing Bliss that "nobody can regulate it. It's just a fight
all the time." (Exhibit 4 at 15:22-23).
10. Wes Goff stated, "I was kind of disgraced to be on the Board. That's why I told one of
our Board members, Ron Kowitz, I told him, I said, I am ashamed to be on here anymore.
You know, it just didn't seem like - they hadn't got any respect. I mean, it works both
ways, you know. Management needs respect too, but I don't think some of our water
users got the respect they deserved." When asked if Bliss is one who does not get
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respect, Goff responded, "Yes, I do." (Exhibit 4 at 20:6-15).
11. " ... after I seen the problem and seen what it was, I called our other Board member, Ron
Kowitz, told him, I said, Ron, you need to go out and look at it. I says, We are in the
wrong on this. So he was going to go out and look at it." (Exhibit 4 at 34:6-11).
12. MID's Board of Directors have visited Bliss' property to investigate Bliss' claims against
MID. (Exhibit 3 at 10:13-20).
13. Bliss' property naturally drains into a dry drain ditch to help ensure his property does not
flood during spring runoff. (Exhibit 3 at 63 :4-14).
14. In the spring, MID places a plug in Bliss drain ditch to keep the irrigation water which
also uses the same dry drain ditch, from running backwards onto the Bliss property.
(Exhibit 3 at 63:4-14).
15. The Bliss' drain ditch plug should be placed by MID into the comer of the drain ditch in
the Spring to prevent irrigation water from backing up onto Bliss's property, and
removed in the fall to allow for spring runoff to drain naturally to the Goyne Sump, but
there has been a year or two, one being 2016-17, that MID failed to take the plug out
causing flooding. (Exhibit 3 at 63:4-14; Exhibit 9 at 27:23 to 28:5, 28:25 to 29:11, 34:2023; See three pictures showing drain plug and removal during late winter/early spring to
allow for runoff water, attached hereto as "Exhibit 13")
16. On April 26, 2016, "Manager Davidson reported that he had left the plug out of the drain
to see how it will work this year. Chair Hunt assured Mr. Bliss that the District will
continue to monitor the situation and be responsible for its water. (See MID Board of
Director Minutes from April 12, 2016, attached hereto as "Exhibit 14", at P.1464,
DEFENDANTS 000129).
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17. On August 11, 2015, MID engaged Attorney Fletcher to respond to Bliss' claims against
MID for failing to maintain of the ditch lateral serving Bliss' property and deny Mr.
Bliss' claim of $2,015.00. (See MID Board of Director Minutes from August 11, 2015,
attached hereto as "Exhibit 15", at P.1428, DEFENDANTS 000124).
18. On October 19, 2015, at a Special Meeting of the MID Board of Directors, "Attorney
Fletcher discussed the additional crossing that Victor Bliss has installed in Lateral 1712.
He clarified that the Bureau has agreed to the crossing but that Mr. Bliss will have to
complete the required paperwork for authorization with them rather than MID." (See
Exhibit 3 at 59:8-22; MID Special Meeting of the Board of Directors, Minutes from
October 19, 2015, attached hereto as "Exhibit 16", at P.1464, DEFENDANTS 000129).
19. The MID Board of Directors then passed a motion stating: "Mr. Bliss has been told by
the Bureau of Reclamation that they will consent to the crossing ... ". (Exhibit 3 at 59:822; Exhibit 15).
20. Once the MID Board of Directors voted on this motion, all dealings concerning the
crossing on Bliss' property were turned over to the Bureau of Reclamation, who in turn
approved the application of Bliss and begin its communication and negotiation with Bliss
to finalize a written agreement. (See Letter from US Bureau Reclamation to Davidson
dated 11/24/2015 -DEFENDANTS 000023-24, Letter from US Bureau Reclamation to
Bliss dated 6/9/2016-PLA 001208-09, Letter from EGB to US Bureau Reclamation
dated 07/08/2016-PLA 001102-03, Letter from US Bureau Reclamation to EGB dated
07/27/2016-PLA 001221-22, all attached hereto as "Exhibit 17").
21. On April 12, 2016, Robert "Hap" Boyer came before the Board to discuss the Lateral
1712 alteration issues concerning Victor Bliss' property. He stated that he had met with
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Mr. Bliss and his family, as well as Manager Davidson and other Bureau of Reclamation
(BOR) employees. He reviewed the alterations to Lateral 1712 that have occurred since
1993, and the concerns with where the lateral was located on the Knopps' and McCalls'
properties. He stated that the lateral could possibly be located on the Bliss' property and
that it may need to be moved to allow for MID' s easements without affecting the Bliss'
property. (Exhibit 14 at 1464).
22. MID Directors, counsel for MID, and MID employees have discussed claims submitted
by Bliss for weed spraying, maintenance, water overflow, property damage, lateral
roadway, crossing, unequal treatment, and a public records requests, although denying
Bliss's claims. (See Exhibit 12; Exhibit 14; Exhibit 15; Exhibit 16; Exhibit 17 at PLA
001208-09; MID Board of Director Minutes from October 13, 2015, attached hereto as
"Exhibit 18", at P.1428, DEFENDANTS 000138-39; Deposition of Ruth Elizabeth
Stansbury Bailes taken February 28, 2018, relevant portions of which are attached hereto
as "Exhibit 19" at 67:24 to 68:6, 69:13 to 70:2, 74:4-12).
ARGUMENT
I.

PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS

A. The Idaho Tort Claims Act does not bar Plaintiff's Counts II, III & V.
Contrary to Defendant's argument, the Idaho Tort Claims Act does not bar Plaintiffs
Count II- Breach of Fiduciary Duty, Count III- Trespass, or Count V - Wrongful
Prosecution/IIED. "The Idaho Tort Claims Act, LC. §§6-901 to 929, governs the liability of
government entities and political subdivisions for damages arising out of negligent or otherwise
wrongful acts or omissions." LC. §6-903; City ofChubbuckv. City ofPocatello, 127 Idaho 198,
203 (1995). Under the Idaho Tort Claims Act, a claimant must present and file his claim to the
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clerk or secretary of the political subdivision within 180 days from when claim arose or
reasonably should have been discovered. LC. §6-906.
However, the Idaho Tort Claims Act does not apply to claims for contract breaches. City
of Chubbuck at 203. And the Idaho Tort Claims Act does not bar claims for which Idaho has not
recognized a cause of action. Hagy v. State, 137 Idaho 618, 621-2 (Ct App 2002). The Idaho
Tort Claims Act does not apply to Plaintiffs Counts II & III. Alternatively, if this comi does
rule the Idaho Tort Claims Act applies to counts II and III, all notices of claims were presented
within the confines of the Idaho Tort Claims Act. Similarly, all notices of claims were presented
within the confines of the Idaho T01i Claims Act on Count III.
1.

The Idaho Tort Claims Act Does Not Apply to Plaintiff's Counts II & III.

The Plaintiffs Counts II & III are based upon a contractual obligation and therefore not
subject to the Idaho T01i Claims Act. The Idaho Tort Claims Act does not apply to claims for
contract breaches. City of Chubbuck at 203. If an action is based upon rights held and
responsibilities due under an ... contract, it is unnecessary to pursue the issue of the
applicability of the Idaho Tort Claims Act. County of Kootenai v. Western Casualty & Surety
Co., 113 Idaho 908, 916 (1988). County of Kootenai dealt with an insurer's responsibility to
pay under an insurance contract when a sheriffs office conducted an improper execution sale. Id.
The lower court refused to apply the Idaho Tort Claims Act reasoning it was inapplicable in a
contract case. Id. The Idaho Supreme Court refused to address the applicability of the Idaho
Tort Claims Act. Id.
Similarly, with Bliss' case, the duties owed by MID under Bliss' Count I - Breach of
Fiduciary Duty claim and Count II -Trespass claim all emanate from MID's implied contract and
quasi-contract duties as a trust holder of Bliss' water rights.
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Whenever any waters have been, or shall be, appropriated or used
for agricultural purposes, under a sale, rental, or distribution
thereof, such sale, rental, or distribution shall be deemed an
exclusive dedication to such use; and whenever such waters so
dedicated shall have once been sold, rented or distributed to any
person who has settled upon or improved land for agricultural
purposes with the view of receiving the benefit of such water under
such dedication, such person, his heirs, executors, administrators,
successors, or assigns, shall not thereafter without his consent, be
deprived of the annual use of the same, when needed for domestic
purposes, or to irrigate to the land so settled upon or improved,
upon payment therefor, and compliance with such equitable terms
and conditions as to the quantity used and times of use, as may be
prescribed by law. Idaho Constitution, Art. I 5, Sec.4
"The irrigation district law regards the irrigation district as a unit, and as a legal entity,
holding title to its property and water rights in trust for the uses and purposes set forth in that
law." Bradshaw v. Milner Low Lift Irrigation District, 85 Idaho 528, 547, 381 P.2d 440, 450-1
(1963). "A trust creates a fiduciary duty relationship in which the trustee is the holder oflegal
title to the property subject to the beneficial interest of the beneficiary." Dbsi/Tri VP 'ship v.

P'ship v Bender, 130 Idaho 796,809,948 P.2d 151 (1997). The failure of the Manager of the
State Insurance Fund to comply with Idaho code sections to distribute dividends to policyholders
was grounded in contract. Farber v. Idaho State Ins. Fund, 152 Idaho 495,497,272 P.3d 467
(2012).
Similarly, Bliss' causes of action for Breach of Fiduciary Duty and Trespass are sounded
in contract law under the premises that MID holds the water rights of Bliss in trust for him to
receive the benefit. Just as a manager of an insurance fund as a contractual obligation to
distribute dividends to policyholders, MID has the obligation to distribute water belonging to
Bliss through their canal system and deliver it to Bliss. MID obtains their authority or lack
thereof to be present on Bliss' property pursuant to their contractual obligations with the Bureau
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of Reclamation. The Counts for Breach of Fiduciary Duty and Trespass and therefore sounded
in contract law and the Idaho Tort Claims Act does not apply.

2.

The Idaho Tort Claims Act is Satisfied Because All of Plaintiff's Claims
Were Submitted in Compliance Therewith.

Bliss filed several notices with MID that satisfy the Idaho T01i Claims Act. The record
shows that MID had ample written notices to know of all of Bliss' complaints against MID. "A
claim filed under the provisions of this section shall not be held invalid or insufficient by reason
of inaccuracy in stating the time, place, nature or cause of the claim, or otherwise, unless it is
shown that the governmental entity was in fact misled to its injury thereby." LC. §6-907. The
court in Smith, explains that Smith's claim would be insufficient "only if the city can establish
that it was thereby misled to its injury." Smith v. City ofPreston, 99 Idaho 618, 621. In this
instance, MID has not been misled as to Bliss injuries. MID has notice and opportunity to know
Bliss' claims against MID
Bliss begin sending his notices with the delivery of his statement on July 23, 2015. (See
Exhibit 12). When a denial was sent by MID's attorney, Mr. Fletcher on August 12, 2015, Bliss
sent another notice on September 9, 2015 through his attorney's office. (See Exhibit 12). When
another denial was sent on October 20, 2015 by Mr. Fletcher again, Bliss sent a third notice on
November 23, 2015. (See Exhibit 12). On February 28, 2017, Bliss sent another notice to MID.
(See Exhibit 11 ). In all there have been at least four (4) separate notices sent to MID that comply
with Bliss' notice requirements under the Idaho Tort Claims Act.
"The primary function of notice under the ITCA is to put the government entity on
notice that a claim against it is being prosecuted and thus apprise it of the need to preserve
evidence and perhaps prepare a defense." Blass v. County of Twin Falls, 132 Idaho 451, 452-53,
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974 P.2d 503, 504-05 (1999) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Smith v. City of

Preston, 99 Idaho 618, 621, 586 P .2d 1062, 1065 (1978). In this case, Bliss and his attorney
have contacted MID and/or its attorney in at least four (4) different written notices, regarding
Bliss' claims. (Exhibits 11 & 12). Furthermore, MID's Board of Directors admit that some of
Bliss' claims are meritorious. "For at least a couple of years, Victor Bliss has had complaints
against M.I.D. Some of them are probably legitimate ... " (Exhibit 8).
Similar to Bliss' case is Cox v. City ofSandpoint, 140 Idaho 127, wherein the city of
Sandpoint tried to argue for dismissal of claims under Idaho Code §50-219, which refers back to
the requirements ofldaho §9-600 Idaho Tort Claims Against Governmental Entities (hereafter
"ITCA"). Sandpoint argued that Cox had failed to file a claim pursuant to ITCA. Id. at 129.

Cox's correspondence regarding his claims began between Cox's attorney and the City of
Sandpoint' s attorneys in 1993. Id. The parties continued negotiations trying to resolve their
dispute until Cox filed suit against the city in 2001. Id. The record does not provide any
additional information about correspondence or formal notice given between Cox and Sandpoint
City other than billing statements Cox sent prior to commencing the action against the city. The
Court in Cox found that "There is no express format for a claim under the ITCA." Id. at 131. As
a result of the attorneys of the parties engaging in discussions, the Court found that Cox had
reasonably put the City of Sandpoint on notice because the City was aware of Cox's claims and
the need to preserve evidence and prepare a defense. Id. at 132. The Court concluded by
vacating the summary judgment ruling and remanding it to the district court, awarding Cox
attorney's fees for the appeal. Id.
Similarly, in this case, Bliss and his Counsel have previously been in negotiation with
MID's attorney in an attempt to resolve Bliss' dispute with MID. Bliss and his Counsel sent at
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least four (4) different written notices. (Exhibits 11 & 12). Like the Cox case, as a result of the
parties not being able to reach a resolution to their differences, Bliss was forced to commence
this action against MID for MID's past and continued breaches, bad acts and behavior. MID's
claim of not having notice is disingenuous, especially since MID's attorney discussed the notices
and correspondence he received with the MID Board as reflected in board minutes, letters of
correspondence from MID's insurance regarding Bliss' claims and letters between the attorneys
themselves. (Exhibits 11, 12 & 15 - 19).
Defendant had written and actual notice of Plaintiffs claims. Plaintiff's claims were
submitted to MID where they were discussed with Mr. Davidson, Mr. Fletcher, ICRMP and the
Board. The claims were even written into minutes of the board meetings. MID sent their own
Board of Directors to Bliss' property to view and investigate Bliss claims. According to Mitchell
v. Bingham Memorial Hosp., 130 Idaho 420,424, 942 P.2d 544, 548 (1997) quoting Pounds v.
Denison, 120 Idaho 425, 426-27, 816 P.2d 982, 983-84 (1991)) the purpose of the requirement is

to: (1) save needless expense and litigation by providing an opportunity for amicable resolution
of the differences between the parties, (2) allow authorities to conduct a full investigation into
the cause of the injury in order to determine the extent of the state's liability, if any, and (3)
allow the state to prepare defenses."
MID has had ample notice and opportunity to resolve Bliss' claims, however, MID has
simply refused to address the claims or denied them entirely. MID has had their Board of
Directors at Bliss' property to investigate his claims. Former Chairman of the Board Frank
Hunt, who also visited Bliss' property, acknowledges that Bliss has legitimate complaints.
(Exhibit 8). MID has had ample notices and opportunities to investigate Bliss' claims as
evidence by the various array of MID principles and agents involved in reviewing, analyzing,
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discussing, investigating, and denying those claims.
The record shows that MID had at least four (4) written notices to know of all of Bliss'
complaints against MID. Therefore, Bliss has satisfied the notice requirements under the Idaho
Tort Claims Act. Summary Judgment should be denied.

B. MID has a Fiduciary Duty to provide Water to Landowners and Maintain its
Ditches and Canals.
MID's authority is created by statute. IC §43-101 et seq. However, MID's authority is
tempered by the Idaho Constitution, Article 15, Secs 4 & 5. "These constitutional provisions
apply to irrigation districts ... The district holds title to the water rights in trust for the
landowners. The landowners, to whose lands the water has become dedicated by application
thereon to a beneficial use, have acquired the status and rights of distributees under Const., Art
15 §§ 4 and 5. Bradshaw v. Milner Low Lifi: Irrigation District, 85 Idaho 528 at 545,381 P.2d
440 (1963) quoting Nampa & Meridian Irr. Dist. v. Barclay, 56 Idaho 13, 47 P.2d 916, 100
A.L.R. 557 (emphasis added). Similar to granting authority to a trustee to act on behalf of a
beneficiary, MID has been granted authority to act on behalf of the districts landowners. The
assessments MID is paid are to be used for the benefit of the landowners by allowing MID to
maintain canals and ditches and provide for delivery of water to the landowners of the district. If
MID is not maintaining its ditches and canals or failing to deliver water to the landowners then
MID is not fulfilling its fiduciary duties imposed by statute.
MID is required to maintain it canals and ditches in good order and repair, ready to
deliver water by the first of April in each year. LC. §42-1202, §42-1203, §42-1204. MID's
exclusive monopoly on delivering water to its landowners requires close adherence to duties
imposed by statutes since, as with all monopolies, there is no incentive to provide better service
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at a cheaper cost. MID's argument is essentially an argument for inefficiency. Since MID holds
governmental authority, the courts are the landowners only remedy to question whether MID is
in fact fulfilling the fiduciary duties and obligations MID owes the landowner. The use of
landowners' property (water & easements) and money (assessments paid to MID) create a
fiduciary relationship in which landowners depend on MID to act according to their best interests
by adhering to the obligations set forth implied contract and state statute.
1.

MID failed to maintain the canals and embankments in good repair (not an
act of God) which resulted in damage to Bliss' property.

Although MID argues it has no obligation to manage flood waters, MID misses the point,
in that it fails to acknowledge that part of maintaining its ditches includes placing and removing
an earth plug each year at the end of a drain ditch on Bliss' property, which it uses to control its
own waters during the water season. MID does correctly point out some of its duties owed to
Bliss under Idaho Code Sec. 42-1204, which states,
The owners or constructors of ditches, canals, works or other
aqueducts ... upon the lands owned or claimed by them, or upon
other lands, must carefully keep and maintain the same, and the
embankments, flumes or other conduits, by which such waters are
or may be conducted, in good repair and condition, so as not to
damage or in any way injure the property or premises of others.
(emphasis added).
MID is aware that this plug in the drain ditch interferes with Bliss' property adequately
draining, yet MID failed to remove the earthen plug in the fall 2016 resulting in Plaintiffs
property flooding the following spring of 201 7. Owners of canals are responsible for their own
acts or omissions. LC. §42-1203 - 1204. Frank Hunt former chairman of the board of MID
admitted MID neglected to take the plug out of the drainage ditch to allow for spring runoff.
" ... the plug is put in during the summertime to keep the water
running backwards down this dry drain ditch. And then it's
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supposed to be taken out in the fall so that when the spring runoffs
come, in those years that we have a runoff, the water goes down to
that drain ditch. And the plug is out, so it continues on into another
drain ditch. And I am also aware that there's been a year or two
that they forgot to take the plug out." (Exhibit 3 at 63:4-12).
Mr. Hunt's testimony illustrates no plug - no flood. Mr. Hunt establishes two things: 1)
Acknowledgement that MID has an obligation to maintain their ditches which includes routinely
removing and replacing a plug in a drain ditch they utilize; and 2) MID did not remove the plug
from Bliss' drain ditch. MID erroneously alleges that the spring runoff (an act of God) is the
cause of Plaintiff's property flooding while ignoring MID's failed actions to remove the plug
resulting in Bliss' property being flooded. This is the exact factual dispute that prohibits
summary judgment from being granted in this case.
Since MID admits they failed to remove the plug and maintain the drain ditch system,
summary judgment is inappropriate as it is a disputed fact that MID's plug and failure to
maintain the ditch was the cause of Bliss' property to flood.
2.

MID owes a fiduciary duty to Bliss.

MID owes Bliss fiduciary duties. "Establishing a claim for breach of fiduciary duty first
requires a finding that a fiduciary relationship exists .... Generally speaking, where one party is
under a duty to act or to give advice for the benefit of the other upon a matter within the scope of
the relation, a fiduciary relationship exists." City ofMeridian v. Petra, Inc., 154 Idaho 425,441
(2013).
. .. [F]iduciary relationships are commonly characterized by one
party placing property or authority in the hands of another, or
being authorized to act on behalf of the other....
The term fiduciary implies that one paiiy is in a superior position
to the other and that such a position enables him to exercise
influence over one who reposes special trust and confidence in him
... Id.
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The legal title to all property acquired under Title 43 vests in the irrigation district, but" .
. . shall be held by such district in trust ... " LC. §43-316; Nelson v. Big Lost River Irr. Dist., 148
Idaho 157, 162, 219 P .3d 804, 809 (2009). MID admits that it owes landowners specific duties
as prescribed by LC. §42-1201 - 1206. As a holder of water rights and easements, MID is a
Trustee to Bliss. The trustee's obligations and responsibilities to its beneficiaries, such as Bliss,
enure to the benefit of Bliss who, in this case, is a landowner and water user within MID's
district. "The district holds title to the water rights in trust for the landowners. The landowners,
to whose lands the water has become dedicated by application thereon to a beneficial use, have
acquired the status and rights of distributes under Const., Art 15 §§ 4 and 5. Bradshaw at 545.
Moreover, officials of a district would be in breach of trust if they use any district water rights
for the benefit oflands outside district boundaries. L.B. Yaden v. Gem Irrigation Dist., 37 Idaho
300,302 (1923).
MID is simply wrong in arguing it owes no duty to act in Bliss' best interest or on his
behalf, since this argument is ignorant of the clear, long established, principle of law that MID
holds the water and easements in trust for the benefit of its users. Since MID is holding the
water in trust for Bliss, MID owes a fiduciary duty to protect Bliss' interest in the water and
easements.
Therefore, it is clear, and as a matter of law, MID owes fiduciary duties to Bliss in this
case. MID's request for summary judgment is inappropriate.

3.

MID breached its fiduciary duties when it failed to adhere to its obligations
owed to Bliss.

MID argues that summary judgment is appropriate because it does not owe a duty
specific to Bliss. However, MID's argument acknowledges Idaho statutes whose specific
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purpose is to regulate MID's behavior for the benefit of the individual landowners of MID's
district. MID's argument is particularly disturbing since it dismisses outright notions that MID
owes any sort of duty to its individual landowners. MID' s relationship with its landowners could
be comparable to shareholders in a company in that MID cannot act in an oppressive way
towards its members. A breach of a fiduciary duty occurs when "oppressive" conduct by those
in control in te1ms of "fiduciary duties" owed by the majority shareholders to the minority and
the "reasonable expectations" held by the minority shareholders in committing their capital and
labor to the particular enterprise. McCann v. AfcCann, 152 Idaho 809, 815 275 P.3d 824;
quoting Balvikv. Sylvester, 411 N.W.2d 383,386 (N.D. 1987).
In this instance MID is depriving Bliss of a fair return on his investment by taking his
assessments yet failing to comply with state statutes outlining its duties owed to Bliss. Bliss has
entrusted MID with both property (water & easement) and money (assessment) that MID would,
according to state statute and case law, provide water for him to use on his land. MID claims
that it owes Bliss nothing, highlighting the "oppressive" conduct discussed in A1cCann,
especially where MID who has control and owes a fiduciary duty to Bliss refuses to carry out its
obligations owed to Bliss. Bliss has no reasonable alternative way to access water for his entire
property.
Here are a few examples of MID failing to fulfill its fiduciary duties owed to Bliss:
1) MID breached its duty to" ... keep a flow of water therein sufficient to the requirements of
such persons as are properly entitled to the use of water therefrom ... " as is shown from the

following evidence. See LC. §42-1201. (emphasis added)
"And even though everything was running good at the time, I
agreed that it would be better if the ditch was fuller. I also noticed
a locked headgate controlling the amount of water going past his
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pump to downstream users. I also noticed that the only way a ditch
rider could check on the water level at the pump was to walk
nearly a quarter of a mile to the pump. There is [sic] no roads. This
makes it difficult to monitor the ditch level." Exhibit 3 at 27:11-21
"And then that evening he (Bliss) called me up and said that his
pipe movers had shut the pump off because there wasn't enough
water to feed the pump without it cavitating. And I told him, I
says, Well, it sounds like you need to have more water turned in
the ditch." Exhibit 3 at 21: 12-16
"I spent two or three hours with Victor and went home. Later that
evening I received a call from Victor saying that the pipe movers
had decided there was not enough water in the ditch and shut the
pump off. He asked what was he to do? I said it sounds like he
needed more water in the ditch. I though(t) that was a brilliant
statement, backed by a lifetime of irrigating ... My intent was that
he would turn in a little more water at the head of the ditch."
(Exhibit 8).
"I went out to look at a problem he was having getting water
delivered to his headgate. It was going past his and not being held
back for him." Exhibit 4 at 11 :21-23.
" ... after I seen the problem and seen what it was, I called our
other Board member, Ron Kowitz, told him, I said, Ron, you need
to go out and look at it. I says, We are in the wrong on this. So he
was going to go out and look at it ... " Exhibit 4 at 34:6-12.
"To have it all go over the top, you know, to eliminate this
headgate and have everything, you know, flowing over. Right now
where it flows underneath, it still wastes a lot of water because
they're not going to regulate it at the end ... " Exhibit 4 at 17:5-9.
" ... we're not holding portions of these canals like we should be.
Believe me, I'm a flood irrigator, and pressure is---either you'll get
ahead of water or you waste water." Exhibit 4 at 32:1-4.
With respect to fixing the problem by eliminating the undertow
gate, Mr. Goff said, "I didn't know I would have needed to. I
thought it was one of those-I shouldn't have to be running the
canals. I see a problem, and I would think that the management
should have enough smarts to fix the problem." Exhibit 4 at 29:26.
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" ... There's a staff gauge here and there, but I don't think anybody
ever looks at them. If they do there would be more consistent flow
of water." Exhibit 4 at 35:24 to 36:1.
2) MID breached its duty owed to " ... maintain the banks of canals in good order and repair so
they are ready to receive water ... shall construct the necessary outlets in the banks of the
ditches, canals or conduits for a proper delivery of water to persons having rights to use of
the water" as is shown from the following evidence. See LC. §42-1202.
"And we come to the conclusion that that was a little bit of a
Mickey Mouse setup, that it was a combination undershot headgate
and an overtop spill .. .It just seemed to me, and I think the rest of
the Board kind of agreed, that just an overtop of the spill would be
better ... " Exhibit 3 at 11 :4-11.
"The problem with the -the way the water was delivered to his
headgate. It wasn't being able to be checked off like it was in the
past. It had an undertow, and it was letting the water suck through
it ... It's a quarter of a mile through there, but two thirds of the way
through it's got quite a fall. So without any kind of check in there,
it would be hard to hold that water back. The undertow, when it
gets low on volume, it would just suck everything away from
him." Exhibit 4 at 12:10-20.
3) MID breached its duty to" ... shall carefully keep and maintain the embankments thereof in
good repair, in order to prevent the water from wasting during the irrigation season ... " as is
shown by the following evidence. See LC. §42-1203
"We went out as a Board and looked at the situation. And as far as
my knowledge, it was supposed to have been taken care of, but---"
"It was supposed to have been sprayed and the dirt cleaned back up
off the fence." "Yeah, we pretty much directed the manager to get
it taken care of." "He might have sprayed some weeds. I don't
remember. If they did, they didn't do a great job. There was
willows, and they just kept growing up." (The willows were) "Six,
eight feet. They're above your head good." Exhibit 4 at 10:12 to
11:9
When asked if MID mowed or sprayed, Mr. Hunt responded "We
probably did not. .. " Exhibit 3 at 34:20-22.
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"Q. And have you been the ditch rider for that time on Mr. Bliss's
lateral?
A. Yes. I've been out there since working there, yes.
Q. Are there other ditch riders that work that same lateral, or do
you have that exclusive responsibility?
A. I have that exclusive responsibility as long as I am working
there ...
Q. Does MID maintain that part of the canal at all?"
A. As far as I am - as far as I know, we do, but I've personally
never maintained that." Exhibit 5 at 6:3-11, 28:19-22.
"Q. Have you observed any willows growing on the ditch bank that
were required to be removed in the area?"
A. "There were - I don't know what type of tree they were, but
there was a string of them on the south - or north bank for
probably, maybe, 100 yards or so."
Q. Are they there now?
A. No, they are not.
Q. Do you know who removed them?
A. I do not know." Exhibit 5 at 46:24-25; 47:1-9.
"Q. And then just for verification in this photo here, you haven't
sprayed or controlled any of the ditch bank growth in this area; is
that correct?
A. I have not." Exhibit 5 at 49:4-7.
"Q. But if there were - to the best of your knowledge, if there were
some sort of maintenance that was done by MID, it would be
recorded in a report and provided to you?
A. Counsel? Yeah. And we would have provided it to you."
Exhibit 19 at 48:23 to 49:3.
Material facts above show that MID failed to fulfill their statutorily mandated
responsibilities owed to Bliss. MID has not delivered water to Bliss, not maintained their canals
and banks, and trespassed on Bliss's property destroying his fence and property. MID cannot
hide behind an argument of collective obligation to the district rather than a specific obligation
owed to its individual members. When asked how MID treats its water users, Former Board
Member of MID Wes Goff stated, "I - the last couple of years I was on the Board, I was kind of
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disgraced to be on the Board ... I'm ashamed to be on here anymore ... I don't think some of our
water users got the respect they deserved." (Exhibit 4 at 20:3-13). Mr. Goff continues on and
states that Victor Bliss is one of those water users who didn't get respect from MID. (Exhibit 4 at
20:3-17).
Summary Judgment is not appropriate when MID, as an entity serving as tmstee for the
beneficiary water users of the district, is failing to meet its obligations to Bliss.

4.

The Statute of Limitations is met when MID continues to breach its fiduciary
duties.

MID cannot claim a statute oflimitations bars Bliss' causes of action when the harm
being caused to Bliss continues and has not abated. Since the harms Bliss claims are continuing
the statute oflimitations does not apply. A tort should be analyzed for the purpose of time
limitations according to whether it is simply one complete act with ensuring damages, or whether
it consists of a series of continuous activities. Curtis v. Firth, 123 Idaho 598, 602, 850 P.2d 749,
753 (1993). MID continues to act contrary to Bliss' interests refusing to deliver water and
refusing to maintain its easements. "A continuing tort has been defined as: one inflicted over a
period of time; it involves a wrongful conduct that is repeated until desisted, and each day
creates a separate cause of action. A continuing tort sufficient to toll a statute of limitations is
occasioned by continual unlawful acts, not continual ill effects from an original violation."
Curtis at 603, 754 (quoting 54 C.J.S. Limitation ofActions, § 177, at 231 (1987)).

The material facts above show MID is not acting in accordance with state statutes on
behalf of Bliss. Each time Bliss orders water, he is being denied the water to which he is
lawfully entitled because the stmctures, headgates, and maintenance on the MID canal is so poor
MID cannot deliver water to Bliss' headgate sufficient for him to receive to run his pump. The
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events described above are within the statute oflimitations and MID's continued failures and
breaches of its obligations (continued unlawful acts) owed to Bliss create a continuing tort for
which the statute of limitations is tolled.
In a similar case, a defendant obstructed a stream bed which prevented water from
flowing onto plaintiffs' property for four consecutive years. Woodland v. Lyon, 78 Idaho 79, 298
P.2d 380 (1956). The court held that "the tort herein alleged is not a single wrong, but a
continuing one, and appellant may, if the evidence supports his claim, recover for all injuries
occurring within the statutory period, even though the obstruction occurred more than four years
before the complaint was filed." Id. at 83, 381. It is clear that Woodland actually referred to
continuing damages resulting from one tortious act, rather than continuing acts. Curtis at 603,
754.
Similar to the Plaintiff in Woodland, the change in the MID canal lateral affecting Bliss,
the under toe check, the drain plug, and the other modifications, are causing continuing damage
to Bliss. Each time Bliss orders water, his rights are being trodden upon because he can't get his
water, his pump cavitates and must then be shut off to prevent further damage. Even though the
structural changes to MID' s canal may have occurred more than four years before the Bliss'
complaint was filed, the continuing wrong is ever present and will continue into the future unless
remedied.
As such, Bliss' breach of fiduciary duty claim is not bared by the statute of limitations.
C.

Trespass Claim is Not Barred by the Statute of Limitations Since it is Continuing.

As similarly stated regarding continuing tortious actions above, a continuing diversion of
water from a watercourse to the injury of a water proprietor is a continuing trespass for which
damages may be recovered for all injuries occurring with in the period of limitations. Woodland
Page 28 of 39

Page 188

at 83, 381-2.
1. The Statute of Limitations is Tolled when the Trespass has not been abated.

As described above, a continuing tort tolls the statute of limitations and is as if each day
creates a separate cause of action. Curtis at 603-4, 754-5. In this instance, MID continues to
trespass on Bliss' property. MID has removed dirt from the canal piling it up against a fence that
is continued to encroach onto Bliss' property damaging his fence.
The right-of-way also includes the right to deposit on the banks of
the ditch or canal the debris and other matter necessarily required
to be taken from the ditch or canal to properly clean and maintain
it, but no greater width of land along the banks of the canal or ditch
than is absolutely necessary for such deposits shall be occupied by
the removed debris or other matter. LC. §42-1102.
In this instance MID has placed both debris and dirt that exceeds the right-of-way
encroaching on Bliss' property. " ... 6 inches of the berm was on the Bliss property, and on the
other end it was like a foot and a half. . .I think the fence posts have probably got some extra dirt
around them." (Exhibit 9 at 41: 11, 42: 10-11 ). Since MID' s own manager, who has viewed the
encroachment, admits that MID has dirt encroaching on Bliss' property, there is a genuine
dispute of material fact precluding granting summary judgment.
MID's trespass is continuing making the statute oflimitations argument irrelevant.
2. MID is Not Immune When It has Enlarged the Easement and
Exceeded it Right-of-Way.

As explained in the proceeding sections, MID admits that "extra dirt" was placed on
Bliss' property. I.C.§42-1102 allows for the removal of debris, but it does not allow for the
enlargement of the easement itself. In Abbott v. Nampa School Dist., 119 Idaho 544 at 548 808
P.2d 1289 (1991) the Court found that" ... the general rule concerning easements is that the right
of the easement holder may not be enlarged and may not encompass more than is necessary to
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fulfill the easement. Citing Coulsen v. Aberdeen-Springfield Canal Co., 47 Idaho 619,277 P. 542
(1929). The Abbott Court continued, " ... an easement does not include the right to enlarge the
use to the injury of the servient land." Citing Merrill v. Penrod, 109 Idaho 46, 704 P.2d 950
(Ct.App.1985).
In this case, MID' s own manager discusses having the property surveyed for the purpose
of dete1mining the canals placement and the removal of extra dirt from the canal. MID admits
that extra dirt was taken from the canal and placed on Bliss' property outside the scope of the
easement, resulting in dili surrounding Bliss' fence. The Abbott Corni continues citing Linford
v. G.H Hall & Son, 78 Idaho 49,297 P.2d 893 (1956), by setting forth the established rules for

ditches and canals with regards to their easements, "the right to the ditch or other artificial
watercourse is an easement, no change can be made against the landowner over whose land the
ditch passes that is burdensome to the servient tenement, or that changes the character of the
servitude; such as moving a ditch to a new place, or enlarging it." Id. (emphasis added).
"Respondent could clean the ditch and put spoilage on the bank, but could not deepen and
enlarge the ditch and dump new quantities of di1i, other than cleaning, upon the servient estate
without being liable in damages." Id. "The dominant estate has no right to enlarge its easement
merely by doing so." Id.
In this instance, MID has dumped new quantities of dirt on Bliss' property, the servient
estate after relocating its canal abutting the Bliss property. MID has covered Bliss' fence and
caused damage. MID is liable in damages for the continuing trespass on Bliss' property.

3. Bliss' Property Rights are Directly Affected by MID's Trespass.
At issue in Bliss' trespass claim is Bliss' property rights.

The Court in Alm v. Johnson,

75 Idaho 521, 523-4, 275 P.2d 959 (1954) as cited by MID, is distinguishable in its finding when
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it states, "[t]here is no dispute in this case relative to the ownership of plaintiffs land or his right
to the crops growing thereon." Id. In this case, Bliss' right to use his property and the continued
encroachment of MID on to Bliss' property challenges what interest Bliss and MID hold in Bliss
property. This is absolutely a "substantial right" that the Alm Court identified as an instance
where summary judgment would not be appropriate. Id.
A ruling in favor of MID on summary judgment would effectively result in a taking of
Bliss property contrary to Idaho case law specifically stating that MID cannot enlarge its
easement. Additionally, determining damages of MID's trespass is extremely fact sensitive
making summary judgment inappropriate. Bliss has disclosed the damages to his fence. (Exhibit
10). Bliss' should not be placed with the burden of proving his case on Summary Judgment,
rather Bliss has shown that sufficient material facts exist to deny summary judgment.

D.

MID Wrongfully Prosecuted Bliss When It Sought Criminal Charges Against Him
for His Authorized Action.
1. MID is Not Immune From Suit.

MID argues that it is immune from Bliss' malicious prosecution claim because there are
no facts to show "malice or criminal intent". See LC. §6-904. However, MID ignores the
uncontroverted fact in this case that the Chailman of the Board, Frank Hunt authorized Bliss to
remove the lock and chain from the headgate so that Bliss could get more water. Mr. Hunt
testified that he was aware of the lock and chain on the headgate when he had gone out onto
Bliss' property earlier in the day. Mr. Hunt also stated that "[m]y intent was that he (Bliss)
would tum in a little more water at the head of the ditch." (Exhibit 8). Mr. Hunt's statement
shows that he was aware that in order for Bliss to get more water he would need to remove the
lock and chain from the headgate to control the water going past Bliss' headgate.
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As Chairman of the Board of MID, Mr. Hunt had direct authority to allow Bliss to change
the water so that Bliss' pump would not cavitate. I.C. § 43-304 states specifically that the board
of directors of an irrigation district may ... "do any and every lawful act necessary to be done that
sufficient water may be furnished to the lands in the district for irrigation purposes." Mr. Hunt's
actions were in accordance with I.C. §42-1201 which requires MID to "keep a flow of water
therein sufficient to the requirements of such persons as are properly entitled to the use of water
therefrom ... "
MID failed to provide sufficient water to Bliss; gave Bliss authority to increase the water
flow so that he would have sufficient water; and then maliciously sought criminal charges
against Bliss for exercising the authority he had been granted. These facts show malice and
criminal intent on the part of MID employees to harm Bliss. Bliss was harmed is a result of
MID's malicious actions in drafting false factual statements to criminally prosecute him. MID
maliciously called law enforcement, turning over five intentionally false statements from
employees lying about Bliss' authority, and then demanded Bliss be criminally prosecuted.
There are sufficient facts showing a genuine dispute as to wrongful prosecution, and
therefore MID's motion for summary judgment should be denied.

2. MID provided inconsistent statements resulting in Bliss arrest.
MID misstates Idaho law on the requirements for wrongful prosecution when it argues
that MID is not a "prosecutor". "To prove malicious prosecution a plaintiff must make a prima
facie showing of six elements: (1) prosecution of the plaintiff; (2) termination of the prosecution
in favor of the plaintiff; (3) that the defendant instigated the prosecution; (4) that the defendant
was activated by malice; (5) that there was a lack of probable cause to arrest the plaintiff; and (6)
that the plaintiff sustained damages." Herrold v. Idaho State Sch. For Deaf & Blind, 112 Idaho
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410, 411-12 (1987) (emphasis added). There is no requirement that MID be the prosecutor, only
that MID instigated the prosecution.
It is undisputed that Bliss was charged by the Minidoka County Attorney with a crime,

and that the charges were dismissed, in favor of Bliss. There is also no dispute that MID
Chairman Frank Hunt, and employees Dan Davidson, Ruth Bailes, Amber Christensen, Vance
Johnson, and David, along with Attorney Fletcher all prepared statements/e-mails instigating the
prosecution. (Exhibits 8 & 20). Because the issue of authority was maliciously misstated by
MID employees, probable cause would have been lacking for the arrest/charges. MID ·
intentionally sought and pursued criminal charges against Bliss without probable cause since
MID itself had told Bliss to remove the lock. MID's duplicitous statements illustrate malice
towards Bliss by trying to have criminal charges brought against him for exercising the authority
granted him from Frank Hunt.
MID's false statements and attempt to have Bliss prosecuted establish material facts
which show malicious prosecution. Summary Judgment is not appropriate and should be denied.

3. MID has Intentionally Acted Duplicitously resulting in Emotional Distress to
Bliss.
As set forth above, Bliss has shown facts that demonstrate "atrocious" and "beyond all
possible bounds of decency" to establish IIED with the false statements, intentionally made to
seek prosecution of Bliss, regarding his lack of authority to adjust the water. MID knew that
Bliss needed more water for his farm and MID authorized Bliss to open the headgate to get more
water, but then sought to criminally prosecute Bliss after he did as he was authorized to do by the
head of MID. MID's conduct with this respect was intentional and reckless. To pursue criminal
action against Bliss when MID either knew or should have known that Mr. Hunt had given Bliss
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pennission to open the headgate to get water is outrageous. MID's actions resulted in Bliss
suffering damages, including emotional harm. The pressure of getting sufficient water from
MID while also facing MID pursuing Bliss criminally resulted in severe emotional distress,
including the real possibility of being labeled a pariah in the community.
While Bliss being an-ested as a result of MID's contradictory behavior, Bliss has also
suffered emotional distress as a result of MID' s continued interaction and refusal to address any
of Bliss' problems regarding the water MID holds in trust. In analyzing a claim for Intentional
Infliction of Emotional Distress with respect to a statute of limitations the Court in Johnson v.

A1cPhee and JCAV, LLC, 147 Idaho 455, (Idaho App. 2009) 210 P.3d 563 stated, "[s]ince
usually no single incident in a continuous chain of tortious activity can" fairly or realistically be
identified as the cause of significant harm," it seems proper to regard the cumulative effect of the
conduct as actionable."

Here in this case, Bliss has had so many unrealistic challenges with

MID in trying to get MID to perform even the most basic services its required to do by law, that
there is also cumulative effect in which MID's behavior becomes outrageous and actionable.
Summary Judgment on Bliss' IIED claim should be denied.

E.

MID and Bliss have a Contract.
Bliss and MID have entered into an implied contract in which Bliss provides MID an

easement (water & property) and an assessment (money) in exchange for MID's promise to
maintain the ditches located in the easement and delivery of water to cultivate his property. A
contract implied-in-fact is a true contract whose terms are infen-ed from the conduct of the
parties. Medeical Recovery Servs. v. V, 2018 Ida. Lexis 81 (2018). "A contract implied in law is
not a contract at all, but an obligation imposed by law for the purpose of bringing about justice
and equity without reference to the intent or the agreement of the parties and, in some cases, in
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spite of an agreement between the parties." Hull v. Giesler, 156 Idaho 765, 777 (2014). "This
type of contract is also called a quasi contract, unjust enrichment, or restitution, and is a noncontractual obligation that is to be treated procedurally as if it were a contract. Id.
As discussed above, MID has both, obligations set forth by law as to how it is to
appropriately hold the water in trnst on behalf of Bliss, and obligations set forth over the parties'
course of conduct. MID acknowledges that it has: 1) failed to maintain the ditches that service
Bliss' property by not keeping the ditch banks clear; 2) failed to keep the ditch full sufficient that
Bliss could use the water at his headgate for irrigation purposes; 3) not maintained a headgate
that allows for the proper delivery of water to Bliss 4) enlarged its right-of-way in the easement
it uses further encroaching on Bliss' property. MID admits itself that it is required by legal
statute to perfmm these services. All of these items imposed on MID by state statute are also
part of the implied agreement between Bliss and MID. MID does not provide any explanation as
to why Bliss should pay an assessment to MID if he is not supposed to expect anything in return
from MID. This would clearly be unequitable and result in the unjust enrichment of MID. There
is a clear understanding that MID will provide water and services in return for Bliss' continued
payment of assessments.
Lastly, the breaches complaint of above are also clearly continuing breaches since MID
has failed to remedy the situation that provides water to Bliss, and therefore the Statute of
Limitations is inapplicable.
Therefore, there is a genuine issue of material fact precluding granting summary
judgment to MID on Bliss' breach of contract claim.

F.

Declaratory Relief is Available to Bliss and Necessary.

Under Idaho law, comis shall have power to declare rights, status, and other legal
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relations, whether or not further relief is or could be claimed. LC. §10-1201; Paslay v. A&B
Irrigation Dist., 406 P.3d 878, 881 (Idaho 2017). The Idaho Supreme Court has long held that

the questioned right or status may invoke either remedial or preventive relief; if may relate to a
right that has either been breached or is only yet in dispute or a statue undisturbed but threatened
or endangered. Id. A declaratory judgment action must involve a justiciable controversy. Id.
Standing is an essential element of a justiciable claim. Id. Standing requires (1) a distinct injury
in fact, (2) fairly traceable to the conduct from which a plaintiff seeks relief, and (3) a substantial
likelihood that the requested relief will remedy or prevent the injury. Id. Standing may be
predicated upon a threatened harm as well as a past injury. Id. at 881-2.
Bliss' claims are justiciable. Bliss has a distinct injury in fact because he has identified
that MID fails to deliver him water, fails to maintain its canals and drains, and is trespassing on
his property. All of these actions are traceable to the conduct of MID and the requests he is
seeking to MID accountable, restore its water delivery to him, and hold open meetings. An order
of this court will certainly remedy or prevent Bliss from further harm of not receiving his water,
force MID to remove its continuing trespass, and force MID to hold public meetings in which
Bliss can be heard.
MID claims that the ditch riders are responsible for the delivery of water and
maintenance of its ditches. In this case the ditch rider for Bliss' lateral ditch states that in the six
years he has worked for MID he has never performed any maintenance on Bliss' ditch. Mr.
Warr even acknowledges that there have been trees growing on the ditch banks. Former
chairman for MID Wes Goff states that the trees on Bliss' ditch were six (6) to eight (8) feet tall
indicating substantial neglect on the part of MID. MID also acknowledged that the failure to
maintain the ditch resulted in a plug not being removed from a drainage ditch. This failure
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resulted in Bliss' prope1iy being :flooded. Finally, declaratory relief seems even more necessary
and relevant when former Board of Directors Frank Hunt and Wes Goff admit that Bliss has a
"Mickey Mouse set up" that results in his headgate receiving less water than a different type of
setup. Certainly these facts show Bliss' standing and that his claims involve justiciable
controversies.
As such, summary judgment should be denied.

II. DEFENDANT'S COUNTERCLAIMS
A. MID has No Actionable Claim for Trespass.
MID contends that Bliss has trespassed on their right-of-way as a result of Bliss
constructing a crossing. MID' s recitation of the facts however is selective at best. MID has
deferred to BOR to make a determination regarding Bliss' crossing. MID minutes for 19th
October 2015 state, "Attorney Fletcher discussed the additional crossing that Victor Bliss has
installed in Lateral 1712. He clarified that the Bureau has agreed to the crossing but that Mr.
Bliss will have to complete the required paperwork for authorization with them rather than
MID." (Exhibit 16). Given that MID's Board of Directors voted to pass the crossing agreement
to BOR, MID deferred to BOR to make a decision regarding Bliss' crossing. Moreover, MID's
own minutes from their meeting reflect that BOR had approved Bliss' crossing, resulting in the
merit of MID' s claim of trespass being suspect at best. Summaiy judgment is not appropriate
when the facts establish that MID has tacitly approved and accepted Bliss' crossing when he
received approval from BOR.
Additionally, based on MID's own logic, the statue oflimitations on pursuing a trespass
cause of action against Bliss has likely already passed, given MID waived any of its claims of
trespass in 2015 when it ratified BOR's intervention to determine the crossing, approval and
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finalization with Bliss. LC. §5-218(2) provides for a three year statute oflimitations for causes
of action regarding trespass. Based on MID' s own logic, applying the statute of limitations
would bar MID from seeking recovery.
Therefore, summary judgment should be denied.

B. MID is Not Entitled to Declaratory Relief because MID Relinquished Decision
Making Authority of the crossing to BOR.
As discussed extensively above, MID's right-of-way has encroached on to Bliss'
property. MID acknowledges that dirt, not debris, has been placed on Bliss property. MID does
not provide any argument stating facts that would support any claim of trespass other than the
crossing that Bliss received approval from the BOR. Since the crossing has been approved and
MID has elected to differ enforcement and decision making authority to the BOR, MID cannot
now seek declaratory relief which MID's Board has voted and approved in their October 19,
2015 meeting to transfer and abate to the BOR.
This further illustrates the strengths and credibility of Bliss' other claims in this suit,
specifically the breach of fiduciary duty, in part, because MID is acting beyond the scope of what
its own board of directors agreed and approved. It does not make rational sense for MID to
claim it is entitled to declaratory relief from Bliss' "trespass" on a crossing that MID's board has
ratified and acknowledged was approved by the BOR, and where Bliss is to work exclusively
with BOR not MID. MID cannot act beyond what the Board of Directors have authorized MID
to do.
For these reasons, this Comi should deny MID's request for summary judgment on its
claim for declaratory relief.

CONCLUSION
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PlaintiffVictor Bliss respectfully requests that Defendant Minidoka Irrigation Districts's
Motion for Summary Judgment be DENIED in its entirety.

DATED this 7 th day of April, 2018.

Jonathan R. Grover
r -ttomey for Plaintiff Victor Rodger Bliss
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